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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a study of the regulatory regime which governs the retail 
electricity market in the United Kingdom. It focuses in particular on the 
relationship between retailers, consumers and the regulatory authorities and 
the role of simple and transparent information in determining the price 
structure in the retail electricity market. This dissertation examines the 
development and the problems within the UK retail electricity market during 
the critical period between 2003 and 2010 and analyses the role of the 
regulatory regime in this. The study critically reviews the argument for using a 
system of market prices as the best way to provide choices and lower prices 
for consumers along with the argument for strengthening the role of the 
regulatory body in response to the interests of consumers. The study shows 
that this free market model, as favoured by retailers, has failed to provide 
consumers with either valuable choices or lower prices. It shows that 
because: 1) consumers are not able to use price information to inform their 
choices; there is relatively little ‘shopping around’ for the best price; and 2) the 
regulatory body is captured by suppliers. The study suggests improvement in 
the regulatory regime relating to information to facilitate greater efficiency in 
the retail electricity market and to increase the level of consumer protection. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
More than 27 million householders use electricity regularly in the UK. 
Electricity as an energy source has an incredible influence on our day to day 
lives and is used to power most of the technology people use on a daily basis 
from medical equipment and manufacturing machinery to residential heating, 
cooking and lighting. With the advent of new entertainment and household 
technologies that are also electrically powered it can be seen that electricity 
consumption has been significantly increasing every year for many years. 
This trend will continue, which will undoubtedly affect pricing and future 
human life.  
 
Unfortunately, retail electricity price for final consumers in the UK has been 
increasing sharply since 2003. It substantially affects most householders and 
vulnerable groups, leading them living in fuel poverty. The percentage of UK 
consumers experiencing energy poverty has doubled since whereby electricity 
prices for householders have not been reduced and have increased 
significantly, becoming higher than before the introduction of privatisation 
(DEFRA 2012; Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons, 2011). In 
relation to this, approximately 22,000 people over the age of 65 died as a 
result of cold-related illness during 2007 and 2008. This tragic issue had 
arisen from the fact that consumers had been paying too much for energy. It 
is noted that, for every 10% of energy price increase, approximately 400,000 
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people will experience fuel poverty. By mid 2009, there were approximately 
five million UK householders living in fuel poverty. (Hansard HC 10 June 
2009; Business and Enterprise Committee: Eleventh Report of Session 2007-
08; The Bow Group 2007).  
 
The UK retail electricity market 
According to the above issues, there has been an increasing focus on the 
retail electricity market sector, by scholars, stakeholders and the government. 
There are six main reasons for this. First, the retail electricity market system 
relates to three key players: electricity suppliers, householders and the 
regulator. Relationships and interactions between them have influenced 
market prices and have consequently affected public interests (Dubash 2001; 
Fox et al. 1991, quoted in Ferreira 2006).  
 
Second, the introduction of full competition or the emergence of the retail 
electricity market was expected to generate further positive effect after 
privatisation and liberalisation, in particular, lower electricity prices for 
consumers. People have been offered benefits with the opportunity to choose 
and switch service providers, as a result of this change. However, in actual 
fact, to date, prices have been increasing sharply, householders have not 
sufficiently engaged with the retail market, and many of those considered 
vulnerable have not been protected adequately through the existing 
competitive retail market and the switching process (discussed in detail in the 
next sections) (DECC Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics 2009; 
Defeuilley 2009a; Peerbocus 2007).  
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Third, concerns about fuel poverty in the UK have increased and the 
government set targets to end fuel poverty among those vulnerable 
consumers by 2010 and among all other households by 2016. The electricity 
sector is responsible for a quarter of the soaring number of households 
suffering in fuel poverty, which links to the increase in retail electricity prices 
from 2003 until now (Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons, 2011; 
DECC Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics 2009; Ofgem 2001).  
 
Fourth, any significant efficiency gain within the generation sectors emerging 
after reform are not being passed on to householders, the heaviest end-users, 
which is described as the ‘gap’ (Peerbocus 2007), with the author viewing this 
‘gap’ as the unknown obstructer which: 1) hinders consumers from obtaining 
the benefit of competition that occurs within the generation sectors; 2) leads to 
an inefficient retail market; and 3) causes a poor connection between 
electricity consumers and service providers.  
 
Fifth, awareness of the externalities of the retail electricity market system has 
become an issue, raising the focus of examining the retail market to ensure 
that the interests of consumers cannot be threatened by issues such as 
economic crisis and the requirement of EU legislation on the use and 
availability of renewable energy (Rowlands 2005; Marshall 2003; Roberts et 
al. 1991).  
 
Sixth, the regulatory policy developed has recently determined to increase 
economic and social interests, in particular focusing on adequate protection of 
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energy householders and vulnerable groups. This is associated and 
consistent with the objectives and duties of the regulatory body, Ofgem, to 
enhance these interests, with power being provided under the related national 
Acts and EU Directives such as the Utilities Act 2000 and Directive 
2009/72/EC (an amendment to Directive 2003/54/EC) (James 2009; OJ L 
211, 14.08.2009; OJ L 176, 15.07.2003).  
 
Additionally, the market has been substantially focused on even more, in 
particular where important factors within the system and other externalities 
have significantly changed. For example: recently, there have been 
substantial concerns about a reduction in competition within the system 
happening as a result of an increase in the number of vertically integrated 
companies within the energy sector, this issue highlighting the existence of 
market power (market failure) (Ofgem Achieved Press Release 2009c; 
Thomas 2002a); protecting the interests of consumers has been intensely 
focused on in response to the national Acts and EU Directives (OJ L 211 
14.08.2009; Marshall 2003; National Audit Office (NAO) 2001); as well as this, 
environmental issues at EU level have been highlighted because the energy 
sector is responsible for 28% of carbon emissions in the UK (OJ L 211 
14.08.2009; Munisamy–Doraisamy 2004; Eberlein 2001). These issues have 
had an impact on pricing, and influencing the scale of regulatory responses 
within the UK electricity industry. 
 
Especially, with regard to the relation between an uncompetitive retail 
electricity market (as a result of reduction in competition) and several issues 
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emerging such as price unfairness in relation to fuel poverty, price/tariff 
information, consumer confidence and trust, and difficulties in switching 
service supplier, with price/tariff information found to be the most critical issue.  
 
Price/tariff information has played a critical role affecting the numbers of 
customer switching supplier and the increased in the number of people living 
in fuel poverty. In fact, price/tariff information is the only prime factor used by 
energy consumers for interacting with the market. This is because there is no 
difference among electricity services provided by different companies, only 
prices. However, there have been more than 5,000 energy tariffs available 
across suppliers within the UK. Consumers have found information relatively 
complex to understand and have not received adequate quality information for 
their market participation, resulting in either them avoiding participating with 
the market or making worse choices by switching to a new, more expensive, 
supplier. Additionally, misleading information with deceptive guarantees of 
lower prices and premiums was provided by door to door sales people, 
leading many consumers to switch to more expensive suppliers and 
consequently suffering from fuel poverty (Foggo and Newell 2008; NAO 
2001).  
 
Nonetheless, also, there has been an increasing focus on the perspective of 
customer switching rate. Two main reasons account for this. First, many 
people do switch each year, but many of them end up on a worse deal, 
resulting in them having to pay much more for electricity consumption. 
Second, it is Ofgem’s assumption that, in order to have successful market 
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function, people need to engage with the market by using price information 
and switch service provider, meaning that a high switching rate refers to a 
high intensity of competition. However, in fact, there has been a survey 
showing that millions of householders have never switched and have been 
inactive to market price signals, particularly vulnerable groups. This was 
because they found market pricing information complicated and could not 
recognise the significant gains from switching; rather, they saw the possibility 
that they could be worse off if there was an error during the switching process. 
Also, the number of consumer complaints in the UK regarding switching 
service providers has notably increased; this seems to be related to the 
number of people living in fuel poverty (Defeuilley 2009a, 2009b; Which? 
2008; Ipsos MORI 2008).  
 
The current response from the regulatory body 
In response to the above issues, Ofgem, the energy regulator, launched an 
investigation known as ‘Ofgem Probe’ (Ofgem 2008), which was to examine 
retail energy market performance in order to respond to concerns about the 
function of the market for domestic consumers and small businesses. This 
was aimed at ensuring that consumers are able to fully engage with retail 
pricing and competition as well as ensuring that the retail market is efficient 
and working well. The result was announced at the end of 2008, showing that 
retail markets were efficient and suppliers were acting competitively. 
According to the Probe, the vast majority of consumers benefited from the 
establishment of retail competition as soon as the market began in 1998.  
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However, Ofgem also discovered from the study that there was an issue 
regarding the promotion of a competitive retail market which needed to be 
improved; sufficient, good information was not being effectively delivered to 
householders, particularly vulnerable groups who were gaining the least 
benefit from the competition, resulting in that they cannot always benefit from 
the market and competition. As a result, Ofgem has introduced many 
remedies and requirements in response to this problem. Perspectives on the 
extent to which these requirements have affected the system are discussed 
later. 
 
In relation to the discussion above, it is worth highlighting here that, the issue 
of information is also consistent with the requirement highlighted in the current 
EU Directive 2009/72/EC with regard to consumer protection and consumer 
rights needing to be provided through appropriate and sufficient price/tariff 
information (Official Journal of the European Union L 211, 14.08.2009). 
Clearly, information with respect to market prices and benefits to electricity 
consumers has recently become a critical issue requiring further investigation. 
 
In relation to the above, the proposal regarding consumer and energy 
regulation in response to the recent problems within the UK retail energy 
markets and the need to ensure social responsibility was discussed in the 
Parliamentary debates in June 2009. The content of the debates detailed the 
need to develop sensible regulation in order to strengthen Ofgem’s remedies 
and to obtain the right incentives, as well as stressing greater measures for an 
efficient regulatory regime, which Ofgem and the government should be 
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considering for increasing the level of consumer protection, in particular for 
the poor (Hansard HC 10 June 2009). 
 
The focus of the debate was on householders, especially vulnerable groups. 
MPs urged the government to look into how suppliers simplify and deliver the 
social scheme and information to consumers, as MPs wanted to make sure 
that vulnerable groups are on the cheapest tariff available and are being 
treated fairly within the energy retail system (Hansard HC 10 June 2009).  
 
In accordance with government policy towards greater social concern and the 
power provided under the Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act 2000, 
including the above-mentioned reasons, Ofgem introduced the role of the 
social energy tariff to make it effectively useful for all vulnerable consumers 
(social tariff is currently being replaced by the Warm Home Discount Scheme 
which is available from April 2011 to March 2015). Ofgem made sure that the 
social tariff was the cheapest deal and urged suppliers to comply with 
providing this benefit, including the availability of lowest price and energy 
efficiency grant for vulnerable consumers across the country (Smith 2009; 
Ofgem Achieved Press Release 2008i; Baker 2006). However, unfortunately, 
Ofgem has not really tackled the problem of obtaining consistent, more 
accessible and fairer social tariffs for the group of people at the bottom who 
are living in fuel poverty. 
 
Furthermore, recently, Ofgem has attempted to introduce the solution for 
current circumstances, by proposing a new scheme known as “Project 
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Discovery”; this is to study what can be done in relation to government 
intervention or to a provision of new measures and an improved regulatory 
regime to ensure the energy security of the country and the consumer benefit, 
whereby we will soon be facing many critical challenges such as the global 
and national financial crisis, and the need to invest in renewable energy in line 
with EU legislation, all of which will have a definite impact on consumer bills 
and the risk for people who live in fuel poverty. In fact, Ofgem has recently 
pointed out that householders could face an increase in retail electricity price 
of up to 60% by 2016 as a result of these issues (Ofgem 2010; Webb 2010; 
Ofgem Achieved Press Release 2009j). Clearly the indication is that reformed 
energy sectors, such as the UK electricity sector, have become important for 
consumer interests, requiring extensive investigation into how to develop 
useful strategies and the accompanying regulation in order to ensure 
sustainable benefits for consumers.  
 
Justification for the research 
The electricity sector is considered one of the largest industries in the UK. The 
sector reform includes introducing competition within the generation and 
supply sectors and delivering the benefits of competition to consumers 
(Peerbocus 2007; Woo, Lloyd and Tishler 2003). Reformed electricity sectors 
have been accompanied by a regulatory framework and practice to reach the 
goal of reformation; for that reason, regulation can drive results and 
outcomes, namely, regulatory regime is a significant factor that can increase 
the success of electricity sector reform (Munisamy–Doraisamy 2004; Levi-
Faur 2001). 
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The development of the regulatory regime within the reformed electricity 
sector is being continually discussed and studied. The major aims of studies 
regarding the development, the use of economic regulation and the means to 
impose it are to help identify the correct paths to be taken in order to increase 
public benefits and to develop them to become a standard model of 
implementation, this form being used varyingly and nationwide for correcting 
all kinds of market failures and undesirable outcomes (Waddams Price 2010; 
Pollitt 2008; Rothkopf 2007). In other words, the regulatory regime needs to 
be improved regularly in order to keep pace with uncertainty factors.  
 
According to the above, the retail electricity market has undoubtedly become 
the main focus for economic regulation, whereby the system, to date, has not 
been contributing to a balance of economic and social interests but to the rise 
in energy poverty and an inadequate consumer safeguard. The mentioned 
issues, particularly with regard to information, highlight the extent of the 
regulatory regime needing to be improved and introduced alongside these 
objectives and goals. Despite Ofgem having attempted to contribute to the 
investigation in the retail market (Ofgem Probe 2008), creating remedies and 
regulations in response to it, unfortunately, it appears that existing regulations 
still do not sufficiently address the need to protect householders, especially 
the poor. There has been no clear regulation from Ofgem that can be used 
either to maximise market participation by householders or to protect them 
from a substantial electricity price increase as a result of present and future 
issues. These include external issues such as the impact of the economic 
crisis, with an increasing number of people becoming unemployed, and as a 
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result of this, being categorised as vulnerable, as well as those people who 
are in debt and who are struggling to manage their debt commitments and to 
pay for their electricity bills. 
 
Action to improve regulations and enforcement in order to support 
householders to gain advantages from the market and to protect them from 
undesirable results, while ensuring economic efficiency, is essential. 
Therefore, this study will first provide an analysis on development in the 
regulatory regime of the UK retail electricity market, focusing on the issue of 
information relating to the interests of consumers, that is more suitable to the 
current perspective of the system and that will be useful in directing a 
regulatory framework and related regulations so as to facilitate greater 
economic interest along with increase levels of consumer protection.  
 
1.2 Research aims and objectives and methodology 
The above introduction has set out the context for the analysis within the 
dissertation. The following section outlines the main aims of the study and 
indicates the methodology that will be applied to achieve the aims and 
objectives. 
 
Research aims and objectives 
The study aims to provide an analysis on a development in the regulatory 
regime of the UK retail electricity market, focusing on the issue of information, 
in that would be more appropriate than the existing one for protecting the 
interests of consumers. This study set outs to achieve the following 
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objectives: 1) evaluating the evolution of the UK retail electricity market 
system (discussed in Chapter 4); 2) understanding the current stage of the 
problem within the retail market (discussed in Chapter 4); and 3) analysing an 
improved regulatory regime in relevance to the aspect of information and to 
the relationship between the regulator, electricity suppliers and householders, 
with these being a key element for reducing the current problem (discussed in 
Chapter 5). 
 
Methodology 
As discussed above, there are many knowledge gaps relating to an 
improvement in the regulatory regime of the UK retail electricity market and 
the interests of consumers, this becoming more important as a result of many 
challenges occurring inside and outside the market system, and affecting 
consumer benefits (discussed in detail in Chapter 3). The study therefore 
explores these issues in greater depth and investigates how the regulatory 
regime can be improved, by using a qualitative research technique that is 
interactive and constructive as a way of providing intensive study. This will 
shed light on important issues and possible solutions through the 
development of rich, in-depth information (Saint-Hilaire and Doukakis 2005). 
 
Research tools  
In order to complete the research objectives, the study uses ‘in-depth 
interviews’ as the main tool to collect primary data. This method provides a 
degree of flexibility and the possibility of modifying enquiries and related 
questions following up the interviewee’s response.  In particular, interviewing 
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experts from related organisations is the key research strategy in gaining rich 
data used in building a comprehensive understanding of all the issues. 
Importantly, this method allows the author to explore issues, key themes and 
theories, identified through the literature review with participants, while helping 
to generate ideas and arguments and to capture important data relating to 
these themes and theories, in order to, ultimately, evaluate and suggest an 
improved regulatory regime (Saint-Hilaire and Doukakis 2005; Julios 2002). 
 
The data is collected through conducting a semi- structured interview with 
over 40 relevant stakeholders and other related organisations. These are the 
expertises working directly with energy consumers and their benefits. 
Purposive sampling is used to select the participants for primary data 
collection due to the large population from all stakeholders and the limitations 
of time and restricted funding. The 40 participants are selected according to 
seven broad constituencies: 1) regulatory bodies (R); 2) consumer bodies (C); 
3) government (G); 4) scholars (S); 5) supplier sites (SS); 6) comparison sites 
(CS); and 7) journalist (J). These organisations are identified as particularly 
relevant to the issue of the UK retail electricity market. Additionally, the 
interviewee’s case number is provided (e.g. SS1), which helps to recognise 
quotes from the same interviewee throughout the text. 
 
Questioning during the interviews was focused on the relationship between 
the energy regulator, the suppliers and the consumers in relation to 
competition and market participation by consumers, the electricity service and 
the provision of price/tariff information along with various duties of the 
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regulator. Interviews were either conducted over the phone or face-to-face. All 
interviews were audio taped and transcribed verbatim.  
 
A secondary data analysis is carried out to supplement the interview findings, 
this also helping to shape the discussion of an improved regulatory regime 
outlined in the final chapter of the study. This includes the statistics regarding 
increased retail electricity prices, consumer switching rate and the related 
Directives and national Acts. These are collected from information available 
on the DECC, DEFRA, Ofgem, Consumer Focus and energy comparison 
sites websites, newspapers, press releases, Ofgem Probe, NAO and PAC 
annual reports, energy bills, etc.  
 
Analysis of findings 
In order to analyse the interview findings, the theoretical framework 
(discussed in Chapter 2) is used. The technique involves two methods of 
logical reasoning, which are the deductive and inductive approaches. These 
are applied for analysing data and for generating the answer to the research 
question. The research finally shows that we have arrived at a better 
understanding of the evolution of the UK retail electricity market along with the 
current problems facing it. Additionally, it provides a conclusion regarding 
possible improvements in the regulatory regime relating to information so as 
to help increase the levels of consumer protection.  
 
Because of the fact that this research is related to many changes involving 
time, the research timeline is fixed and is the period from 2003 to 2010, which 
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is historically related to the fact that the price cap was removed in 2002 and 
market-based regulation was then promptly introduced.  
 
Research limitations 
Research limitations are related to some issues as a result of the qualitative 
approach and technique as well as the sampling size and method, which 
include: 1) a greater risk in bias; 2) difficulty in evaluating precision and 
reliability of data; and 3) difficulty in drawing reference from interviews to 
make generalisations. Additionally, political issues may affect the internal 
validity; this is due to the fact that, during the period of research, there was a 
General Election (May 2010). A new government could have had an impact 
on improving Ofgem’s performance for a time because the authorities would 
try to favour the new government by trying to be tough with suppliers (Webb 
2010); the argument regarding a ‘captured Ofgem’ could become faulty during 
the General Election. This shows that political change could create threats to 
internal validity. 
 
1.3 Structure of the dissertation 
The dissertation comprises two parts, each dealing with different aspects of 
the study of the regulation of the UK retail electricity market. The first part 
outlines: 1) the importance of the retail electricity sector in relation to an 
improvement in the regulatory regime; and 2) the analysis of related themes 
and studies on recent issues and changes in the regulatory regime. Chapter 1 
provides an introductory overview of the regulatory regime and the current 
stage of the problems within the market relating to the interests of consumers. 
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Additionally, the chapter discusses the need to consider improving the 
regulatory regime. Chapter 2 provides the dissertation’s theoretical framework 
that will be used for an empirical analysis of the study. Chapter 3 reviews 
related literature, demonstrating the main findings in previous studies; 
information gained from the literature review contributes to the issues that 
deserve further investigation. 
 
The second part of the study reveals the evolution of the UK electricity sector. 
This includes the history of the retail market. This part also explores and 
analyses the problems occurring between 2003 and 2010 and the possible 
improvement in the regulatory regime. Chapter 4 gives a historical overview of 
the UK electricity sector over the past 20 years, detailing how the 
establishment of the retail market system developed in relation to the scenario 
of electricity price increases, this reflecting a scenario of millions of people 
living in energy poverty and the importance of improving the regulatory 
regime. Additionally, the chapter presents an analysis of both internal and 
external factors affecting electricity price movement since 2003, including the 
period under discussion between 2003 and 2010. Chapter 5 provides an 
investigation into sources of the information issue and an improvement in the 
regulatory regime associated with information used within the relationship 
between suppliers, consumers and the regulator. Additionally, the chapter 
explores the regulatory authorities’ performance, examining whether or not 
Ofgem has exercised their power efficiently (through application of regulation) 
in order to protect the interests of consumers. Finally, the dissertation shows 
possible perspective of improvement in the regulatory regime of the UK retail 
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electricity market in response to the crisis during the post-2003 period. 
Chapter 6 provides overall discussion, conclusion and some 
recommendations drawing from the findings. The contribution to knowledge 
and future research are also discussed. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
The previous chapter introduced the context of the study and showed the 
importance of improvement in the regulatory regime of the UK retail electricity 
market with relevance to the interests of consumers. It also set out the 
academic justification highlighting the value of the study, outlined its main 
aims and objectives, and described the methodological material that will be 
applied in the study. This chapter introduces the main theme of an efficient 
regulatory regime in a liberalised energy market relating to a solution for 
market failure, and provides other related thoughts regarding this area. These 
various theoretical views demonstrate the influential methods of viewing 
regulation in an energy context with relevance to economic and consumer 
interests. These reflect a standpoint of current policy environment in the UK 
with regard to reformed energy sectors. Additionally, the chapter goes on to 
review the main concepts and theories contributing to the application of 
regulation within the UK retail electricity market system.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an analytical framework for an 
empirical analysis that will be presented in the second part of this dissertation. 
Accordingly, the presentation is selectively focused in particular on the 
relationship between suppliers, consumers and the regulatory body within the 
retail electricity market, this relating to: 1) use of regulation (licence); and 2) 
the role of regulatory information applied between the above three players in 
reinforcing competition and market participation by consumers, determining 
the price structure in the market, and consequently contributing to a long-term 
solution for adequate consumer protection. Particular emphasis on consumer 
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benefit through regulatory policies and regulation is given to householders 
and those considered vulnerable, who are in a critical position and face the 
risk of falling into fuel poverty along with further undesirable outcomes in this 
era of liberalisation. 
 
The definition of an improved regulatory regime can be broadened to include 
overall improvements by defining the appropriateness of supporting a goal of 
electricity industry reform. In this study, the analysis of an improved regulatory 
regime critically highlights the aspect of social objectives for the interests of 
UK householders while ensuring retail market efficiency during the period 
between 2003 and 2010.  
 
This chapter is outlined as follows. The chapter starts with concepts of 
improved or efficient regulation that are being applied within the market 
system in Section 2.1. It includes descriptions of market, market failure, and 
relevant economic theories relating to competition, regulation, and competition 
policy currently being focused on in the energy context. Additionally, the 
perspective of social obligation is also exposed. Section 2.2 provides an 
overview of the regulatory regime within the UK retail electricity market 
system. This includes highlighting the UK model of electricity regulation. 
Additionally, the chapter reviews the use of regulation, as a form of licence 
condition with respect to the regulatory information, within the relationship 
between suppliers, consumers and the regulator. Section 2.3 provides an 
analytical overview of the dissertation’s theoretical framework. The section 
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gives a generalisation of the framework that will be used later in the analysis 
part of the dissertation, as well as providing a conclusion. 
 
2.1 Themes of a regulatory regime in a liberalised market 
As revealed in the introductory chapter, an improvement in the regulatory 
regime is important and is required to achieve an efficient market, as well as a 
consumer protection, particularly within the energy and other utility industries 
as key providers for universal service. The following shows details of the 
market, market failure, and economic theories relating to regulation, 
competition, and public policy. In addition, the perspective of social obligation 
is highlighted. With these contexts being revealed, it should contribute to a 
better understanding of: 1) an efficient regulatory regime that suits a currently 
liberalised market; and 2) how these various theoretical approaches are 
applied to the UK energy context, this framework being utilised to achieve the 
main aim previously outlined. 
 
2.1.1 Market system 
The study examines the development and problems within the liberalised 
market and argues the case for improvement in its regulatory regime. It is 
therefore important at this point to look at the nature of the market system. 
Market is a system of economic coercion. Exchange and trade of goods and 
services are voluntary and are being stimulated and determined by price 
mechanism. Market participants see themselves as making free and voluntary 
choices, this relating to purchases and sales; people choose what to produce, 
how things are being produced and the size of production (Lindblom 2002; 
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Samuels 1996; Mitchell and Simmons 1994). Market force was described by 
Adam Smith in ‘The Wealth of the Nations’ that it reflects a sense of self-
interest by sellers and buyers; market participants usually attempt to take full 
advantage from market for their self-interest and maximise the interaction 
between themselves; with these actions taking place with competition 
introduced, then the outcomes and benefits would eventually serve society. 
This situation occurs naturally without the need to apply regulation, but 
because of an ‘invisible hand’. However, Stiglitz opposed this theory, arguing 
that “there is no such thing as an invisible hand” and markets are always 
inefficient in all economies. 
 
The studies above show that the market is an economy and an open system, 
whereby an interaction between buyers and sellers is driven by prices and 
their satisfaction, and whereby this relationship is non-coerced. The only point 
that these studies have not made clear is whether or not the market force 
(from self-interest) alone can drive desirable outcomes and has a potential to 
exclusively resolve all problems without government intervention.  
 
(a) Market efficiency 
Studies have shown that market efficiency refers to an allocative and 
operational efficiency with information available (Meitner 2006; Bator 1992). 
The degree of market efficiency is critical for the explanatory power of market 
price because efficiency involves a lower or at least a less predictable pricing. 
A perfect market can be described as a market: 1) without resistance such as 
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no tax; 2) with perfect competition (this condition is very rare); and 3) with 
informational efficiency (Hackett 2006; Meitner 2006).  
 
Alternative theories by Pareto showed that market efficiency should mean a 
situation where market participants are satisfied; production and exchange of 
goods and services will occur until the equilibrium system is reached. 
However, Pareto stressed that “no one could be made better off without 
someone being made worse off”. According to Pareto, one man’s gain is 
another one’s loss, this always taking place in a normal and efficient market 
environment whereby satisfaction is specifically used as a key indicator 
(Buchanan 2001; Stiglitz 1994).  
 
The above reveals a contrasting thought regarding market efficiency. It 
appears that an efficient market is determined by several factors, leading to a 
belief that it is rare or may never occur these days. The alternative analysis by 
Pareto, seemingly, gives a sensible view of the market in the real world; the 
only concern here is whether or not losers are always small consumers.  
 
(b) Perfect and imperfect competition  
According to the above discussion, it may be worth examining carefully the 
issue of perfect and imperfect competition because a scenario of inefficient 
competition results in an inefficient market and disadvantages for consumers.  
 
Scholars looked at different indicators in evaluating the degree of market 
competition. For example, Holland (1987, quoted in Roberts et al. 1991 p.11) 
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looked at a combination of the availability of multiple firms and the loss of 
market power as decisive factors, while Roberts et al. (1991 p.11) looked at 
the relationship between the service price and the cost of producing the last 
unit of production known as a ‘marginal cost’. Additionally, Cook (2001 pp.3-7) 
referred to a competitive one with many independently - operating small 
enterprises selling a homogeneous product with which they are free to 
continue to either enter or exit the market. Additionally, sellers and buyers 
must have perfect information (see also Baumol and Blinder 2009; Kwoka and 
Madjarov 2007).  
 
On the other side of the argument with regard to the issue of imperfect 
competition, scholars gave a specific definition that it is a situation where 
market is dominated by a small number of firms and one or more firms have 
power to manipulate prices. It includes both unconcealed or tacit collusion and 
nepotism (Motta 2004; Holland 1987, quoted in Roberts et al. 1991 p.11). In 
other words, firm behaves as a price maker and not as a price taker. 
However, this point is contrast to Schumpeter’s theory, arguing that, in the 
real world of the market system, large corporate firms were replacing 
traditional family-owned business; mergers and takeovers were continually 
taking place. When this change occurred, a few large firms effectively 
developed, exercising their control over prices and goods and services, 
allowing them to plan their activities and eventually could yield benefits, which 
present in the form of secure supplies and lower prices to consumers (Mitchell 
and Simmons 1994; Brouwer 1991). Seemingly, his point of view 
underestimates the issue of output restriction as a result of price manipulation 
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by a few firms, who could frequently set up higher prices than firms in the 
competitive market would. 
 
According to the above issues, however, perfect competition could be 
possible but it is rare and close to impossible to achieve (see Section 2.1.1 
(a)). What we have realised here is that efficient competition is critically 
important for the market and for consumers. However, it is non-existent these 
days. This fact importantly reflects that it may not be necessary to judge the 
market against this standard of perfect competition (because it does not exist) 
as long as markets can either work well or come close to a perfectly 
competitive standard. The question is: what rules can be used to appropriately 
judge market performance when markets are not working well and benefits 
cannot be delivered to consumers, in order to provide a guide for the 
application of regulation to benefit people?  
 
Other than the above studies, Baumol and Sidak (1994 pp.43-45) also argued 
that perfect competition is not necessary so long as markets are performing 
best (in other words, there is no market failure), along with the benefits of the 
introduction of a liberalised market being delivered effectively to consumers. 
However, the importance is that they suggested the alternative aspect of 
viewing a relationship between a perfectly competitive market and regulation, 
by using the concept of perfectly contestable markets as a means to help the 
regulator design what rules may be utilised to evaluate market performance 
and to guide regulation.  
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Baumol and Sidak (1994 pp.43-45) clarified that a large number of buyers and 
sellers needing to exist within a perfectly competitive market does not 
necessarily have to be the case on condition that monopoly power (as a result 
of the existence of a small number of firms in the market) is likely to be 
temporary, therefore, no regulation being required. This is a situation of ‘a 
contestable market’, where entry and exit can be effortless and costless; new 
firms enter the market to earn profits but do not stay in the market as long. 
These new firms cannot exercise long- term monopoly power if others could 
also easily and cheaply (no substantial investment) enter the market. The rival 
firms would competitively offer customers lower prices, resulting in the new 
firms instantly leaving the market after earning some profits. This is a 
recurring cycle, where the existence of profits in the market would be a 
magnet for the entry of new firms, and these firms would later leave the 
market after having too many rivals existing in the market and/or potential 
profits being low. This, however, reflects that Baumol and Sidak did not see 
the absence of competition, arising as a result of the existence of a small 
number of firms, as either a failure or a disadvantage for consumers; rather, 
they saw this situation as part of market movement to benefit consumers 
(because rivals competitively offer lower service prices).  
 
On the other hand, the author views this point of a contestable market argued 
by Baumol and Sidak as a critical argument for the UK electricity market, 
because these new firms, who aim to enter the market to earn excessive 
profits, are likely to leave the market within the short term if their expectations 
are not reached. The rival firms existing in the market for a long term 
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(ongoing, not temporary) mostly gain power through vertical and horizontal 
integration within the electricity generation sectors and therefore have more 
power to low the prices for a short-term period in order to pressurise these 
new entrants to leave the market. Electricity cannot be stored and is 
generated in power stations with a long planning period. The threat of entry by 
these small new entrants (who neither own any power station nor distribution 
network) can neither provide a significant threat to the system nor sufficient 
protection to consumers. Having said that, if these new entrants cannot either 
continue to enter the market (because of expensive electricity investments) 
and to offer lower prices for consumers or stay longer in the market, but a few 
firms (with large capacity) can, the likelihood of the return of market power 
could still be high, so the disadvantages for consumers remain. 
 
From the above, most studies significantly concern a number of firms and the 
degree of market entry as a key criterion for a competitive market. However, 
in fact, other aspects relating to weakness and threats of the market system 
have also had a substantial impact on the degree of competition. In this study, 
changes taking place both in and outside the system, particularly retail pricing 
information used between suppliers, consumers and the regulator, is focused 
on as a critical criterion creating a significant impact on competition unit in this 
complicated era of liberalised market.  
 
In theory, a competitive system is expected to face the least information issue 
in order for consumers to use information for their market participation and for 
the system to effectively deliver benefits to consumers. Imperfect market 
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occurring as a result of imperfect information has been examined to clarify 
how this relates to the degree of competition. However, as suggested above, 
perfect competition or a perfect market does indeed not exist these days and 
therefore, competitive market in relation to the availability of pricing 
information has been focused on and discussed extensively in order to 
address the appropriate information required within a competitive market 
system. Some scholars verify imperfect information as a common issue 
without a necessity for government action to impose any policy in order to 
strengthen information quality in a competition unit. According to them, 
information can never be perfect and therefore a competitive market does not 
depend on perfect information. For that reason, the application of regulation 
as a solution in this regard is not recommended (Samuelson and Marks 2012; 
Pennington 2010). On the other hand, some looked at this information issue 
as the significant factor leading to a poor degree of competition and, 
ultimately, market failure. According to them, a high degree of asymmetric 
information in the market system has become the criterion determining how a 
lower competitive level in the market is (Dierks 2005; Stiglitz 2003). The 
relationship between suppliers (sellers) and consumers (buyers) does not 
hold in the environment of asymmetric information and, as a result, 
competitive condition in the system does not exist. In other words, unless the 
government intervenes, a competitive market can never take place in the 
environment of intensive asymmetric information. If not, expected benefits 
from liberalised market will not be delivered to consumers (Stiglitz 2008, 
2008a, 1994).   
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However, according to recent circumstance, imperfect information in the UK 
energy market system has been accelerated by various firms’ strategies, this 
investors creating immense asymmetric information as part of their business 
strategies for their own profits (they aim to increase poor information in the 
market for their own interests). Additionally, pricing information is usually set 
by a few large firms who have the power to manipulate price. This reflects 
how the availability of information relates to disadvantageous changes in the 
degree of competition. Ultimately, the market in the ‘real world’ is way too far 
from perfect and is totally not working, with this failing to provide consumers 
with better deal. Competitive market should have the least imperfect 
information with neither misleading and deceptive information nor 
uncompetitive price setting information. This problem, indeed, makes the 
market to be extremely imperfect. 
 
According to the theory, the availability of appropriate information in the 
competition unit, although information may not be perfect, will remarkably lead 
to an existence of competitive market. This also will allow the system to work 
effectively and finally create sustainable market efficiency. According to 
Stiglitz, government intervention in supporting competition is always 
recommended as a solution for better competition unit against all weaknesses 
and threats, particularly in the area of utilities. It was claimed that 
governmental policies supporting a provision of adequate quality information 
could help to sustain a competitive condition (Stiglitz 2008, 2008a, 1994). 
Therefore, competitive market now depends on the degree of information 
issue, especially in the retail energy system. 
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(c) Market failure 
Having discussed the issues of market efficiency and competition, it is 
important to now examine what may possibly cause an inefficient market or 
‘market failure’ and what can be an appropriate solution to this problem. Many 
scholars indicated that ‘market failure’ is a situation whereby the market is not 
efficient, resulting in an inability of the market to produce efficient outcomes. 
Additionally, the failure undermines a balance of economic and social 
interests, leading to a call for improvement in a regulatory regime (see, for 
example, Mitchell and Simmons 1994; Bator 1992; ed. Cowen 1992). For 
example, according to (ed.) Cowen (1992), ‘market failure’ is defined as the 
scenario of the inefficient allocation and distribution of goods and services that 
happens through a free market mechanism, and indicating that there are 
many factors relating to this unfavourable situation such as costs and 
externalities.  
 
On the other hand, arguments by Mitchell and Simmons (1994), Roberts et al. 
(1991 p.15) and Noll (1989, quoted in Eberlein 2001 p.32) showed that market 
failure is described as an excuse for government intervention. This 
interference includes uses of price control, anti-trust law/ competition policy, 
provision of good information for consumers, direct provision of goods and 
services, redistribution of income, etc. The aim is to correct the sources and 
consequences of market failure.  
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Market power, asymmetric information, and externalities  
The sources of market failure being investigated in this study include: 1) 
market power; 2) asymmetric information; and 3) externalities. It is important 
to now look carefully at these and how they perform and contribute to an 
unfavourable consequence of allocation and distribution of resources.  
 
First, market power is described as a situation whereby firms can alter service 
prices without the disadvantage of losing market share (see, for example, 
Defeuilley 2009a; Littlechild 2001; Macatangay 2001). For example, Motta 
(2004 p.40) has pointed out that it is a situation whereby firms have the ability 
to lift prices above a competitive level (the benchmark price) in a profitable 
way, this often being as the results of either horizontal or vertical mergers and 
of the collusion. Importantly, the collusive condition is derived from several 
issues, for example: 1) the liberalised industry with a smaller number of firms; 
2) the liberalised industry with many firms of identical size and of large 
capacity setting a high price and obtaining a share of the profits; and 3) a 
weak power of buyer/consumer with the inability to bargain. It is clear that 
these sources relate to the intensity of competition in the market, resulting in 
market power. Therefore, Motta suggested that in the case that these firms 
have a large degree of market power, competition policy can serve as a way 
to resolve this problem. However, in the case of market power only being 
temporary, competition policy may not apply because market force would 
naturally drive desirable outcomes (see also Baumol and Sidak 1994) 
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Second, asymmetric information causes market failure, as argued by Stiglitz. 
It is a scenario whereby the amount of information held by consumers 
regarding goods or services is smaller than the information held by producers. 
The theme focuses on the relation between imperfect information and 
economy. Information is a market determinant because market participants 
will typically observe and use information for their decision - making. 
Unfortunately, market participants always have insufficient information in the 
real world of imperfect competition (Dierks 2005; Stiglitz 2003). In relation to 
this, a lack of knowledge by consumers, at some point, allows rogue agents to 
take action, causing problems and undermining consumers’ trust (Dierks 2005 
Ch.3). Likewise, Stiglitz (2008, 2008a, 1994) argued that there are incentives 
for sellers to make use of and to increase the imperfection of information for 
their own interests, this clearly affecting public interest. In brief, the greater the 
information asymmetry between firms and consumers, the greater the scope 
for deception and fraud; within these unfavourable conditions emerge the 
rogue agents are more likely to be successful, and subsequently consumers 
face difficulties.  
 
In relation to the above, the issue of market failure occurring as a result of 
asymmetric information is generally sorted into different categories. The type 
underlined in this study refers to ‘adverse selection’. This applies to the capital 
market and is defined as a circumstance whereby market participants do not 
have adequate quality information regarding quality of products while 
negotiating or making a purchase of goods or services in the real world of 
imperfect information. Sellers always overstate the qualities of products 
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(misleading). This results in an increase in poor quality of goods in the market 
because firms can maximise profits by operating in this way. Additionally, 
consumers will either avoid taking a risk by not participating with the market or 
will wrongly purchase a bad product. Theses cause pricing inefficiency, 
ultimately leading to market failure (see, for example, Dierks 2005; Stiglitz 
2003; Charttrakom n.d.). Nonetheless, some scholars argued that this 
adverse selection issue can be resolved when sellers provide a guarantee or 
give buyers some assurance against the risk of related problems, arguing that 
there is no need for regulatory policy or state intervention (Kay and Vickers 
1988).  
 
With regard to the above issue, and according to the theory of constrained 
Pareto efficiency, the situation where asymmetric information, particularly 
adverse selection, has an impact on market system: consumers are highly 
likely to gain the least benefit from the market; and the government may not 
be able to provide resolution because the government themselves also cannot 
access the required information that consumers may need for market 
participation. However, Stiglitz critically argued that the market in the real 
world is not constrained Pareto efficient. Therefore, government intervention 
can still be effectively helpful and can help to ensure consumer benefits for 
everyone in society (Pareto improvement: developments in allocations that 
makes at least one person better off without making any other person worse 
off). Therefore, Stiglitz emphasised regulatory intervention to prevent 
consumers from the disadvantageous impact of asymmetrical information 
(Stiglitz 2008, 2008a, 1994). 
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Furthermore, according to Stiglitz, the impacts of externalities on the market 
will be worse when the issue of information arises. In other words, the issue of 
information can exacerbate the impact of externalities on the market system 
and other related issues. Hence, government intervention in response to the 
problem may be varied from time to time and place to place depending on the 
externalities (Stiglitz 2008, 2008a). 
 
As revealed above, it reflects that it is highly likely that poor information 
contributes to irrational decisions being made by consumers, subsequently 
leading to the poor allocation and distribution of goods and services in the 
market. Clearly, this issue could aggravate other related problems affecting 
the system, resulting in disadvantages for consumers.  
 
Third, externalities, known as the external cost, are considered a cause of 
market failure. The term “externalities” is often used with different meanings. 
The definition when relating to market failure refers to one individual’s actions 
affecting the utility of another individual. There are positive and negative 
externalities, with the former being those that profit others; the latter are those 
that make others worse off (ed. Cowen 1992 p.2). Charttrakom (n.d p.9) 
explained that social cost is equivalent to negative externalities. Also, Coase 
(1960) highlighted that those actions of firms which have detrimental effects 
on others are referred to as a social cost or a negative externality. It typically 
takes place in economics when a decision or an action causes cost to 
individuals or groups but not to the firms making the decision or taking the 
action (ed. Cowen 1992; Cornes and Sandler 1986; Charttrakom n.d.). These 
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firms usually do not make a payment to those damaged by their activities, 
rather, pass it onto consumers; if this is the case, government intervention 
may be called for. For example, fumes being caused as a result of firms’ 
actions. This pollution has a direct negative impact on people and this is a 
social cost for the industry, as argued by Pigou (1960, quoted in Greenwood 
and Preston McAfee 1991pp.103-121). 
 
According to Roberts et al.’s study, there are two methods that can be applied 
as a solution to this problem (through government intervention); they 
highlighted the importance of the use of a direct subsidy and of use of a 
cross-subsidy. The former deals with a tax system; it allows problems to be 
solved by taxpayers. The latter focuses on the means of increasing prices so 
that other consumers, not taxpayers, pay for the social cost (Roberts et al. 
1991 Ch.2).  
 
In addition, each source interacts with one another; as a result the degree of 
market failure may escalate. For example, the existence of the power of a 
monopoly such as collusion in setting high prices by companies; this condition 
generates pricing inefficiency, undermining the knowledge of consumers since 
price conveys information, creating disproportionate reaction among 
consumers and their purchases, and consequently causing inefficient 
allocation and distribution within the market system (Roberts et al. 1991 p.14), 
and vice versa, asymmetric information gives rise to market power, as the 
greater the asymmetric information between firms and consumers, the greater 
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the power of the firm to lift the price without the disadvantage of losing market 
share (Stiglitz 2008, 2008a, 2003). 
 
Now, we realise that the scenario of market failure could possibly take place 
at any time and within any market. All kinds of weaknesses and threats for the 
market system could become issues affecting the degree of market 
competition and the market efficiency level, resulting in poor allocation and 
distribution of resources and disadvantages for consumers. However, the 
situation could be even worse when asymmetric information occurs. 
Therefore, we can now see the reason for government intervention as a 
rational way of resolving the problem of allocation of scarce resource, 
whereby a market with self-interested agents alone cannot.  
 
(d) Government intervention  
As revealed above, market failure has been claimed as justification for 
government intervention. It is important to now carefully examine the concept 
of government intervention. This should provide a better understanding 
regarding alternative ways of dealing with inefficient allocation of resource, 
and whether or not this can be made through some degree of application of 
regulations to sustain good outcomes for society. 
 
Studies show that the government may take action to correct market failure 
because a free market will not correct on its own. This action is to improve the 
allocation and distribution of resource and regulation is a tool used by the 
government to pursue these objectives in order to ensure the best interests of 
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society (see, for example, Hackett 2006; Mitchell and Simmons 1994; Asch 
1988).  
 
However, the controversy over the role of government when it comes to 
market failure so as to secure the interests of consumers relates to a 
disagreement about the application of regulation (because deregulation and 
regulation is in contrast). Scholars such as Hayek (Steele 2001), Roberts et 
al. (1991 Ch.2) and Besley (2006 Ch.2) revealed the possible disadvantage 
that could emerge as a result of government intervention, including uses of 
regulatory policies and regulations.  
 
For example, Roberts et al. (1991 Ch.2) explained that privatisation and 
liberalisation are the introduction of deregulation and competition to regulated 
and monopolistic industries; therefore, the liberalised market and regulation 
are in conflict. They revealed the ‘conceptual model of triangular conflict’ 
which is based on three pairs of opposition, including privatisation, 
liberalisation and non-market objectives. Within the liberalised market, where 
the conflict occurs as a result of the use of regulation by the government 
(through the regulator) to pursue particular objectives, it has inelastic 
boundary lines between these three pairs (vectors). From Figure 2.1.1a 
below: N represents the nationalised industries; P represents a lucrative 
(profitable) transfer to private sector; NP represents the difference in value 
between nationalised and private industries; L represents liberalisation; NMO 
represents non-market objectives and the axes represent the extent of 
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changes emerging in the system; for example, P axis = the interaction of 
privatisation.  
 
       P        
  Figure (2.1.1 a)                            P1    Figure (2.1.1 b)       
                          P axis 
L  ax    NMO       L1                           N   NMO 1 
   
Figure (2.1.1 c) 
                 N 
             P2     NMO axis 
L2                                                           NMO 2 
 
If liberalisation is fully promoted, market prices of goods and services will fall 
down. It can be seen that P1 is therefore moved closer to N than P, as shown 
in Figure 2.1.1b. This is a desirable price (P1) as it is low and close to a price 
offered in the nationalised system. In other words, P1 is being moved closer 
to the marginal cost. However, in the case that non-market objectives are 
heavily imposed as a result of government intervention through regulatory 
policies and regulations, the price may fall even further than P1, and 
liberalisation will subsequently be impeded. In addition, in a worsening 
scenario, whereby there is no attempt made for liberalisation as a 
consequence of significant extension of the NMO axis, then we can see 
dramatically cheap prices (P2) offered by firms as a result of this action. 
Prices are set lower than the price offered in the nationalised system, as 
shown in Figure 2.1.1c. Accordingly, Roberts et al. (ibid.) argued that the 
     N                                                                             
L axis 
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imposition of non-market objectives within a liberalised industry undermines 
the goals of privatisation and liberalisation because lower prices offered by 
firms (P2) could lead them to soon leave the market. 
 
An alternative argument opposed to government intervention indicated that an 
inefficient market is a result of a disequilibrium system, this scenario being the 
nature of a market, as a market is never in equilibrium because the self-
interests of the independent market participants are somehow in agreement 
while somehow in conflict. It cannot be expected to stay at a perfectly 
competitive level at all times; however it would find the market adjustment 
towards equilibrium on its own and finally the entire general equilibrium. This 
means that government intervention for avoiding a negative consequence of a 
non-equilibrium market system is not recommended (Bryant 2010; Steele 
2001). 
 
Government intervention to regulatory capture 
Others argued that the government used its power to enforce regulation to 
benefit some groups, known as public choice theory. A government’s 
decision-making is based on the preference of interest groups, and the goals 
of re-election and re-appointment (see, for example, Pierson 2006; Kasper 
2002; McNutt 2002).  
 
The theory of public choice, these days, extends into many aspects. However, 
because this study performs an analysis of regulatory regime in the liberalised 
market, concerning suppliers, consumers and the regulator, the focus of the 
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public choice theory presented here is only on the theory and concept of 
regulatory capture. It is with regard to behaviours of government agencies 
(the regulators) who are supposed to regulate industries in response to 
consequences of inefficient allocation of resources or of market failure so as 
to ensure the goal of public interests. However, the agencies do not act based 
on public interests but in favour of the interests of the industries. This can be 
seen as a captured regulatory body that applies regulations for benefits of 
some interest groups (see, for example, Croley 2008; Pierson 2006; McNutt 
2002; Anderson 1981).  
 
The above assumption was also critically argued by Stigler, who stated that 
“regulation is used to prevent competition, but the regulatory authorities 
manage to regulate because of the influence of the industry” (The Concise 
Encyclopedia of Economics 2008). According to Stigler’s view, use of 
regulation by the government agencies in a liberalised system would create 
the least consumer benefit because regulation is always captured by the 
interests of the industries. However, many scholars highlighted that Stigler’s 
theory failed to take into consideration many situations taking place in various 
industries (Derthick and Quirk 1985; Wilson 1984, quoted in Eberlein 2001 
p.32). 
 
Throughout the above discussion, the perspectives of market and market 
failure and the concept of government intervention in a capitalist market 
system are in contrast. The point of view regarding an invisible hand and self-
interest as elements driving market force found the market as not being 
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capable to generate the best interests of society in a real world. Market failure 
is an unavoidable situation in most, meaning that the market no longer meets 
the conditions of being well-functioning. Government intervention is claimed to 
be a key way of correcting market failure and of stimulating market efficiency 
so as to increase consumer benefits. However, application of regulation within 
the capitalist system remains controversial and has the following conflict 
interests: 1) whether or not regulation is applied for political expediency in 
relation to the interests of industries and does not sustain market efficiency; 
and 2) whether to what extent regulation should be applied in network 
industries so as to sustain the interests of consumers. 
 
From the above, it is worth noting here that understanding the way the market 
functions (in the real world) and the regulatory requirement for consumer 
benefits (government intervention) is very important. Having said that, it is 
important to understand: 1) what is the most effective perspective in 
explaining the real-world market of imperfect competition; and 2) which factors 
possibly lead to the unfavourable situation of market failure (a poorly 
functioning market where expected benefits cannot be delivered to 
consumers). These examined details should contribute to an appropriate 
concept of assessing market performance, whereby the regulator can use it to 
understand the market system and to take action regarding the appropriate 
role with which to regulate it. Clearly, this is valuable for providing an 
analytical framework being used in analysis part of this study. 
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(e) Stiglitz – government intervention and regulation 
As can be seen from the above-discussed issue of market failure there is 
potential for government intervention with the use of regulation. However, the 
doubt remains whether this itself can cause problems and distortion. 
Therefore, it is worth looking at the economic theory of Stiglitz, which has 
recently become a significant standard tool for studying the appropriate 
relationship between government intervention through regulation and the 
liberalised market, especially when the market system has failed to produce 
desirable/efficient outcomes, and facing weaknesses and threats from inside 
and outside the system such as poor pricing information (asymmetric 
information) and economic crisis, respectively. 
 
Reviewing Stiglitz’s theory and concept should help to verify the argument 
regarding the need to improve the regulatory regime being a sustained way to 
answer the current problem within the UK retail electricity market and to 
understand what needs to be included in an efficient regulatory regime. 
 
Stiglitz, in his analysis, emphasised that the invisible hand and self-interest of 
classical economics, which are believed to generate an efficient allocation of 
resource, cannot always be well-functioning and are highly likely to provide 
instability (Stiglitz 2009, 2008, 2000). It is important to now ensure sustainable 
growth for the country through an increased role for the government. 
Additionally, Stiglitz argued that, in fact, Adam Smith noticed market limits and 
stressed that business firms could increase profits easily by conspiring to lift 
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prices rather than developing production with more efficiency, therefore, 
suggesting the use of anti-trust law (competition policy).  
 
Stiglitz (2009, 2008, 2008a, 2000, 1994) examined the theoretical and 
empirical weakness of the capitalist market system and provided an 
explanation for why we need to consider government intervention in ‘network 
industries’ and to allow this to occur (network industries are described as the 
economic entities with a strong policy concern which is inextricably linked to 
regulation (Crampes 1997 p.2)).  
 
First, he referred to the Pareto maxim, pointing out that “no one can be made 
better off without making another worse off within the market system”, Thus, 
Stiglitz stressed that government intervention has a greater potential to 
increase societal efficiency and equity. Lack of social solidarity may increase 
other costs. Second, Stiglitz suggested that some regulatory interventions are 
already well-accepted these days, such as competition policy being 
implemented to control the monopoly power and the impact of the abuse of 
dominant position within the market system (Stiglitz 2008, 2008a, 1994). 
Third, he stressed that the current global financial crisis and the recognition of 
high costs clearly reflect the need for government intervention in the event of 
poor performance by institutions and regulatory agencies. Policy intervention 
regarding social protection in the current economic climate will help to 
enhance equal opportunities for everyone in society to benefit from scarce 
resources (Pareto improvement). Fourth, he argued that still there is the need 
to have public policy intervention implemented even though markets are 
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efficient because markets usually fail to produce socially desirable outcomes 
(Stiglitz 2008, 2008a).  
 
Fifth, government intervention needs to take place to maximise competition 
(to ensure the high intensity of competition). He referred to a condition of 
market power that causes critical risks to the economy: those, who are 
wealthy, increase profits from inefficient allocation of resource. Accordingly, it 
is important, at some stage, to stimulate competition through interventions. 
Sixth, Stiglitz highlighted that use of regulation is often aimed to encourage 
‘constructive behaviour’. He explained that use of regulation is not only 
essential for preventing harmful effects but “economies with well-designed 
regulations can perform far better than those with inadequate regulation 
because regulation can both enhance markets and protect those who might 
otherwise suffer in unregulated markets”.  
 
Finally, importantly, he highlighted that promoting transparency is important 
and might lead to better resource allocation in a capitalist market system, but 
this principle alone being emphasised and used in some types of markets 
against the changed circumstances without government intervention would be 
considered a weak system (Stiglitz 2008, 2008a, 2000).  
 
According to Stiglitz’s arguments above, a clearer view regarding how to 
improve a regulatory regime emerges. Sustainable growth with healthier 
policies and regulations toward the interest of consumers is highlighted. 
Stiglitz can see that the market alone cannot provide essential goods and 
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services for consumers. Markets may facilitate wealth to gain benefits but the 
benefits to one are made up from the loss to others, particularly the poor. 
Additionally, according to Stiglitz, an adequate consumer protection is 
necessary in response to market failure (because markets always fail in all 
economies), in order to ensure sustainable development or sufficient benefits 
for everyone in society; in particular, where we are currently facing the 
changing environment such as economic crisis, in which resources become 
more limited and costs are very high. According to Stiglitz, when these 
conditions emerge, government intervention through regulation is needed.  
 
2.1.2 Regulation in relation to public policy and regulatory 
policy 
Having examined the issues of market and related economic theories, it is 
worthwhile to now look at the contexts of regulation, regulatory policy and 
public policy in relation to market failure. With these contexts being reviewed, 
it should contribute to a better understanding regarding how policies and 
regulations play critical roles in delivering economic and social well-being for 
the public as a whole, thereby providing an explanation for improvement in a 
regulatory regime.  
 
According to Meier (1985, quoted in Eisner et al. 2000 Ch.1), regulation is 
described as “any attempt by the government to control the behaviour of 
citizens, corporations or subgovernments”. The perspective regarding the 
relationship between regulation and regulatory policy and public policy is that: 
1) regulation reflects a form of various employed procedures that is aimed to 
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be used for designing and enforcing regulatory policy; and many regulatory 
policies may be required in order to serve a goal of public policy; 2) regulation 
is characterised by its purpose; and 3) the scope of application of regulation is 
subject to regulatory policy and the goal of public policy (Sappington 1994).  
 
These perspectives regarding regulation highlighted by Meier and Sappington 
show that regulation can be extensive. Because this study is with regard to 
the liberalised electricity market, term of regulation, therefore, refers 
specifically to ‘economic regulation’ that governs the electricity sector. Hence, 
the regulation being focused on is not only aimed to promote economic 
interest, but is also required to pursue social objectives relating to the 
interests of consumers (Simmonds 2002 Ch.5). In particular, the latter point is 
central to the focus of this study. Thus, this section will focus on the regulation 
that is used for increasing efficient allocation and distribution of resources and 
for ensuring the best interests of society.  
 
In addition to the above, the role of the regulators is also important (with these 
the government is excluded); it is concurrently highlighted with issues of 
regulation in the study, because they are responsible for generating and 
enforcing regulatory policies and regulations for governing in areas such as 
energy and telecommunications (Croley 2008 Ch.2). 
 
Efficient regulation and its application to the market 
The following discusses the aspect regarding efficient (good) regulation and 
its application to the market; with this revealed and discussed it should help to 
60 
 
shape improved regulation and its enforcement towards to an ideology of an 
efficient regulatory regime, in addition, reflecting ways to respond to market 
failure.   
 
Scholars highlighted that regulation must act, and be seen to act, in the public 
interest. The factors used for indicating the concept of efficient regulation are 
varied: efficient regulation mainly needs to be a driving force for transparency, 
independency, accountability, confidence and trust, proportionality, 
consistency, target focused, effectiveness, flexibility and fulfilment of 
necessity (see, for example, Pollitt 2008, 2007; Braithwaite et al. 2007; 
Rothkopf 2007). This means that efficient regulation can be identified as a tool 
used to ensure the desirable consequences through posing those principles. 
According to this, efficient regulation is equal to a combination of merited 
rules, which help to meet those principles. 
 
In relation to the above, Marjone (1990 pp.1-5) suggested that regulation can 
be applied for a number of reasons within the market system: 1) regulation is 
applied to support an economic purpose defending the market from 
inefficiency such as price cap regulation (see also Bell 2002 pp.66-73); 2) 
regulation is required  to monitor the existence of market power (see also, for 
example, Defeuilley 2009a; Woo et al. 2003; Macatangay 2001); 3) regulation 
is needed to protect the public against price discrimination across the different 
classes of ‘consumers’ or ‘buyers’ (see also Coen 2005 p.2); 4) regulation is a 
significant tool that the government uses for encouraging industries to 
become more responsive to environmental changes as a result of their 
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businesses; 5) regulation can be applied when there is a short supply 
situation, this resulting when service price has increased dramatically; thereby 
regulation is required for strengthening basic social welfare (see also Corry 
2003); and 6) regulation might be used to protect service providers against 
unreasonably low prices in excessive competitive markets, otherwise this may 
cause further deleterious results to consumers. 
 
The above shows the perspectives regarding the principle and function of 
efficient regulation; in particular, two major objectives for the use of efficient 
regulation, which include social and economic interests, clearly help to 
provide an understanding about this dissertation’s core aim. This is to analyse 
how regulation can be improved to reflect the principle and with the correct 
extent of enforcement within a liberalised market system, especially when 
circumstances change, in order to maximise market efficiency as well as to 
protect consumers. 
 
2.1.3 Competition policy 
Having discussed the issues of regulation in relation to public policy and 
regulatory policy, it is important to now review competition policy (a product of 
government intervention) since it was introduced within the liberalised system 
with the major purpose of making use of rules, laws and regulation. The aim is 
to maximise competition by controlling monopoly power, as well as minimising 
other impacts of the abuse of dominant position, in order to serve public 
interests (Motta 2004; Neumann 2001). As a result of reviewing the policy, we 
should arrive at a better understanding regarding what principle should be 
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focused within the regulatory regime. Additionally, viewing the policy should 
provide a clearer view regarding the role of the regulatory authorities in 
answering issues within the system such as market power and destructive 
market.  
 
Competition policy is the set of policies, laws, and regulations which ensure 
that competition in the marketplace is not restricted in such a way as to 
reduce economic welfare, and its goals are social welfare or economic and 
individual freedom. In other words, the policy facilitates uses of regulatory 
policies and regulations within the capitalist market system to secure or 
maximise competition towards the goal of greater allocation and distribution of 
resources for the benefit of everyone in our society (Hwang and Chen 2004; 
Motta 2004; Neumann 2001). This is part of the benchmark against which to 
judge what to improve in a regulatory regime.  
 
There are two different levels of competition policy relating to the UK retail 
electricity market: 1) competition policy at the EU level; and 2) competition 
policy at the national level (UK competition policy). These two levels are 
integral because the creation of an internal market is an essential element of 
EU competition policy ((eds) Hwang and Chen 2004 Ch.1). The former aims 
to be enforced to generate European market integration; this can be 
completed by pursuing three critical objectives. First, with regard to anti-trust; 
competition policy serves as a tool to support market efficiency against 1) 
market-sharing cartels or collusion, and 2) abuses of dominant positions (it 
reflects a behavioural intervention). Second, the issue of merger control: this 
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relates to anti-competitive mergers and/or takeovers (it reflects a structural 
intervention). Third, with regard to state-aid: government intervention to grants 
to particular firms is prohibited as this action could undermine competition. 
Any firms which act illegally against the legislations will be referred to the 
European Court of Justice (Motta 2004; Cini and McGowan 1998). In addition 
to this, EU competition policy has been significantly influenced by social 
factors: promoting choice for consumers was recently seen as a prime 
concern of the competition policy (European Commission (EC) 2004; Motta 
2004; Cini and McGowan 1998). 
 
The latter is the national competition policy of the UK, dealing with an internal 
liberalised market. The UK Competition Commission (CC) was established 
under the Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 2002 and is a public 
body responsible for supporting businesses and industries with mergers, 
marketing and regulation as well as for investigating merger control against 
the uncompetitive environment of the market system (BÖllhoff 2005; Motta 
2004).  
 
In terms of the relationship between the UK competition policy and social 
welfare, it has been suggested by Motta (2004 Ch.1) and the OECD (2002 
Ch.3) that after the establishment of the Competition Act 1998, competition 
policy became a key element for the government to develop deregulated 
markets (maximise competition). The policy stresses that making a market 
that works well (by controlling market power) is the main strategy to protect 
consumers.  
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It may be worth highlighting here that the UK government, the regulatory 
bodies, and the CC aim to facilitate better competition because benefits for 
consumers would occur as a result of this economic growth. In brief, 
economic welfare is expected to reflect consumer welfare, and consumer 
protection is left to the market and the economy following the UK competition 
policy, this needing to be adjusted in line with EU law with respect to 
enforcement against market power and to adequately safeguard consumers. 
In addition, the regulator has a key role to regulate the system towards these 
goals. 
 
2.1.4 Social obligation 
Having discussed several issues, which include the market, market failure, 
government intervention, regulation and competition policy, it is important to 
now look carefully at the issue of social obligation in the context of universal 
service. This issue is important, particularly during the current economic crisis 
faced by the UK and other countries, which has resulted in a further 
unemployment and a rise in the cost of goods and services. In particular, it 
has had an impact on the UK electricity sector, including the retail electricity 
market system, the focus of this study.  
 
Examining the issue of social obligation should highlight what has previously 
been discussed regarding whether or not government intervention through 
regulation should now be emphasised and implemented. This should reflect to 
what extent the government, corporations, organisations and individuals may 
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react in providing benefits to our society, because a perfect market exists 
nowhere and market failures exist everywhere.  
 
The issue of social obligation has been studied by scholars and linked to 
subjects such as philosophy, psychology, and sociology. In this section, we 
will highlight the perspective of social obligation within the capitalist market 
system. Consumer benefits and protection are focused on as goals of social 
obligation.  
 
Social obligation refers to a condition in which related parties act in response 
to general social norm, arising from social facts like agreements, promises, 
contracts and joint decisions. It also reflects public policies with the monopoly 
rights in network industries. There are two types of social obligation: one has 
to be undertaken by the individual and the other has to be undertaken by the 
state (Carver 2009; Miller 2006; Yarrow 1996) 
 
In relation to the above, social obligation relating to the energy market system 
was focused on, and this relates to adequate consumer protection. Consumer 
protection as a form of social obligation is subject to political decision. The 
government is obligated to deliver a fundamental service to everyone in 
society while, at the same time, stressing and delivering a fair economic 
outcome (Corry 2003; Eberlein 2001). This fact relates to the goal of universal 
service, a practice of providing necessary goods and services, which is 
comprised of three principles: 1) geographic accessibility; 2) access should be 
affordable; and 3) access should be equitable (Cherry et al. 1999; Yarrow 
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1996). Clearly, this reflects the role of government in universal service as 
firms cannot remain profitable in this situation, and may pass the costs onto 
other consumers; otherwise they may leave the market sooner.  
 
According to the above, some scholars argued that it is highly likely that social 
obligation may become critical when it comes to the emergence of negative 
externalities or changed circumstances such as environmental problems 
relating to the requirement for environmentally friendly energy, and economic 
crisis relating to production costs. It is possible to face a severe shortage of 
goods and services, higher production costs, and, consequently, higher prices 
for non-vulnerable consumers; therefore, suggesting to shift the focus from 
competition to consumer protection in network industries such as the 
electricity industry, this needing appropriate government response, otherwise 
leading to consumer vulnerability along with poverty (Waddams Price 2010). 
 
Here, an understanding emerges that it is not only true that private markets 
always fail to provide an adequate level of consumer protection, but also that 
the impact of externalities would escalate the degree of consumer protection 
required, this being coherent with Stiglitz’s argument above. This clearly 
guides the focus of improvement in a regulatory regime in this study,  
 
2.2 The UK model of electricity regulation: the regulatory 
regime applied within the UK retail electricity market 
The following documents the main literature contributions to the UK model of 
electricity regulation for supply sector. This is followed by a review of the use 
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of regulation, as a form of licence, specifically, focusing on the provision and 
use of regulatory information. This is used within the relationship between 
suppliers, consumers and the regulator as a method to promote greater 
competition and better consumer protection.  
 
The details given will: 1) provide a better understanding with regard to the 
weaknesses within the existing regulation being applied within supply sectors, 
including the retail electricity market; and 2) be useful in guiding theme and a 
suitable theoretical framework that will be used in the analysis section of the 
dissertation. 
 
(a) The UK model of (utility) regulation 
Before reviewing the UK model of electricity regulation, it is important to 
understand the style of the UK model of regulation being applied within utility 
sectors. Stern (2001 Ch.6) indicated that the UK model explicitly represents a 
model of independent regulation, and is only being influenced by small 
specialist regulatory offices. It is informal in its processes; as a result, the UK 
model of regulation could possibly result in being less secure and less 
predictable.  
 
Newberry (2010, 2001) showed that the UK model of regulation has distinctive 
features: 1) legislation defines duties: responsibility is subject to rules and 
laws or these specify a general framework of regulation; 2) licences to provide 
credibility; licences contain the details of the regulatory system and the 
conditions, which are being used for negotiated restructuring and for 
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controlling parties towards the general framework; 3) a regulator to insulate 
from politics; there is a shift in responsibility from the Secretary of State to the 
regulatory authorities and they would receive guidance from the Secretary of 
State (see also Simmonds 2002); 4) RPI-X for incentives and inflation: RPI-X 
represents price cap regulation being used by the government so as to 
motivate companies to invest for their own benefit and also for the public (Bell 
2002; Simmonds 2002; Jamasb and Pollitt 2000); and 5) dispute resolution by 
the CC; in the event of dispute or disagreement, this independent body is 
responsible for providing references for investigation regarding all major 
complaints and enquiries.  
 
Clearly, in this era of liberalisation, the above highlights the key roles of: 1) the 
regulator through use of licence condition; and 2) the CC through the power of 
market investigation against anti-competitive practice, in ensuring competition 
and consumer protection. 
 
(b) The existing model of electricity regulation 
Pollitt (2008, 2008b) and Simmonds (2002) presented that the traditional 
model of the UK electricity regulation of 1990 being organised by the regulator 
has a distinctive configuration and elements. It is outlined principally by 
specific legislations, which include the Electricity Act 1989 and its amended 
versions such as the Utilities Act 2000, the Energy Acts, and by licences 
(issued under these legislations). Electricity regulation is generally aimed to 
protect the interests of consumers through promoting competition. The 
regulator or Ofgem (the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets) has power 
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under these legislations, including the Utilities Act 2000, the Competition Act 
1998, the Energy Act 2004, the Energy Act 2008, and the EU Directives with 
respect to competition issue and Ofgem’s duty towards best regulatory 
practice or efficient regulatory regime, respectively. In other words, the 
regulator is responsible for the statutory responsibilities under these Acts and 
legislations.  
 
The UK electricity regulation is divided into the following sections: 1) 
generation sector; 2) transmission sector; 3) distribution sector; and 4) supply 
sector. This dissertation only focuses on the retail electricity market sector; 
therefore, this chapter will only highlight the economic regulation being used 
within the supply sector.  
 
The UK retail electricity market (as part of the supply sector) was introduced 
in 1998 and the use of price cap regulation was highlighted to stimulate 
competition until 2002, but was subsequently removed because of a 
significant increase in market participation by householders (Defeuilley 2009a; 
NAO 2001). Therefore, from mid 2002, Ofgem announced replacement of this 
regulation of electricity supply via price cap regulation with the use of power of 
investigation and enforcement under competition policy and law. This reflects 
a shift in regulatory approach from using price cap regulation as a means to 
regulate the electricity market to using another form of regulation (market-
based regulation) that involves the goal of competition policy (Simmonds 2002 
Ch.5).  
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Nonetheless, EU Directive 2009/72/EC (an amendment to Directive 
2003/54/EC), and other national Acts such as the Energy Act 2008 (legislation 
at EU and national levels) have recently modified the framework for electricity 
regulation. According to several changing/shifting circumstances such as 
climate change and other EU targets with regards to social and economic 
issues and environmental protection, the regulatory framework being issued 
under these legislations now aims to protect the interests of existing and 
future consumers while ensuring the sustainable development of the 
electricity sector. In particular, the amending Directive places emphasis on the 
interests and protection of electricity consumers, especially on vulnerable 
groups; therefore, consumer choice and public service obligation are 
significantly highlighted within it. Additionally, the formation and 
implementation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions are 
encouraged in this regard (OPSI 25.01.10 Anderson 2009; Official Journal of 
the European Union L 176, 15.07.2003). 
 
(c) Licence 
Licence is a tool granted and used by government authorities in order to 
control a range of stakeholders’ activities. In this study, licence refers to a set 
of regulations and conditions granted and used by Ofgem, so as to control the 
companies’ behaviours assumed to have led to market failure. Electricity 
suppliers in the UK need to be authorised through a licence condition in order 
to supply energy to consumers. These licences outline the obligations on and 
duties of each licence holder (licensee). The form and scope of licence is 
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mainly subject to the varied market structure and the various pace of 
improvement of the electricity sector (Simmonds 2002 Ch.4).  
 
According to the Utilities Act 2000, licences for electricity supply, which 
includes the retail electricity market, need to be separated from other 
electricity sectors and has its own standard known as the ‘standard licence 
condition’. In other words, the current licensing regime consists of a set of 
standard conditions; each granting requires specific standard conditions 
(Simmonds 2002 Ch.4). The conditions would allow the regulator to take 
action if companies behaved inappropriately (Hunt 2002 p.385). In addition, 
licence conditions may be modified and amended towards specific 
requirement, including changing circumstances. However, modifications can 
only be processed through agreement between both the licensee and the 
regulatory authorities; if there is a dispute the case would be sent to the CC 
(OECD 2002; Simmonds 2002). 
 
(d) The relationship between suppliers, consumers and the 
regulator within the retail market in relation to use of a licence 
regarding provision and use of information 
 
• The relationship 
Within the retail electricity market there is a relationship between retail 
electricity suppliers, consumers (householders), and the regulator (Ofgem). 
Fox et al. (1991, quoted in Ferreira 2006 p.74) suggested that there is an 
interaction between the three specific components in the general (open) 
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system: suppliers or competitors; consumers; and the regulator. The 
interaction between them is regulated by specific functions, skills and 
applications. Additionally, regulation, competition within the reformed market 
and consumers are connected and integrally related (Dubash 2001 p.12) 
 
As revealed above, information is added to this relationship and is a key 
element for market participation as well as for a functioning market; 
communication within the relationship can occur through a transparent flow of 
information, which can then be utilised to encourage consumers to engage 
with the market for informing their choices and for obtaining the benefits of 
liberalisation (Figure 2.2.1 (a) below). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2.1 (a)                                      Regulator 
  
                           
                Suppliers                                                                      Consumers 
 
• Information and licence condition 
Since this study is with regard to the retail electricity market; this section will 
highlight the perspectives of appropriate/quality price/tariff information being 
provided and used within the retail market.  
 
It was noted that consumers may have appropriate/sufficient information 
(such as the cheapest tariff available) from both sides in the relationship: 
The Retail Electricity         
Market System 
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suppliers and the regulator, and use the details received in their decision-
making process. This helps to strengthen competition (although it is never 
perfect), determining the appropriate price structure in the retail market, and 
leading to a long-term solution for a well- functioning market as well as for 
consumer protection (Mayo and Steinberg 2007; Dyner and Franco 2004; 
Stiglitz 2003). 
 
In order to facilitate market participation by consumers, appropriate 
information should be easy for the consumer to understand. First, the 
information provided has to be of good value to the consumer. This means 
that consumers should be provided with facts relating to the current 
prices/tariffs being offered by different suppliers. Second, the format and 
presentation of information is important in helping consumers to understand 
the information in a way that leads them to make a good decision. Third, 
information provided needs to be understandable and clear for all types of 
consumers, especially those with no prior knowledge of the market. Finally, 
the less cost and time needed for an information search can stimulate the use 
of information (Mayo and Steinberg 2007; Weil et al. 2006) 
 
The regulator is required to be associated with helping consumers gain 
access to quality price/tariff information. The provision of information by 
suppliers to authorities was stated in Condition 5 of the Standard of Condition 
of Electricity Supply Licence. First, the regulatory authorities are allowed to 
request information from suppliers; suppliers can find themselves in difficult 
situations if this information is not provided appropriately to the authorities. 
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Second, suppliers are required by the regulator, through licence conditions, to 
ensure that competition and fairness are adhered to by providing quality 
price/tariff information with the most accurate information possible for 
consumers to use. This detail shows that Ofgem is responsible for setting 
standard requirements which must be followed by suppliers in providing 
appropriate information. Third, other related information required should 
comprise: 1) a statement of consumption; 2) the efficient use of electricity; 3) 
the actual energy consumption in comparison to the previous year for the 
same period; 4) notification of price rises and the right for consumers to 
change suppliers; and 5) fuel mix information coupled with information on 
environmental protection and impact (Standard Condition of Electricity Supply 
Licence 2008; Occasional Paper 2004; NAO 2008b).  
 
In relation to the above, the direct relationship between the regulator and 
consumers is important. It is the role of Ofgem to encourage consumers to 
use the information provided and to engage with the market. However, with 
regard to this objective, Ofgem has been working with other organisations to 
ensure the interests of consumers such as Consumer Focus (CF) and 
Consumer Direct (CD) (PAC 2008; Mayo and Steinberg 2007). 
 
The above reflects that, within the relationship between the mentioned three 
players, there is communication taking place using a flow of market price 
information, this information being required for market participation by 
consumers. However, as we have realised from previous discussed theories, 
this information is never perfect, with asymmetric information existing in the 
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system, whereby energy suppliers have more information than either energy 
consumers or the regulator. Particularly ‘adverse selection’ has been an 
obvious issue for the UK retail electricity market. Additionally, there is much 
inappropriate and misleading information provided to the public, which mostly 
relates to a guarantee strategy used by suppliers. These have all affected 
consumer decision making and the degree of market failure, and have 
exacerbated the impacts of related weaknesses and threats (externalities). 
For this reason, regulation (licence) regarding information is required and 
needs to be improved in order to frame a provision of information towards 
consumer benefits. 
 
2.3 An analytical overview of the dissertation’s theoretical 
framework  
After reviewing the theories and concepts relating to market failure, regulation 
and the policy environment in the UK energy context, it is now important to 
relate several aspects of these to indicate the theoretical framework and 
boundary of this research, this being used later in the analysis part of the 
dissertation: 1) for determining what key variables will be examined; and 2) for 
drawing up the relationships that will be looked for so as to finally analyse an 
improved regulatory regime as a way to mitigate the current issue. This is to 
contribute to a larger analysis, as well as to extend the earlier analysis piece 
of work with respect to the development of the regulatory regime in the UK 
retail electricity market. 
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The above-revealed issues regarding concepts, beliefs and theories highlight 
that the aspect of the use of regulation (licence) to respond to market failures 
such as in the event of market power has been controversial one. One group 
strongly argues that current set-up of the market is acceptable and fine as 
long as it is directed by the government; the market itself can grow and create 
the best interests for the participants in the real world of imperfect information. 
Furthermore, they argue that using regulation could possibly create a 
worsening scenario for the system because it would be captured by interest 
groups. Another group believes in government intervention becoming a 
sustainable solution for consumer protection, as this requirement is neither 
consistently nor adequately provided by the market. In particular, Stiglitz has 
shown an exceptional argument stressing use of government intervention 
through regulation in response to the issues of market failure. His argument 
has gained in importance in network industries, such as the electricity market, 
when he, in theory, relates the impact of issues occurring inside and outside 
the system on consumers to the need to have government intervention. 
Particularly, at this time, when there are many challenges affecting the 
system, and, clearly, this has turned into the strongest logical argument that 
applying well to the UK retail electricity market and being valid for the 
theoretical framework for this study (see section 2.1). 
 
In relation to the above, asymmetric information, complexion, misleading 
information and changing environments have recently become critical issues 
in the energy market system. In fact, in the real world of the market system, 
information is always never perfect and, therefore, we understand that perfect 
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information cannot be used as a valid criterion against which to judge the 
performance of the market system and to guide regulation. However, these 
days, there are more critical issues regarding asymmetric information relating 
to ‘adverse selection’, and an increase in confusion and information 
deception, with these particularly relating to market power. It is true that 
information can never be perfect in a liberalised market, but it does not mean 
that an increase in misleading information is acceptable or appropriate 
information is not required in a competition unit. This is still required for 
supporting consumers to use their power through market participation.  
 
This issue regarding information, at this time, is adversely affecting the energy 
market system, as well as millions of UK energy consumers, who need to 
participate with the liberalised electricity market for their everyday energy 
consumption. Within the market, householders are the key players in 
generating demand and in stimulating economic growth, but recently they 
have been provided with fallacious and inappropriate/insufficient information; 
particularly, those considered vulnerable are suffering from increases in 
electricity bill as a result of 1) confusing and deceptive price information 
received and 2) uncompetitive price setting/information.  
 
Changing environment or ‘externality’ has been escalating the effects of 
inefficient market, as well as, generating various undesirable impacts on the 
system such as economic crisis; and the requirement of EU legislation 
regarding the environmental protection and the use of renewable energy, etc. 
Importantly, market participants, including consumers and suppliers, are 
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currently facing the various consequences of the changing environment, 
particularly the latter, where renewable resource is required for electricity 
generation. This important requirement is associated with social responsibility, 
whereby suppliers have to act socially in response to the environmental 
issues taking place as a result of electricity generation. Accordingly, energy 
prices for consumers have been increasing because of new investment in 
renewable energy generation. Most of this social cost has been passed on to 
consumers (via pricing information), as firms usually do not pay for this. 
However, its disadvantageous consequence will be escalated whenever 
issues of confusing, insufficient and deceptive energy price information are 
given to consumers. Clearly, we cannot expect energy market system to be 
self-correcting in this situation. 
 
We understand that the retail electricity market can never be perfect because 
of imperfect competition and of imperfect information. Clearly, these are not a 
valid criterion to judge whether regulation is required. However, it is still 
necessary to find the best way to cope with market conditions, whereby more 
weaknesses and threats have occurred (inputs of regulation). The market is 
suppose to face the least asymmetric information and be free from other 
complication such as a misleading guarantee information in order to be 
competitive.  Having said that, it is important that regulation is used; this will 
provide an opportunity to secure appropriate information (internal strength) 
and to decrease weakness regarding provision of misleading and deceptive 
information, these helping to sustain the interests of consumers. 
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For the above reason, it is vital to investigate and develop regulations, 
particularly with regard to information, the most important factor in the retail 
system which needs to be applied within the relationship between consumers, 
suppliers and the regulator. According to Stiglitz, inadequate regulation 
provided always generates harmful effects. He suggested using regulation in 
response to the issue, especially where asymmetric information and adverse 
selection have affected the system and the interests of consumers, and 
arguing that the market system is not a constrained Pareto efficiency. 
Therefore, government intervention through regulation still can be productive. 
 
In relation to the above, it is also worth noting here that EU legislation has 
recently focused on protecting consumers, in particular, vulnerable 
consumers, applying the modified framework for electricity regulation, such as 
the EU Directive 2009/72 EC (an amendment to Directive 2003/54/EC), as 
well as the competition policy (at EU level). These have highlighted the way to 
protect the interests of consumers through a combination of the availability of 
consumer choice relating to better information, market participation, and use 
of regulation for better consumer benefits where necessary. Therefore, 
competition unit cannot avoid government action in supporting better flow of 
quality information for the interest of consumers. 
 
In fact, the EU regulatory framework and the competition policy at EU level 
regarding sustainable development of the energy sector and consumer 
protection are having a significant impact on the policy environment in the UK. 
For example, the Energy White Paper 2007 and the Energy Act 2008 have 
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recently been put into effect, introducing a provision of clean and affordable 
energy for UK consumers. However, to date, as reviewed in Chapter 1, there 
has not been a significant solution for UK retail electricity consumers, 
particularly for those who are vulnerable. Instead, unfortunately, a number of 
people suffering from fuel poverty have been reported, and many of them are 
having difficulty accessing appropriate/sufficient pricing information. 
 
Ofgem, the UK energy regulatory body, is responsible for regulating the 
energy sector, including the UK retail electricity market, and has recently 
received the authority from the EU Directive, the Energy Acts and the 
Competition Policy to protect the interests of consumers, as well as 
encouraging them to participate with the market so as to take advantage of 
the liberalised market and competition. In fact, Ofgem has recently conducted 
a probe regarding the retail system (see Chapter 1), but there has not yet 
been any clear resolution of the issues, in particular, to ‘adverse selection’.  
 
In summary, in order to analyse and suggest improvement in the regulatory 
regime in the UK retail electricity market (outputs of regulation), it is important 
to evaluate the inputs of regulation, including: the weaknesses of the market 
system in relation to Ofgem’s performance and the current problems, 
particularly, the issue of inappropriate/insufficient information; and the 
changing environment such as the requirements of EU and national law. 
Clearly, adequate consumer protection is at the centre of this improvement. 
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It is clear that this analytical overview provides a conceptual framework and 
boundary to this study, which is to provide an analysis of the issue of 
improvement in regulation and its enforcement, through the provision of 
regulatory information, as the best way to cope with various weaknesses and 
threats which lead to a reduction in competition. The analysis will be 
completed with the provision of empirical evidence (shown in the second part 
of the dissertation); as a result, it should be seen how the issue of the 
development of the regulatory regime can be dealt with and made to work 
more effectively.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has introduced the main concepts of market, competition, 
deregulation and regulation and their incorporation. The regulatory information 
relating to the three key players: suppliers, consumers and the regulator, has 
been discussed and presented in detail. Additionally, the issue of the use of 
regulation for non-market objectives as a form of social obligation has been 
highlighted. The theory, the UK model of electricity regulation, and related 
legislation involving the retail electricity market has been identified. Because 
price/tariff information within the retail electricity market system remains 
difficult, as well as changing circumstances having increasingly resulted in a 
negative impact on households and those living in fuel poverty; an extension 
to the analysis on the improvement of the regulatory regime within the UK 
retail electricity market with respect to regulatory information and social 
objectives has been focused on.  
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
In the last 20 years, regulation of the UK electric sector has been discussed 
extensively. Researchers have sought, in general, to achieve economic and 
consumer interests as a whole. This chapter, literature review, explores the 
previous studies, identifies past discoveries and discussions and outlines the 
theories that have significantly influenced investigations during this period. 
This chapter presents the hypotheses and methodologies of these studies 
and is followed by an analysis of the weaknesses (knowledge gap) and 
relationships of the existing research. The knowledge gathered will be used to 
structure a research theme and argument and to determine and arrange the 
empirical part of the dissertation. This chapter highlights the value of filling the 
gap in existing research and provides the academic justification for this study. 
The aim is to present the background for the research argument of this 
dissertation in relation to recent findings. This research suggests 
improvements to the regulatory regime of the UK retail electricity market. 
 
This chapter presents the literature available in three key study areas: 1) 
economic issues associated with competition policy and the innovation of 
regulation related to market failure and its effect on consumer interests: 
Section 3.1.1; 2) the regulatory regime of the UK retail electricity market, as 
this appealing system has a direct and considerable impact on the public and 
is currently the focus of many studies: Section 3.1.2; and 3) the impact of 
national and EU-level regulations on the UK retail electricity market. These 
three main issues have been topics of much research: Section 3.1.3. Section 
3.2 provides discussion and a conclusion. 
83 
 
3.1 Recent studies 
The development and analysis of the regulatory regime employed within the 
electricity system is necessary and has influenced a number of studies, with 
these investigations seeking to evaluate and suggest a sensible regulatory 
regime, in order to improve rules and achieve consumer interests, particularly 
when facing economic crises and changing circumstances. Details of these 
recent studies reviewed are also summarised in table format in the appendix 
to this chapter. The table contains related details such as the author(s), year 
of publication, research topic, examined variables and method. The following 
paragraphs briefly highlight general discussions and conclusions. 
 
3.1.1 Studies of regulation in relation to economics  
The studies of regulation which relate to economic issues have been 
concerned mainly with market failure. The focus has been on finding and 
addressing practical models of regulation and its enforcement to resolve the 
complex issue of poorly functioning markets. Scholars including Newbery, 
Stigler, and Stiglitz have studied regulation as part of governmental 
intervention. Despite the number of studies on the use of regulation, no clear 
consensus has emerged on its use.  
  
Previous research has focussed on the following: 1) the impact of regulation 
on the allocation of energy resources and resulting drop in energy prices for 
consumers; and 2) the role of the regulatory bodies in creating appropriate 
regulations and the means to enforce them to develop/reform the energy 
sector. Both topics have been influenced heavily by public choice theory and 
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the notion of regulatory capture, both of which relate to purposive uses of 
regulatory policy and regulation which are likely to be utilised by politicians for 
the benefits of certain interest groups (see Chapter 2). For example, an 
exceptional study by Stigler and Friedland (1962 pp.1-16) looked at the 
impact of regulation applied to various independent variables and the final 
price of electricity. Using statistical regression to verify the hypothesis, this 
study found that regulation applied in the sector neither created an innovative 
impact on the price trend nor reduced the impact of independent variables on 
the final price. Regulation was used as a tool to favour particular interest 
groups, and it led to price increases. 
 
The above study made use of early attempts to understand how an 
application of regulation affected the interests of consumers and to address 
the disadvantageous results of some regulatory action. However, this lacked 
several important perspectives. The study did not investigate other critical 
sources relating to an inefficient system, such as asymmetric information and 
other weaknesses and threats. Simply put, regulation and its enforcement 
changed the situation. Laws regarding market engagement of privately-owned 
utilities were not introduced until 1992, so the bilateral relationship between 
consumers and the market did not appear until almost two decades after this 
study was conducted. Thus, the variables used for this early investigation 
have been outdated, and the conclusions made by these scholars in regard to 
regulatory policy do not apply under the liberalisation of both internal and 
external environments in today’s electrical system. Therefore, an additional 
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study regarding the application of regulation amidst a liberalised electricity 
system is still needed.  
 
In an era of market orientation 
In the era of market orientation, millions of people living in fuel poverty have 
been the adverse effect of a poorly functioning energy market. For that 
reason, many economic studies have focused on the effect of changeable 
degrees of market efficiency on the electricity price, especially prices for 
householders. This has resulted in two main controversial perspectives. 
Various studies have advocated not using regulation as a tool to correct the 
unfavourable consequence of an inefficient market (see, for example, Besley 
2006; McNutt 2002; Roberts et al. 1991), but a number of scholars have 
studied appropriateness of and extent of regulation to eliminate sources of 
market failure (see, for example, Stiglitz 2008a, 2000; Newbery 2002; Mitchell 
and Simmons 1994).  
 
Market failure relating to market power and asymmetric 
information 
In relation to the above, many studies have focused on the background, 
development, and assessment of the liberalisation of electricity sectors and 
have revealed that the market, including the retail system, has normally failed 
to deliver reliable electricity service at low and stable prices. Themes of 
market failure, market power, and asymmetric information, all of which reduce 
competition, have been studied substantially and viewed as weaknesses in 
the energy market system, which critically affect the economy and consumer 
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interests (see, for example, Kwoka and Madjarov 2007; Peerbocus 2007; 
Thomas 2006, 2002b; Sioshansi 2006; Rowlands et al. 2004; Woo et al. 2003; 
Newbery 2002; Levi-Faur 2001; Stiglitz 2000; Pollitt 1997; Mitchell and 
Simmons 1994).  
 
While the issue of information has been included in the analysis on retail 
competition, the question of how to identify consumer reaction to pricing and 
market factors has not yet to be resolved. More investigation of the retail 
electricity market is essential and requires significant evaluation particularly 
with regard to information flow since asymmetric and poor information as a 
result of price manipulation and market power (a weakness) can cause further 
market failure which disadvantages consumers. 
 
In relation to the above issue regarding consumers, information, and 
education, exceptional researches conducted by Rowlands et al. (2004 
pp.272-283) and Ipsos MORI (2008 pp.1-89) revealed the attitude, 
motivations, and behaviour of residential electricity purchasers, examining 
who was likely to participate in the market by using information and switching 
service providers, and investigating what motivates these people to change 
service providers.  
 
Both studies found that consumers switched service providers because they 
were offered a better deal with cheaper electricity prices. Their decisions were 
affected by perceptions about resources used, environmental effects, 
reliability, etc., while those who did not switch were less interested in price 
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and more about service. Additionally, the latter analysis showed that most 
consumers lacked knowledge while making a purchase, and found the 
information confusing, resulting in them making uninformed choices. 
Unfortunately, more than half of the switchers obtained a worse deal.  
 
The above brings to attempts to understand the use of pricing information by 
energy consumers for their market participation. However, some aspects of 
these studies may be developed further. The provision of information used 
within the system should be addressed, thus providing a better understanding 
of the following: 1) how stakeholders manage to use price/tariff information to 
interact with consumers and support their engagement in the market; and 2) 
the resulting issue of asymmetric information causing ‘adverse selection’. 
Furthermore, the issue is not only about imperfect information but about 
deception, scams, and misleading information, with these issues currently 
leading to a poorly functioning market and millions of UK residents living in 
fuel poverty. A further study on these issues is clearly required. 
 
Regulation for tackling market failure 
Related studies on market failure and the use of regulation by the regulator 
within the reformed electricity sector found that the market was far from 
competitive and the reformed system lacked good regulatory models and 
practices. Interest centres on finding ways of sustaining electricity reformation 
and market orientation with an adequate degree of competition so as to 
ensure increased levels of consumer benefits (see, for example, Pollitt 2007; 
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Rothkopf 2007; Newbery 2002; Levi-Faur 2001; Defeuilley 1999; Tenenbaum 
1996).  
 
The themes of market efficiency, market failure, and government intervention 
have gained importance in their influence on the research problem and 
hypotheses of many studies. Studies have tried to: 1) identify the necessity to 
have regulation in the energy market system; 2) uncover an appropriate 
principle of regulation for the reformed energy market; and 3) find the extent 
to which regulation can be applied within the system in response to market 
failure. The studies found various results and suggested different solutions. 
Nonetheless, the majority of studies confirmed that regulation was a key to 
resolving market failure in order to protect the interests of consumers (see, for 
example, Anderson 2009; Bell 2002; Brown 2001; Stiglitz 2000, 1994). The 
exceptional studies presented below attempted to understand and identify the 
relationship between the market and regulation. 
 
For example, Brown (2001 pp.1197-1207) examined cost-effective gain 
(energy efficiency) within the electricity system and the opportunity for 
consumers to consume energy at the least cost (total cost) in relation to the 
pressures of market failure and market barriers. The findings showed how 
existing market failure and related barriers created low use of energy 
efficiency by consumers. It was argued that this situation must be resolved 
through governmental action because it could not be solved by private 
companies.  
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This study confirmed the appearance and consequences of market failure 
within reformed electricity sectors and proposed the use of regulation as a 
sustainable way to strengthen energy efficiency in the public interest. 
Certainly, the question of allocative and operational energy efficiency is 
important. But the study did not tackle the complexities associated with other 
divisions of the reformed energy sector. In actual fact, the retail market sector 
predominantly connects to consumers, in particular, householders. Therefore, 
an investigation into the issue of market failure and the use of regulation 
within the retail system would be valuable. Weaknesses in the retail system 
relate to the roles of various stakeholders but most adversely affect 
householders. Thus, an extensive investigation into this sector is still required. 
 
Other researchers have explored the impact of certain regulation on the 
overall performance of the reformed electricity sector, including an analysis of 
price cap regulation as a driving force for effectiveness (see, for example, 
Giannakis et al. 2005; Bell 2002; Sappington 2001). For example, Bell (2002 
pp.66-73) studied performance-based regulation (PBR) within deregulated 
electricity sectors in the US, the UK, and other European countries over the 
last decade, concluding that effective use of price cap regulation could create 
desirable results if other components, including incentive mechanisms and 
benchmarking techniques, were also in place. Most importantly, the study 
showed that price cap regulation applied for a short period in the UK resulted 
in lower electricity costs and retail market prices under the introduction of full 
competition.  
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However, at this time, price cap regulation can no longer be used in some 
reformed electricity systems, including the UK retail electricity market. Thus, 
new questions arise: What regulations can be applied when retail prices 
increase? How can we improve the retail system to prevent the exercise of 
market power, etc., in the public interest?  
 
In related investigation, several studies have argued that deregulation of the 
UK electricity sector has been less beneficial than the regulated system and 
proposed ending industry reform. They disclosed that electricity prices 
increased dramatically after the implementation of reform, which resulted in 
more people living in energy poverty. Additionally, the regulators usually 
focused on the interests of the industry and on economic issues (see, for 
example, Anderson 2009; Kwoka and Madjarov 2007; Thomas 2006, 2002b; 
Macerron 2001). It is worth noting here that it would yield the least by 
returning to an under-regulated system. In fact, the benefits of reform have 
been widely observed, such as a significant efficiency gain within generation 
sectors (see, for example, Pollitt 2007; Dubash 2001; Magnus 1997). Doubt 
remains only over improved regulation and its enforcement in response to 
market failure.  
 
Market failure and market power in relevance to competition 
policy (public policy) 
Subsequent studies have focused on the effective use of public policy to 
tackle market failure and other issues. Studies on competition policy (towards 
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economy) in response to market failure associated with limited competition 
and market power issues have been discussed extensively.  
 
Several researchers have investigated competition policy as a means to 
respond to market power (a weakness) which arises from inappropriate 
mergers/takeovers. As highlighted in Chapter 2, competition policy provides 
the regulator with the authority to use regulation to cut market power and 
other anti-competitive practices, allowing competition to be maximised for the 
interests of consumers. Most researchers found that market power affects 
energy price information and argued for adequate intervention by the CC (see 
for example, Rangel 2008; Green 2006; Rubinfeld 2004; Dutz and Vagliasindi 
2000) 
 
For example, an exceptional study by Green (2006 pp. 2532-2541) examined 
problematic mergers within reformed electricity markets in the UK and other 
European countries, finding that integration/mergers prevented consumers 
from benefiting from a liberalised market, because they either were not 
offered lower prices or did not recognise the differences in prices being 
offered. He argued for price regulation to benefit those who never switched 
suppliers, additionally suggesting that competition authorities be more vigilant 
and attentive. However, Green did not clarify how to ensure an increased 
degree of competition after a controversial merger occurred. Therefore, an 
investigation into this issue in order to allowing competition to be maximised in 
the retail electricity market would be valuable. 
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A balance between liberalisation and the use of regulation 
One exception to this limitation in the literature is the study by Pollitt (2007 
pp.1-23), which examined the balance between liberalisation and the use of 
regulation within the electricity sectors. Unlike other researchers, Pollitt sought 
to uncover right practices for the reformed electricity sector. His insight was 
valuable because he neither accepted nor rejected the use of regulation; 
rather, his broad investigation aimed at identifying the right application of 
regulation within competitive systems. 
 
The study exposed many cases that called for regulation of electricity prices, 
service quality, loss of investment, etc. (evaluation criterion). Therefore, it was 
concluded that efficient regulation was necessary, particularly for those 
electricity markets. However, Pollitt pointed out that liberalisation and 
regulation were not mutually exclusive; rather, institutional capability was key 
to determining the degree of regulation appropriate for restructuring the 
system and to managing future developments. If existing regulation failed to 
benefit consumers, it would be an opportunity to strengthen the system 
through the development of a better regulatory regime. This reflects that the 
appropriate use of regulation (the outputs of regulation) depends on the 
degree of the problem (the inputs of regulation, including various externalities 
and changes in the systemic environment) faced by each country. For this 
reason, development of the regulatory regime in the UK retail electricity 
market must be clarified regularly, as this sector has recently faced many 
challenges and most affects householders. 
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Disagreement over using regulation to tackling market failure 
Many studies viewed regulation as problematic to the growth of the reformed 
electricity sector, competition, and the public interest. Such economic 
regulation includes cost-based rate regulation, price cap regulation, market 
entry regulation, merger regulation, licence conditions, etc (see for example, 
Littlechild 2009; Suzzoni 2009; Besley 2006).  
 
These studies adopted methodologies and investigations influenced by the 
themes of market force, inefficient market, government failure, and public 
choice theory relating to regulatory capture. Interestingly, no studies have 
provided conclusive evidence of negative consequences arising due to use of 
regulation. 
 
For example, an exceptional study by Suzzoni (2009) examined the impact of 
price regulation on the retail energy market and focusing on the uses of 
regulated end-user electricity/gas prices in Europe. Previously, according to 
the EC’s view (ERGEG 2007a; 2007b), regulated end-user prices would 
create a negative effect on the retail energy market and competition; the 
assumption was that low prices would deter investment in technological 
innovations and encourage investors to leave the market. Additionally, set 
prices limited consumers from market participation and switching suppliers, 
leading to an uncompetitive environment within the market (through inefficient 
price signalling).  
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Suzzoni’s research, however, showed that regulation was not always the 
cause of problems. This scenario depended upon particular structures within 
the market system. However, the research indicated that regulation for 
consumer protection was not recommended and that consumers should 
understand their right to access information and switch supplier when 
necessary. 
 
From the above, there was no evidence that the use of regulation within 
reformed energy markets led to worse results for the public. The argument by 
the EC over disadvantageous consequences stemming from the use of 
regulation is not entirely theoretical. It was based on experience gained from 
other markets (other goods) but not specifically from energy markets. In short, 
the hypothesis that regulation would unfavourably affect the system and 
eventually hurt consumers was not supported by the evidence. Instead, the 
study above identified the regulation used within many reformed energy 
systems in the majority of EU Member States. Although issues of market 
power and price manipulation were not investigated, the study indicates that 
the effect of regulation, such as price cap regulation, depends highly on the 
system and its environment. Some systems may have the internal strength 
that negates the call for additional regulation, while some systems may have 
internal weaknesses along with critical threats from the exterior environment 
and thus require regulation in order to support the system. This clearly reflects 
the value of this dissertation. 
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3.1.2 Studies of regulation in relation to the development of 
the UK retail electricity market 
Since the retail electricity market was introduced in 1998, an increasing 
number of studies regarding economic regulation have been carried out and 
have gained importance. Additionally, new directives and laws have been 
introduced, stressing that improvement in the regulatory regime within the 
internal retail electricity market is essential to supporting consumer interests 
(discussed in detail in the next section). Regulation in line with these 
legislative changes has become the main area of study (see, for example, 
Anderson 2009; Pollitt 2009; OJ L 176, 15.07.2003).  
 
Various perspectives of regulations applied within the UK 
retail electricity market 
Several studies have focused on the principles and challenges of good 
regulation in retail electricity supply, such as regulatory transparency, 
tendering, and innovation. Analysis indicates that householders need 
transparent tariff information for the supplier-switching process. However, 
doubt remains regarding the switching rate and actual benefit received by the 
switcher. Moreover, efficient (good) regulation is subject to some degree of 
modification due to environmental changes (threats) (see, for example, Pollitt 
2010; Pollitt 2007; Balu 1997; Tenenbaum 1996). Changes in internal and 
external factors of the market system have been noted in searching for a 
possible framework for an improved regulatory regime. This implies that 
improvement in the regulatory regime is always necessary because the 
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system faces the uncertainty of unpredictable changes in politics, economics, 
society, and technology. 
 
Many researchers addressed the regulatory model of the UK retail electricity 
market, indicating the advantages and disadvantages of the regulatory regime 
established for promoting competition within the retail market system and its 
effects on retail prices and consumers (see, for example, Defeuilley 2009a, 
2009b; Levi-Faur 2001; Littlechild 2001, 2009; Thomas 2006, 2002a, 2002b). 
These have been influenced by several theories, including: market failure 
relating to mergers, market power, and poor information, competition policy, 
competition and regulation, efficient regulation, and non-market objectives. 
The following studies show comparable results. 
 
For example, an exceptional analysis by Thomas (2002b pp.1-11) reviewed 
the disadvantages of the current structure within the UK retail electricity 
market relating to the regulatory regime. The findings showed that firms in the 
UK shifted costs from industrial consumers to householders after price cap 
regulation was removed from the retail sector in 2002. Mergers were part of 
the issue, particularly those between the retail and other sectors. The 
companies which merged with retail suppliers survived on the high profits 
from significantly increased retail prices during the period after 2002. This 
clearly highlights the persistent issues relating to market power and mergers 
in the retail electricity sector. 
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By contrast, another exceptional study by Littlechild (2001, 2009) looked at 
the advantage of the current structure within the UK retail electricity market 
relating to changes in the regulatory regime. He explained that consumer 
benefits were served through the choices offered after the introduction of full 
retail competition. He showed that the UK system had the highest switching 
rate and assumed that those who switched found a better deal with lower 
prices. It is clear that electricity price reduction for householders was not the 
prime concern for him; it was, rather, a benefit achieved over time, a result of 
sustained growth of the retail system via competition and switching supplier.  
 
In related studies, Defeuilley (2009a, 2009b) discussed the evolution of the 
UK retail electricity market through examining the switching rate, the extent 
and implications of consumer engagement with the market, along with issues 
of market power and loyalty, in an examination of how expectations and 
outcomes had been delivered by the introduction of the retail electricity market 
and competition.  
 
The findings showed that, to date, the market has not yielded the results 
expected. People reacted differently to price signals and could not make 
appropriate choices. While Britain achieved the highest switching rate of the 
countries studied, the gain reported was low. Defeuilley underlined inefficient 
price signalling and the findings relating to benefits obtained by consumers 
not correlating to the switching rate - a fact that indicates a need for further 
investigation to find a logical explanation. Additionally, a loyalty issue within 
retail competition is reflected in the fact that UK consumers mainly chose to 
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switch to big brand suppliers (the companies that they could name). Defeuilley 
recommended that the system should focus on consumer participation, by 
both active and inactive customers, by encouraging them to access 
appropriate information and make good decisions on tariffs. This clearly 
highlights that the issues of switching supplier and information in relation to 
benefits gained by consumers represents a weakness and needs further 
investigation. 
 
Several studies examined and compared the regulatory regimes and retail 
systems of electricity sectors in many countries, including the UK, indicating 
the pros and cons of each regime with regard to public interests. These 
investigations were influenced by the themes of the utility regulation, including 
the existing model of electricity regulation, as well as other related laws and 
legislations having an impact on its structure, such as the EU Directives and 
the national Acts. The findings showed that the role of the regulator in the UK 
is explicit and vital and fully influences the application of regulation and its 
effect on the public interests (see, for example, eds Coen and Heritier 2005; 
Stern 2001; Cave and Stern 1998). In relation to this, however, other studies 
concerning the performance of the UK energy regulator (Ofgem), indicating a 
lack of power to regulate electricity sectors due to the control of industry 
interests at the sacrifice of consumer interests (a weakness). Researchers 
pointed out that more UK householders would have been better off if Ofgem 
had been tougher on energy companies, a point calling for further reforms 
(see, for example, Maclaine 2003; Newberry 2002; Anderson 1981). This 
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implies that the performance of the regulator is important, needing to be 
examined regularly in order to determine what to improve.  
 
Additionally, in related studies by Pollitt highlighted various aspects of 
regulation within the UK retail electricity market. His investigations were 
influenced by the frameworks of the reformed energy system and of the 
development of regulation with regard to changes occurring inside and 
outside the system. First, Pollitt (2010, 2009a) discussed and made 
recommendations on the future of energy network regulation, including 
regulation within the retail sector (the RPI-X framework used for regulating 
Britain’s energy network since 1989). The results showed that there was a 
need to engage with present and future consumers and a need to improve 
consumer advocacy.  
 
Second, Pollitt (2009b) examined the impact of climate change on the 
potential regulatory model. The analysis showed that regulation needs to be 
applied to protect the environment from the pollution produced by the 
electricity generation sector and supported emission trading to reduce the 
amount of pollutants. This is to ensure global climate security.  
 
Third, Pollitt (2008) examined and made proposals regarding how the energy 
network and existing regulation can contribute to a sustainably liberalised 
energy sector that directly affects consumer interests. The findings showed 
that regulatory effort to encourage efficient and effective switching and price 
transparency within the retail sector were necessary. Environment problems 
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resulting from electricity generation were also highlighted, and it was strongly 
recommended to bring these to the attention of the regulator (as this is 
compliant with EU legislation). According to Pollitt, Ofgem’s authorities have 
to audit decisions between suppliers and consumers rather than act as 
decision maker. Furthermore, Ofgem must focus on the treatment of 
householders, in particular those who suffer from fuel poverty.  
 
In brief, Pollitt’s studies clearly highlighted the role of regulation within the 
liberalised electricity sector. However, Pollitt did not make it clear how 
regulation might be applied to help vulnerable people who face difficulties in 
the switching process or have to pay higher electricity bills as a result of the 
use of renewable energy. These points reflect the need to identify 
improvements in the regulatory regime within the retail electricity market in 
order to reduce the weaknesses and the threats and to help residents. 
 
Other studies have looked at the performance of the UK retail electricity 
market, using the retail electricity price index, the frequency of electricity 
blackouts, and improved service satisfaction as indicators of the evolutionary 
stage of the market and to help establish appropriate regulatory regimes for 
the market system (see, for example, Pollitt 2009; Ipsos MORI 2008; The Bow 
Group 2007; Woo et al.2003).  
 
Some studies took a different tact, examining the performance of the retail 
energy market and proposing a contribution to vulnerable groups as a social 
obligation. For example, an exceptional study by Baker (2006) investigated 
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the impact of social tariffs on consumer interests. The study showed that the 
retail energy system cannot effectively deliver benefits to vulnerable 
consumers. Grants offered by energy firms for this non-market objective were 
limited, and many assumed that energy firms transferred these costs to non-
vulnerable consumers (the Competition Act limits the extent to which the 
energy companies can transfer this cost to other consumers). The study 
highlighted the issue of the social tariff (a weakness) but did not examine to 
what extent this non-market objective has had an impact on UK electricity 
price increases. 
 
The Ofgem Probe (Ofgem 2008) recently examined retail electricity market 
performance. The findings showed that the market has been functioning well; 
however, consumers have found it difficult to engage in the market due to 
information issues. Unfortunately, to date, a practical method for resolving this 
problem has not yet been proposed. 
  
3.1.3 Studies of regulation in relation to the impact of 
national- level or EU level law/regulation on the UK retail 
electricity market 
The EC has recently addressed many issues relating to the reformed energy 
sectors, including energy efficiency, renewable energy, and energy markets. 
As a result, an increase in regulation to ensure a high degree of competition 
and social interest has been observed in electricity sectors. For these 
reasons, recently, studies have extensively focused on how this has had 
impacted the electricity system and, eventually, consumers. 
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Many studies have examined the history of EC utility regulation and 
investigated models and levels of regulation applied within many reformed 
energy sectors. Studies have found that, despite integrated regulation having 
courted controversy and EU-level regulation not being fully accepted in some 
countries, EU energy regulation still has a significant impact on European 
reformed energy sectors and the innovation of regulation, including the UK 
retail energy markets (see, for example, Rowlands 2005; eds Coen and 
Thatcher 2001; Eberlein 2001). 
 
For example, one exceptional research by Rowlands (2005 pp.965-974) with 
regard to the EU Directive (the previous Directive 2003/54/EC) on renewable 
electricity, which examined the history of the Directive and its impact on 
regulatory challenges and changes in reformed European electricity systems, 
including the UK retail electricity market. Because environmental issues and 
alternative energy resources have recently gained significance for the EC, 
Member States have therefore been encouraged to develop reformed 
electricity sectors towards the goal of renewable electricity (through the 
regulatory regime and enforcement).  
 
The study showed that there have been Green Papers and White Papers 
relating to renewable electricity, with the latter announcing the EU law and 
regulation. This indicates the important role the Directive has played in the UK 
electricity sector, including the retail system. The study also underlined the 
development of European electricity reform as an evolution significantly 
influenced by the EU, rather than national law, and entailing various 
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disagreements. Having said that, since development of the regulatory regime 
has to be in line with EC law; therefore, it is important to look carefully at EU 
law and regulation and to relate them to an analysis of improvement in the 
regulatory regime of the UK retail electricity market. 
 
3.2 Discussion and Conclusions 
Discussion 
First, previous studies have shown that the reformed electricity market simply 
failed to deliver low prices for consumers. Electricity price increases are a 
critical issue, caused by market failure related to mergers, market power, 
inefficient price signals (relating to asymmetric information), the effect of 
switching supplier, the cost of the social tariff, and Ofgem’s performance. In 
particular, the biggest weakness was the unresolved issue regarding 
information. Expectations for lower prices and successful participation by 
consumers have not been met despite liberalisation and more retail 
competition. In fact, millions of consumers have been left with worse deals 
after deciding to switch suppliers. Having noted such events, it is important to 
understand the relationship between energy price rises and these internal 
issues/factors. 
 
Second, the studies reflect that development of the regulatory regime is vital 
to ensuring consumer benefits within the retail electricity supply sector amidst 
market failure. Competition policy, competition authorities, and regulatory 
authorities have played a key role in promoting competition and preventing 
development of an anti-competitive environment, while the use of regulation 
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toward the goal of competition policy has been found necessary against 
inappropriate mergers. In this regard, the role of the regulator has been 
highlighted as having a significant impact on the effective use of regulation to 
foster public interests as a whole. From these perspectives, studying an 
improvement in the regulatory regime in relevance to the role of the energy 
regulator is important.  
 
Third, despite previous studies, in particular the works by Pollitt, which was 
substantially related to the development of a regulatory model for the 
electricity sector including the UK retail supply market, no regulatory model 
has been proposed explicitly to reduce the long-term price-associated risk for 
householders arising as a result of changing circumstances from inside and 
outside the system (inputs of regulation), in particular for vulnerable groups for 
whom electricity price increases have been a major concern. Additionally, 
despite Pollitt’s studies, the important issue of the use of information to create 
a sustainable way for protecting the interests of consumers has not yet been 
proposed explicitly. This situation reflects that there is a deficit in regulatory 
studies, especially associated with asymmetric information in energy sectors.  
 
Fourth, in spite of the regulatory model imposed in European countries, there 
has been no agreement over how to improve the regulatory regime and its 
enforcement within the retail electricity market. Moreover, the responsibility of 
regulatory authorities in the face of future uncertainties has also been unclear. 
Thus, an appropriate regulatory regime is still needed, particularly one relating 
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to a sustainable way to safeguard the interests of householders towards 
social objectives.  
 
Fifth, the importance of creating an efficient regulatory regime to help protect 
present and future consumers is a prime requirement of the Energy Act 2008 
and EU Directives (discussed in detail in the next section). Ofgem has already 
conducted its probe to investigate the energy retail markets to find out how 
householders have benefited and have been protected within the competitive 
market. Unfortunately, their findings seemingly do not reveal the real problem 
of market failure due to uncompetitive environments and soaring prices. Nor 
do they suggest an appropriate regulatory regime. Despite the Project 
Discovery (as previously mentioned in Chapter 1) conducted to reveal the 
effect of changing circumstances on energy security and consumers, clear 
measures and regulations to protect consumers have not been proposed. 
While the promotion of competition has been touted as a solution, competition 
alone can produce undesirable consequences. 
 
Previous researches significantly highlight the importance of further 
investigation into the issue of information in the liberalised market, which 
causes the greatest market failure. This reflects that an improved regulatory 
regime is clearly required to: 1) resolve information issues relating to degree 
of competition, consumer market participation and service provider switching; 
and 2) protect the interests of householders against challenges, particularly 
relating to internal weaknesses combined with critical threats from the exterior 
environment faced by the retail system. This study will, therefore, address the 
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issue of the evolution of the UK retail electricity market in relation to current 
problems within the system. This will help provide a comprehensive 
understanding of issues from inside and outside the system. The study will 
also provide an analysis of the issue of asymmetric information relating to the 
provision of price/tariff information to provide suggestions for improvement in 
the regulatory regime. Importantly, the analysis will relate EU-level law and 
regulation regarding necessary information to an improved regulatory regime 
for the retail sector (with compliance to EU requirements). This will extend 
earlier work by taking into account the factors discussed above, particularly 
asymmetric information in the UK retail electricity market, while considering 
consumer benefits in a recommendation for an improved regulatory regime.  
 
The task of accounting for the various factors both within and outside the 
system is very complex. Hence, this study will be based on the relationship 
between retailers, consumers, and the regulator with regard to internal and 
external issues, retail price information, and consumer benefits. The 
recommendations in this study will not only benefit householders, but will also 
serve the vulnerable people who need clearly-defined regulation to protect 
them from market-related disadvantages.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter reviewed the literature, hypotheses, methodologies, and 
conclusions of previous studies. The number of studies investigating the 
development and performance of the reformed electricity sector and its 
regulation has increased considerably. This body of work includes this 
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dissertation, which is aimed at contributing to the extensive literature on this 
topic of interest. Knowledge gathered from the literature review has 
contributed to the identification of issues that deserve further investigation. 
Finally, the study provides an extended analysis of improvements to the 
regulatory regime within the UK retail electricity market. 
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Chapter 4: A Historical Overview of the UK 
Electricity Sector 
This chapter gives a historical overview of the UK electricity sector over the 
past 20 years, when the reformation began, up until now, reflecting where the 
establishment of the UK retail electricity market developed from and how the 
evolution has taken place. The article addresses the issues of: 1) the 
electricity industry structure: Section 4.1; 2) the policy and regulatory regimes: 
Section 4.2; and 3) the price structure, and simultaneously demonstrates the 
scenario of continually increasing electricity prices against the consequences 
of the evolving industry structure and its policy and regulatory regime: Section 
4.3. The chapter also attempts to draw out the important perspectives, 
providing a comprehensive understanding of the background of the research 
framework in relation to recent issues emerging in the system, and 
highlighting the appropriate notion of improved regulatory regime against the 
available evidence, so as to respond to the current problem within the retail 
electricity market.  
 
4.1 Evolution of the electricity industry structure 
The UK electricity industry was initially governed by municipal and regional 
governments, with later calls for nationalisation in accordance with the 
Electricity Act 1947. This Act resulted in the generation and transmission 
sectors operated by the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) 
becoming owned and directed by the government. The distribution sector, 
including supply, was governed by the 12 Area Boards, which later became 
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known as Regional Electricity Companies (RECs) also controlled by the 
government (Thomas 2002a; Levi-Faur 2001; Domah and Pollitt 2000).  
 
The change in the industry structure reflected the fact that the service, 
including generating the power and moving the electricity from power stations 
through the transmission and distribution lines, was only being operated and 
delivered by the government at that time. The focus of the Act moving towards 
nationalisation was clearly with the purpose of service provision for 
consumers by the government, thereby they could have safeguarded and, 
accordingly, public interest was met.  
 
However, later, there was substantial development of the industry towards a 
regime of private regulated monopolies or private ownership with very limited 
competition, as a result of the Energy Act 1983 (Levi-Faur 2001). The change 
was aimed at opening up access to demand for all generators to the 
transmission network, and spurring a new trade of electrical energy, as well 
as removing the entry barriers in the generation sector (ibid. p.56, 65).This 
also created a transformation in service provision that meant the electricity 
industry was managed by the private sector, while the regulatory regime and 
policymaking were still under government control. The transmission network 
and the distribution boards remained within a monopoly and were obliged to 
buy power at the cheapest wholesale price offered by any generator, in order 
to ultimately deliver benefits of competition to consumers (Green 2006, 1998). 
However, unfortunately, there was a failure in industrial improvement in the 
early stages of altering ownership, which was justified as insufficient 
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competition; this was due to the remaining power of the CEGB (Pollitt 1997; 
Roberts et al. 1991). Changes were introduced with the objectives of 
increased competition, as stated above; electrical energy was anticipated to 
be offered competitively in generation sectors. However, the remaining power 
of the CEGB continued and the government was seen to be continuing to 
control the regulatory regime, reflecting an unfavourable degree of 
competition in the industry. Electricity prices could never have been lower as 
a result of this regime. 
 
As a consequence of the above issues, the focus on development soon 
moved to the need to have competition largely emerged in the system, by 
introducing reformation of the electricity sector, as opposed to the existence of 
a natural monopoly as well as the continuing power of the CEGB (Green 
2006; Levi-Faur 2001). Therefore, electricity service was later set to be 
provided in a competitive market in response to many issues or pressures. 
These included: 1) an increase in fluctuation in electrical demand, which was 
difficult to manage and organise because of electricity being a non-storable 
goods; 2) a reduction in supply because of limited fuel resources, which, 
generally, were coal and oil at that time, leading to the high cost of generating 
electricity (Roberts et al. 1991 p.45); 3) a low generating capacity (Bier et al. 
2003 p.113); 4) the highly excessive cost of power plant construction, in 
particular those plants associated with nuclear power; 5) an increased cost 
because of environmental consciousness; 6) a high maintenance 
requirement; and 7) an absence of choices available for consumers (Dubash 
2001; Macatangay 2001; Pollitt 1997). Clearly, these critical issues escalated 
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into a severe financial crisis during this time, leading to an intensively 
disadvantaged impact on the country’s growth. Public spending within 
electricity generation sector was taken into account and needed to be reduced 
in response to the economic crisis; therefore promoting competition became 
the case. Investment in technology and innovations was required so as to 
meet the objectives of increasing competition. Consumers could expect to 
receive better benefits as a result. 
 
UK electricity privatisation 
There was soon a shift in governance to the regime of privatisation in 1989. 
The electricity industry was genuinely privatised soon after Mrs Thatcher won 
her third General Election in 1987. The CEGB was split into four different 
parts; the generation sector was separated into three companies known as 
National Power, PowerGen and Nuclear Electric. All electricity power stations 
were owned by the first two companies in the ratio 60:40, respectively. These 
were privatised except for some nuclear power plants, which still remain part 
of state-owned companies (Green 2006, 1998; Marshall 2003; Levi-Faur 
2001).  
 
The transmission sector became the National Grid Company (NGC) and was 
owned by the RECs, but was eventually privatised in 1995. NGC is now 
completely independent and performs as one system. It was responsible for 
being a ‘system operator’, soon after the introduction of privatisation, to 
facilitate competition in a ‘pool market’, where competing generators offer the 
lowest wholesale price possible to the transmission network through a bidding 
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system (Böllhoff 2005; Thomas 2002a; Balu 1997). This system required 
competing generators to submit and place bids in their respective areas 24 
hours in advance, but the bidding was regularly set up every half an hour. The 
system operator would pay for the successful bidders and arranged the 
generation schedules together with these companies. A few hours before the 
period of electricity consumption, the successful generators had to inform the 
system operator of which power plants could be run for generating that 
electricity. The buyers would also re-inform the system operator of the amount 
of power their consumers would need for that certain period of time. This pool 
market was known as the New Electricity Trading Arrangement (NETA) until 
2005 before incorporating Scotland and becoming British Electricity 
Transmission and Trading Arrangements (BETTA) since, with better facilities 
to support the efficiency of the wholesale electricity market (Thomas 2006, 
2005, 2001; Green 2006, 1998).  
 
Within the distribution sector, the 12 RECs were also totally privatised and 
separated in 1999. Soon afterwards, the RECs were completely taken over by 
different generation companies such as London Electricity, PowerGen, and 
Centrica (Green 2006; Thomas 2002a). Scottish privatisation was also 
introduced to cope with the debt and, finally, two regional distribution 
companies and other suppliers responsible for generation, transmission and 
distribution were set up (NAO 2001; Roberts et al. 1991).  
 
In relation to the above, two associated regulatory bodies were introduced: 1) 
the Director General of Electricity Supply (DGES), which was responsible for: 
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ensuring that demand was satisfied; promoting competition in generation and 
supply sectors; and developing licence conditions and compliance; and 2) the 
regulator responsible for regulating the electricity industry known as the Office 
for Electricity Regulation (Offer), which predominantly had to oversee how the 
NGC and distribution lines opened access to demand for generators (Böllhoff 
2005; Marshall 2003; Yarrow 1994). 
 
Privatisation was imposed within the electricity industry, creating a 
restructured industry, and also beginning an era of divided or fragmented 
electricity sectors, this division and segmentation being explicitly introduced 
as a way of preventing a monopoly and helping to create a competitive 
environment (unbundling). This allowed the buying and selling of electrical 
power to occur through the market base, offering the lowest electricity price 
with the lowest profit margin by generators through a bidding structure, so as 
to meet the balance of supply and demand and to create greater satisfaction 
for consumers.  
 
Clearly, the above reflected an advanced system for service and pricing; 
however, market efficiency, at that time, was still not fully developed because 
a completion of privatisation did not happen at once; in fact, this new strategy 
was gradually imposed. Nonetheless, it certainly highlighted a direct 
relationship between generators and the transmission network or between 
competing sellers and buyers (RECs), this relationship becoming a key 
element within the competitive structure. This act of introducing competitive 
practices within the wholesale market sector presumably better served the 
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interests of consumers because wholesale prices were set competitively, 
resulting in cheaper electricity prices for consumers. This meant that the key 
practice of consumer safeguarding already moved from direct protection via a 
relationship between the government and consumers to competition-related 
protection via a new relationship between consumers, the service providers, 
and the government-owned transmission networks, which used the market 
mechanism for determining service prices. Additionally, it could be seen that 
the two regulatory bodies, DGES and Offer, were pursuing their objectives 
through promoting competition and reducing barriers to new entry within both 
generation and supply (RECs) sectors.  
 
Competition after privatisation 
After the introduction of privatisation and unbundling, National Power and 
PowerGen, who owned the majority of the electricity power plants, were 
enforced to reduce their control and encourage competition to avoid a 
monopoly within the generation sector. As Marshall (2003) and Roberts et al. 
(1991) have suggested, these two biggest companies generally held control to 
increase electricity prices within the wholesale market, and evidence has 
shown price manipulation. National Power and PowerGen, at that time, had 
generation capacity of 50 Gigawatts (GW), while the country had generation 
capacity of approximately 70-80 GW (Thomas 2002a; International Energy 
Agency 1999b, quoted in Bier et al. 2003). It required private investors to 
participate much more in generation sectors and the market so as to facilitate 
better competition. Their power and position in the market were reduced in 
1996, as a result of the sale of their electricity power stations, which were 
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coal-fired and oil-fired power plants, to new investors from outside the UK 
such as other European companies. As a result of this action more than ten 
companies became the new generators, such as Innogy (RWE), with 
generation capacity of 8.0 GW, and EDF, with generation capacity of 5.0 GW 
(Green 2006; Marshall 2003; Thomas 2002a).  
 
In particular relation to the above details, the use of coal- and oil-fired power 
plants was considerably reduced and was replaced by gas-fired power plants 
as a consequence of an increase of new entrants into the generation sector 
(Thomas 2006; Marshall 2003). This was due to the price of natural gas 
which, at that time, was much cheaper than coal and oil, along with the fact 
that it was cheaper to build a gas-fired power plant. Therefore, natural gas 
became heavily used by new companies and has since become the main fuel 
for generation (Sharman and Constable 2008; Green 2006). In addition, 
environmental protection focusing on the reduction of carbon emissions 
became a prominent issue for the government in response to European Union 
(EU) requirements, this significantly supporting high use of natural gas in the 
generation sector (Eberlein 2001).  
 
Although the RECs had not been fully privatised after the introduction of 
privatisation, they were later successfully transformed. The growing 
transformation within the RECs was carefully observed; the RECs were still 
responsible for the sole supply of electricity to householders after the 
introduction of privatisation, thereby remaining a monopoly, but they had to 
treat other competitive generators equally, by allowing them access to 
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transmission and distribution lines so as to deliver a better electricity service 
to the consumer (Green 2006; Otero and Price 2001; Price and Hancock 
1998). This was because consumers, after privatisation, were entitled to buy 
electricity directly from generators where their electricity requirement was 
above 1 MW or 1,000 Kilowatts (kW), but this rule was later amended in 1994 
so that a consumer requiring electricity above 100 kW could choose their 
supplier straightaway and could purchase energy directly from the generation 
sector (Marshall 2003; Bell 2002; Green 1998). Studies have highlighted that 
while it could be seen that the two biggest companies’ market share was 
reducing to almost below 25% within the generation sectors as a result of the 
requirement set by the DGES, instead a significant increase in market share 
of the RECs along with other privately European companies in generation 
sectors was noticed, contributing to the RECs having the power to choose 
their own customers with or without placing bid in the wholesale market 
(Green 2006; Marshall 2003; and Robert et al. 1991) 
 
Breaking down the substantial powers of the two biggest companies in the 
generation sector while encouraging competition from new entrants, created 
an equal balance of powers among the companies in determining competitive 
electricity prices within the wholesale market. Competitive environment within 
the generation sector reflected a desirable result of the introduction of 
privatisation. However, it might also have been complicated to organise and 
control the percentage of market share held by new private investors, while 
persuading the two big companies to reduce their substantial market share. 
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At the same time, the RECs were also forced to reduce their control within the 
distribution and supply sectors; generators could access and offer large 
consumers a better deal directly, although the benefit of competitive pricing, at 
that time, was not yet passed on to households. However, these generating 
companies were seen to be acting to compete with the RECs in supplying an 
electricity service for large consumers, leading to a significant degree of 
competition within the supply sector, and large consumers could immediately 
benefit from this soon after privatisation. Clearly, RECs had developed as 
both generators, transmission and distribution line owners during that time; 
and as a result of this vertical integration had become very powerful, reflecting 
their internal strengths. However, as a result of the changes within the RECs 
they might have favoured certain types of consumers, as they had the power 
to control transmission and distribution line charges (as NGC was owned by 
the RECs until 1995), which rival companies did not thereby possibly creating 
a semi-monopoly environment. This meant that some consumers, eventually, 
might have lost benefits. All of these developments to promote competition 
determined prices and clearly implied how the next steps in improvements 
within the industry structure and related regulations should be taken. 
 
The regime of ordered competition: an introduction to the UK 
retail electricity market 
The government, however, continued to promote and maximise competition 
within the electricity sector. A new approach that was introduced towards the 
end of the 1990s came to be known as the regime of ordered competition 
(Levi-Faur 2001). The new approach had a particular focus on the introduction 
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of market-orientation or ‘liberalisation’, with most effort being given to 
promoting and maximising possible competition, comprising many buyers and 
sellers being available within the system, and allowing electricity generators to 
sell power directly to distributors, retailers, and the consumers (Pollitt 2007). 
According to the strategy of liberalisation, distribution lines need not be 
separated from retail suppliers; electricity consumers are offered the facility to 
directly purchase power from generators or from any other energy supplier 
along with the right to choose to change their electricity service providers as 
frequently as they wish (Dubash 2001).  
 
The main two features of this new structure are: 1) the free market 
mechanism (liberalised system); and 2) the competitive regulation of the 
market established and applied by the regulatory authorities to ensure public 
benefits, this reflecting the fact that regulation and competition within the 
reformed market and consumers are connected (Dubash 2001; Fox et al. 
1991, quoted in Ferreira 2006 p.74). This demonstrates the relationship 
between service providers, all energy consumers and the regulator within the 
market (an open system), with the latter being formed in June 1999 and fully 
introduced in November 2000 under the Utilities Act 2000, and known as the 
Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem), which replaced Offer and 
DGES (Pollitt 2008).  
 
The relationship between the three players began to develop when 
privatisation and the wholesale market were introduced in 1989. However, the 
benefits for small consumers were limited and, at that time, householders 
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could not engage with the market unless their energy consumption was above 
100 kW. Therefore, the new focused strategy for increasing competition 
introduced in 1998, a liberalisation strategy,  attributed to greater interaction 
between the suppliers, the consumers and the regulatory body, providing 
greater opportunities for all types of consumers to participate with the market, 
thereby (presumably) creating a competitive environment within the system 
and resulting in better benefits for all consumers. From this point, it could be 
said that the competitive market was driven mainly by consumers because 
they now had the power to buy the service and that sufficiently inspired new 
investments. Additionally, Ofgem was traditionally at the centre of this 
relationship, facilitating dynamic interaction and competition within the system 
and ensuring that demand was satisfied along with development of the new 
regime.  
 
The UK retail electricity market officially began in 1998 after the passing of the 
Competition Act 1998 in response to the requirement for full competition 
within the electricity sector (NAO 2001; Green 1998). Significant changes 
were observed as a consequence of the introduction of retail electricity 
competition.  
 
First, the RECs were completely split up in 1999 and sold to various 
companies from France, Germany and the US, such as EDF, E.ON, and 
Aquila, respectively, despite geographic issues. This movement created 12 
licensed distribution network operators (DNOs) in England and Wales and two 
DNOs in Scotland. These companies operated their distribution services and 
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set service costs under the price cap regulations. Some firms purchased 
electricity power plants within the generation sector and also invested in 
distribution networks, thereby creating a powerful vertical integration, which 
meant that they became the owners of both the power stations and 
distribution lines. For example, in 2002, Aquila became an electricity 
generator that also invested in the distribution network (Green 2006; Thomas 
2002a). 
 
Changes and unbundling continued for at least another five years with some 
companies merging with others and/or being taken over by others, showing 
movement towards both vertical and horizontal integration, and finally leading 
to a restructuring of the UK electricity sector, especially within the distribution 
and supply sectors. Similarly, in 2007, the 14 licensed distribution networks in 
the UK became operated by just seven larger companies, including EDF, 
Central Network, CE Electric, Western Power Distribution, United Utilities, 
Scottish Power, and Scottish and Southern Energy (Green 2006; Munisamy-
Doraisamy 2004; Thomas 2002a). 
 
Second, the change facilitated a substantial emergence of licensed suppliers 
(licensee), including anyone that could deliver electrical energy to all classes 
of consumers by competing with other incumbents or companies who, at that 
time, bought and owned regional distribution networks within the electricity 
industry. These suppliers did not have to either own the transmission and 
distribution lines or the power stations but dealt with delivering an electricity 
service to consumers, which included operating billing, purchasing 
121 
 
transmission and distribution line services from the incumbents, and setting 
the contracting term, as well as purchasing wholesale electrical energy. 
Suppliers were fragmented from the distribution network, creating a vertical 
separation (Pollitt 2007; Yarrow 1994). For example, in 2002, there were 
approximately 14 electricity retail suppliers with licences delivering electrical 
energy to final consumers: London, SWEB, SEEBOARD, Eastern, Norweb, 
South Scotland, Manweb, North Scotland, SWALEC, Southern Electric, 
Yorkshire, Midlands, Northern, and East Midlands. At the same time six 
companies were retail suppliers as well as owning electricity power stations: 
EDF, TXU, Innogy, also called RWE or Npower, Scottish Power, PowerGen 
(E.ON), and Scottish and Southern Energy. In addition, four companies 
existed as vertically integrated companies, generating electricity, owning 
distribution sectors and supplying electricity to final consumers: EDF, Scottish 
Power, Scottish and Southern Energy, and PowerGen (E.ON) (Green 2006; 
Thomas 2002a).  
 
Third, consumers were allowed to choose for themselves suppliers who would 
deliver energy to their houses. This allowed generators, distributors or line 
incumbents and retail suppliers to directly offer a competitive service to the 
consumers. Consumers could shop around and make their own choices by 
choosing and switching to the service provider that suited their needs. 
Additionally, consumers could choose to buy energy straight from the spot 
market (Defeuilley 2009a; Woo et al 2003; Dubash 2001).  
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With regards to opening up full competition within the distribution and supply 
sectors, selling both the distribution lines of the 12 regional areas across 
England and Wales and the distribution lines of the two regional areas across 
Scotland was recognised as a way of encouraging all generators to access 
demand directly, resulting in a two-way communication whereby a balancing 
point of supply and demand could be met. This change in the distribution 
sector reflects an attempt to overcome barriers for new entrants, providing an 
opportunity for those to enter the distribution lines elsewhere. Cheaper service 
prices for the consumers should, therefore, be expected as a result of this 
situation. The important point is that there was an emergence of many 
vertically integrated companies as a result of the change, such as Aquila, who 
demonstrated stability and reliability in running their business, but who also 
had the ability to manipulate high price setting. 
 
Change within the supply sector also took place immediately after the 
introduction of full competition in 1998; the supply sector has been fully 
separated from the distribution sector, creating many new investors with the 
potential to compete with the distribution line owners (incumbents) in 
delivering service to the consumers. The existence of licensed suppliers 
reflects the opportunity for consumers to choose their own electricity service 
from the company that best serves their interests regardless of the area in 
which they live. This is an expected consequence of vertical separation within 
the RECs and consumers should also be able to access cheaper deals as a 
result. However, some of these suppliers might become dominant in a 
particular area as a result of this new competitive environment. As mentioned, 
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there were a few companies performing as both retail suppliers and 
generators. This indicated that presumably these few companies had the 
potential to determine the price for consumers because of the benefit of being 
vertically integrated. It seemed that limited competition within the generation 
sector and the RECs that had happened previously could at that time be 
reduced, but promoting liberalisation with the aim to enhance competition 
within the electricity supply sector without good direction, in turn, could 
potentially cause market power and provide greater disadvantages to some 
degree. In other words, these companies could become stronger under the 
new structure of the electricity industry, thereby having the potential to create 
undesirable outcomes.  
 
In addition, however, the change shows that consumers have become the key 
driver of sustained development of the electricity industry since 1998, 
because consumers can now drive the market by choosing to purchase the 
services on the condition of a better deal being competitively offered. 
 
 Summarizing, competition was fully introduced through privatisation, 
unbundling and restructuring, by separating transmission lines from the 
generation sector within the CEGB and by separating the supply sector from 
the distribution network within the RECs. 
 
Recent changes in retail electricity supply 
There have been many changes continually taking place within the retail 
electricity supply sector since full competition started; company set-ups, 
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mergers, and takeovers have consistently occurred, including small retail 
electricity suppliers merging with and being taken over by larger electricity 
suppliers. For example, Scottish and Southern, known as Scottish and 
Southern Energy (SSE) has recently become the parent company of many 
small electricity suppliers such as Atlantic Electric and Gas, Scottish Hydro-
Electric, Southern Electric, and SWALEC (Green 2006; Deregulation of 
Electricity Supply n.d.). Importantly, there are now only six suppliers as the 
key suppliers within the system of retail electricity supply market: British Gas, 
Scottish Power, Npower, EDF Energy, PowerGen and Scottish and Southern 
Energy. All of these companies are vertically integrated and have substantially 
dominated the UK retail electricity market and pricing, having equal market 
share of the industry in their delivery of electricity to consumers across the 
country, this implying a sign of market power and collusion (Domestic Retail 
Market Report June 2007; Green 2006; Thomas 2002a). Clearly, the current 
structure of the UK retail electricity market being substantially controlled by 
these suppliers, and it is obvious that there is the potential for high price 
setting to have been manipulated by them. It reflects a consequence of 
inappropriate vertical integration within the industry and this disadvantage 
could lead to continually increasing electricity prices as a result of the 
undesirable environment.  
 
In contrast to the above, the retail electricity market has had many innovations 
since the market began in 1998. Some examples are: choices are provided 
for consumers; vertically integrated suppliers themselves have taken 
advantage of better technology by using gas-fired power stations to generate 
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electricity in order to lower the cost and to compete with the incumbents so as 
to offer a more efficient service to consumers; know-how has been applied 
within the system to facilitate choices and to create better relationships 
between suppliers, the consumers and the regulator, including better 
information being made available online; and consumers can now opt for a 
service from another provider that is based elsewhere in the UK. These 
demonstrate the internal strengths within the system as evidenced, which 
seems to ultimately be approaching the goal of industry reformation that is of 
greater benefit to consumers.  
 
It is also worth noting here that the issue of externalities substantially account 
for the degree of growth of the energy system. Other external requirements 
have also affected the extent of the success of the retail electricity market 
system. For example, as mentioned, there is a concerted effort to generate 
electricity using renewable resources, this being a critical threat to the system 
and leading to a higher cost of generation and more expensive energy for 
consumers. Summarizing, the current structure of retail supply has already 
created an impact on pricing structure. 
 
 4.2 Evolution of the policy and the regulatory regime 
From the early days of electricity industry reformation until the present day 
developing policy and regulatory regime in line with the changed structure of 
the industry has become a critical issue because its impacts are related to the 
performance of the industry, as well as the structure of electricity service 
prices. This means that policy and regulatory regime could drive the 
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objectives and the policy goals or the potential to equally meet both social and 
economic interests.  
 
The Conservative government initially introduced a new strategy of 
deregulation within the electricity supply industry (ESI) in 1983 towards an 
energy policy with a new focus on shifting structure of governance from a 
monopoly state to a competition state, aimed at cutting public expenditure in 
response to the consequence of economic crisis. However, this strategy could 
not deliver a successful outcome, as noted earlier, and therefore privatisation 
was subsequently introduced and implemented within the electricity industry 
so as to move away from a monopoly system (Marshall 2003; Levi-Faur 2001; 
Roberts et al. 1991). The Conservative government, at that time, aimed to 
transfer public monopoly to private ownership because of the need to improve 
efficiency within the electricity generation sector, with it being noted by 
scholars that the policy developed could subsequently contribute to reduced 
power of the government and an emergence of deregulation and competition 
(Marshall 2003; Pollitt 1997; Roberts et al. 1991). This new approach 
demonstrated governmental policy and intention to reduce excessive 
subsidies within the electricity industry; rather protecting consumers by 
introducing privatisation and not using the provision of services by the state, 
because the country would not be able to overcome the crisis and protect 
consumers while having the excessive costs of the old regime of service 
provision.  
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4.2.1 Privatisation and changes in the policy and regulatory 
regime   
With regards to the new era of reformation within the electricity industry, 
privatisation and a changed regulatory regime were simultaneously 
introduced. The White Paper, Privatising Electricity was announced by the 
Conservative government in 1988, indicating their intention to fully privatise 
and restructure the ESI. This was followed by the publication of the Electricity 
Bill, which contained a timetable of the introduction of competition within the 
ESI, with the aim of a complete reorganisation during the government’s tenure 
(James 2009; Marshall 2003; Roberts et al. 1991).  
 
In addition, the Electricity Act 1989 promoted a privatisation policy by creating 
legislations for governing the industry and the regulatory bodies. DGES and 
Offer were established to replace the Electricity Council and were responsible 
for applying the necessary regulations and licence conditions within the 
industry (OPSI 25.01.10; Roberts et al. 1991). 
 
The formal regulatory structure facilitating changes in generation, 
transmission, distribution and supply sector, at that time, was found to be a 
serious tool to pursue the goal of a reformed electricity industry because it 
had a significant impact on electricity pricing structure (Yarrow 1994 pp.79-
82). Even so, the Conservative government focused on using a policy to 
support evolving electricity industry reform rather than operating the industry 
with the strong use of regulations; the regulator was allowed to develop policy 
substantially on their own (Corry 2003 p.6). Professor Stephen Littlechild was 
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introduced as the first Director General of Electricity Supply (DGES) and was 
given the power to create and apply regulation where necessary (James 2009 
p.5). The anti-monopoly abuse regulation, for example, was introduced by 
DGES and used in the pool market to ensure fair bidding and prices. Essential 
laws of competition and regulation were imposed relating to the associated 
measures of unbundling and restructuring so as to facilitate a privatised 
electricity industry (Yarrow 1994).  
 
During the Conservative government’s tenure, re-regulation or deregulation 
was emphasised as a way to minimise entry barriers, and to promote 
competition and investment, rather than being a method used for promoting 
social benefits (Corry 2003; Levi-Faur 2001). Implementation of the new 
system of a privatised electricity industry and completion of all the various 
stages of the legislative process were marked to end by mid 1991 (Levi-Faur 
2001 p.67). Achieving the objectives of systemic transformation was 
evidenced post-privatisation and included the emergence of: 1) competition; 
2) investments; 3) market prices; and 4) opening access for generators to 
supply sectors etc., leading to a success in reform, but the issue of an 
uncompetitive environment within the electricity wholesale market still 
remained afterwards (Yarrow 1994 pp.85-87).  
 
As revealed above, the alteration of the accompanying regulatory regime in 
line with the privatisation policy was important and had a substantial impact 
on the degree of competition, scale of investment, and pricing. Changed 
regulation or deregulation was applied during the stage of implementation of 
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the privatisation policy, whereby it explicitly had the potential to drive a 
desirable reformation. Accordingly, the regulatory bodies and innovative 
regulations accounted for the strengths of the system with their energy market 
expertise, such as Professor Littlechild showing that the electricity industry 
had great potential to progress towards the goal of privatisation.  
 
4.2.2 The retail electricity market and changes in the policy 
and the regulatory regime  
In 1998, a liberalisation policy with the introduction of full competition was 
implemented within the electricity sector, with the resulting structural changes 
relating to changes in policies and the regulatory regime (Coen 2005 pp.2-4). 
Small consumers could choose their electricity service providers. This was a 
consequence of the government policies, which highlighted that the 
consumers should be given new rights and should benefit from privatisation 
and increased efficiency within generation sectors should be fully passed onto 
retail consumers (Littlechild 2009; Roberts et al 1991).  
 
Furthermore, the political aspect also became a main factor in influencing 
changes within the electricity industry. After Labour came into power in 1997, 
a shift in the policy and regulatory reform was carefully observed. The Labour 
government led by Tony Blair took the electricity sectors seriously. Policy and 
the regulatory regime regarding markets and energy services were reviewed, 
addressed and published in the Green Paper of 1998 entitled A Fair Deal for 
Consumers (James 2009; Corry 2003; Ofgem 1999). The Labour 
government’s policy was to continue to protect the industry and electricity 
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consumers through promoting competition and market mechanism, but was 
also concerned with the use of regulations as key tools to serve both 
economic and social interests. The focus was on an appropriate way of the 
use of the regulations and how these could be applied effectively to help 
deliver decent outcomes (Corry 2003; Coen and Thatcher 2001).  
 
The above details show the role of domestic politics in pressuring changes to 
focus more on the use of regulation to support the goal of deregulation in a 
new way, by moving away from exclusively economic concerns such as 
competition and more towards greater social concerns, in particular, 
increased consumer benefits. Regulatory regime was clearly the key theme, 
supported by the Labour government, to increase the internal strength of the 
market system. This meant that regulation would be used to overcome the 
previous problems of: 1) the market power of six electricity suppliers as a 
result of privatisation; and 2) the impact of externalities such as the EU 
requirements relating to the environment, in order to ensure a fair deal for 
electricity consumers. This seemed in contrast to the previous focus of the 
Conservative government to protect consumers through investment and 
competition with the introduction of unbundling and restructuring without 
relying on intensive regulation.  
 
Nonetheless, as the Labour government clearly focused on a non-market 
objective, pursuing greater social interests, it might result in an unprofitable 
electricity service, and for that reason applying regulation within the retail 
electricity market system for this purpose may be limited.   
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Previous articles in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 highlight changes in the policies 
and regulatory regimes in the UK electricity sector. The following articles give 
more detail and specification with regard to influential laws and regulations 
affecting changes in the policy and the regulatory regime within the 
investigated system. 
 
4.2.3 EU Directives, the Electricity Act 1989 and the 
Competition Act 1998 
The EU Directives of 1996 (Directive 1996/92/EC) supported Member States 
to consider imposing energy market liberalisation, but only emphasised the 
issue of benefits to large consumers and the third party access policy (access 
to the system). Full competition that had been implemented within the UK 
electricity industry at that time had developed greater progressively, 
compared with the EU requirement; or rather the EU legislation was 
insignificant for development of the policy and regulatory regime applied 
within the UK retail electricity market (Coen and Thatcher 2001; Eberlein 
2001; Yarrow 1994). In fact, other Acts, such as the Electricity Act 1989, set 
out legislative provision and significantly influenced the extent of the 
development of deregulation of the electricity sectors. The major change in 
regulatory regime demonstrating the power provided under the Electricity Act 
1989, which included Part One (Electricity Supply), Sections 39, 40 and 41, 
and Part Two (Reorganisation of the Industry), in respect of social concern 
and competition, was observed promptly during 1998 and 1999 (OPSI 
25.01.10).  
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Social responsibility policy for householders, in particular for vulnerable 
groups, was emphasised at that time; this change was reinforced by the 
Labour government and the energy regulator in accordance with: 1) the 
Electricity Act 1989, Part Three (Miscellaneous and Supplemental Sections 
104-105); and 2) Directive 96/92/EC. The latter requirement mainly related to 
a common rule for the internal electricity market in Member States. However, 
it clearly emphasised that the rights of householders and vulnerable 
consumers were protected as part of the growth of the internal retail energy 
market regulated by the national regulatory body (OJ L 176, 15.07.2003; 
Corry 2003).  
 
As soon as Ofgem was established in 1999, they set up a scheme (social 
action plan) relating to consumer protection in response to the Green Paper, 
A Fair Deal for Consumers, which called for consultation on how energy 
efficiency, choice and fairness, and protection of householders, particularly 
vulnerable people, could be provided (Ofgem 1999). As a result, the major 
frameworks later proposed by Ofgem in establishing regulation in a form of 
licence obligation: for example, the use of price cap regulation from the start; 
the provision of clear price/tariff information to assist consumers in making 
informed choice (with particular regard to vulnerable consumers); and a 
promotion of energy efficiency as a way to protect poor people. These were 
what companies had to comply with. Nonetheless, as part of the plan, Ofgem 
still strongly encouraged the need to develop competition and market 
participation by consumers as one of the best ways to protect householders 
and vulnerable groups from facing high energy bills (Ofgem 1999). However, 
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it was noted by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) that these 
requirements on suppliers regarding social obligation were by voluntary 
agreement only; there was no statutory law to support the goal of consumer 
protection. It appeared that the government and Ofgem only played a small 
part by way of public relations; indeed not a champion of the consumer 
(ESRC Societytoday 29.03.10).  
 
Additionally, the Competition Act 1998 was also announced during this period, 
its main aim being to discourage anti-competitive behaviour affecting 
consumer benefits as well as to encourage effective competition within the 
electricity industry, including retail supply (Motta 2004; NAO 2001).  
 
The changes occurred within the policy and regulatory regime as soon as full 
competition was introduced. There was an attempt to make consumer 
protection a core part of the retail electricity industry system, and it could be 
seen that, from the outset, the matter of social responsibility and the use of 
price cap regulation were focused on by the regulator. This shows that the 
system had the right start with the appropriate regulatory regime in securing 
the interests of consumers, because the price cap created a greater potential 
for increased efficiencies in generation to be passed through to retail 
electricity consumers.  
 
The Electricity Act 1989 was the key legislation promoting the restructured 
competitive electricity industry, but the Act does not indicate clear use of 
regulation for consumer protection; instead, the EU Directive No. 92 of 1996 
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places greater emphasis on the right of householders and those considered 
vulnerable to be protected adequately as core to the development of the retail 
electricity market. Ofgem’s performance on this non-market objective was 
noted to be fulfilling the EU requirement and the government’s policy, by 
developing the new practical regulatory scheme in response to the interests of 
consumers. The influences of the policy and the EU legislation seemed to 
support the internal strength of the system, unless these powers were 
exercised excessively. This could become a significant threat to the retail 
electricity market system when stringent regulations were applied to force 
suppliers to take full social responsibility, resulting in a less flexible retail 
market. The question is to what extent did these regulatory changes on social 
responsibility have an impact on electricity prices for householders, while 
private companies, who aimed to make profits, were expected to run 
electricity services with some degree of non-market objective provided?  
 
4.2.4 The Utilities Act 2000, the Warm Homes and Energy 
Conservation Act 2000 and the Enterprise Act 2002 
In July 2000, another Act was introduced, entitled the Utilities Act 2000, which 
addressed some important issues raised by the Green Paper 1998, in 
particular, social concern. This Act was to support companies to have 
separate licences for each of their business sectors, and to enable Ofgem to 
regulate the industry in response to various issues, which included protecting 
consumers, particularly vulnerable groups, by promoting effective competition 
and a sustained retail market (OPSI 25.01.10; Marshall 2003; NAO 2001). 
Accordingly, it was seen that the role of Ofgem clearly became an expected 
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key element of administering the Act and created changes in regulation so as 
to achieve the goal of improving consumer benefits. In particular, vulnerable 
consumers were explicitly highlighted in Section 69 of the Act, and Ofgem had 
to ensure to give priority to their interests (Parliamentary Business 28.03.10; 
OPSI 25.01.10; James 2009). In addition, details in regulatory change were 
noticed, emphasising that suppliers should play a major role in operating 
social responsibility.  
 
Furthermore, a bill regarding fuel poverty was promoted by MPs in 
Parliamentary sessions and was processed successfully through legislation, 
resulting in the introduction of the Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act 
2000. This Act aimed to provide power to the government and Ofgem so as to 
enable householders to have warm homes and to ensure a reduction in the 
number of people living in fuel poverty (National Energy Action 29.03.10; 
OPSI 25.01.10). As a result of this Act, a regulatory programme entitled 
‘Warm Front’ was introduced, which was available to everyone in England, not 
only the poor; funding was provided by the Department for the Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) but was limited. Other regulatory programmes 
with the same purpose were also introduced in Scotland and Wales (NAO 
2009, 2004). 
 
In April 2002, another regulatory change was observed, where the price cap 
was entirely removed and market-based regulation was applied; this change 
moved the focus of how consumers can be protected by using price regulation 
to reinforcing full competition. Additionally, the Energy Efficiency Commitment 
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(EEC) was introduced, a regulatory scheme concentrating on energy 
efficiency improvement as a way to protect consumers and to fight against 
fuel poverty, this scheme being included as part of a social action plan. It was 
set up and proposed by Defra but began to be administered by Ofgem in 
2002. Again, suppliers were required to deliver this EEC programme (PAC 
2007-2008; NAO 2004, 2001; Ofgem 2003).  
 
The Enterprise Act 2002 was introduced, aimed at providing power to the 
government and Ofgem in establishing an independent public body called the 
CC (see also Chapter 2). Accordingly, the Commission has an important role 
when coupled with Ofgem to improve regulation against monopoly abuse and 
the abuse of market power (Böllhoff 2005).  
 
As mentioned above, the regulatory programme associated with ensuring 
consumer benefits was developed in accordance with the Acts. The role of 
Ofgem was highlighted to create regulations to be applied within the system 
along with enforcing suppliers to take social concern seriously and to make it 
an obligation. People who live in fuel poverty were intensively focused on and 
safeguarded through the use of licence conditions, so as to lift them out of 
poverty. Specifically, after removing price cap, vulnerable groups became 
highly protected by law because they engaged the least with the market and 
pricing. It can be seen that there was an attempt to achieve greater consumer 
protection than previously, as the introduction of energy efficiency was 
highlighted, this helping to protect consumers from high electricity bills. 
Clearly, energy efficiency is important and beneficial for both consumers and 
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the electricity industry itself. Having said that, energy efficiency results in 
strengths within the retail electricity supply system.  
 
The conflict presumably was the fact that suppliers, in reality, were required 
through regulation to be a key player in assisting consumers and lifting them 
from fuel poverty. In fact, it is difficult to identify possibilities where suppliers 
manage to make good profits while serving non-market objectives. This 
reflects that the correct degree of use of regulation to ensure consumers are 
adequately protected without threatening the benefits of others is critical and 
is still doubtful. Additionally, a new body, the CC, was set up, reflecting an 
effort to increase the use of regulation so as to protect the system from an 
uncompetitive situation as a result of the disadvantage of dominant abuse.  
 
4.2.5 Directive 2003/54/EC, a package of better regulation and 
the Energy Act 2004 
From June 2003 until 2010, the Directive 2003/54/EC was promoted with 
regards to the common rules for the internal market in electricity, and it 
represented an amendment to Directive 96/92/EC, but Directive 2003/54/EC 
remained in use until July 2009 before being replaced by the Directive 
2009/72/EC. The emphasis on consumer protection, especially vulnerable 
consumers, was noted in Article 3 of the Directive, in respect of public service 
obligation and customer protection, stressing that consumers should be able 
to benefit from the existence of an internal energy market by exercising their 
rights to switch energy suppliers with access to available choices and 
transparent and reasonable prices/tariffs in order to obtain a better deal as a 
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consequence. Any measures to protect consumers from facing the 
undesirable results of competition such as energy disconnection needed to be 
brought into force by laws, regulations and administrative provisions. 
Suppliers were also required to provide related transparent information 
affecting the interests of consumers, such as sufficient information on bills and 
fuel resources used in the generation sector and how it had an impact on 
carbon emission.  
 
Furthermore, Article 23 of the Directive gave certain details about the role of 
the energy regulatory body, Ofgem, stating that this body should pursue the 
goals of social and economic cohesion by being entirely independent from the 
interests of the electricity industry, and by not being captured by the interests 
of the industry. The Directive encouraged the regulator to create appropriate 
and efficient regulation in respect of various issues for the efficient growth of 
the electricity industry, including transparency relating to better information for 
people, so as to avoid any detrimental impact on consumers. The EC asked 
for all Member States to comply with this Directive no later than 2004, in order 
to increase greater electricity market efficiency with sustainable development 
and to increase the level of consumer protection (Anderson 2009; OJ L 176, 
15.07. 2003). In relation to this, the government announced and promoted a 
‘package of better regulation’ to be used in combination with the concept of 
‘deregulation’ in 2004; the aim was to sustain the increased benefit of 
competition through the focus on good regulation and its enforcement. The 
regulator is obligated to improve, monitor and assess regulation in response 
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to this requirement of the government’s Better Regulation Agenda (NAO 
2008c).  
 
Additionally, the Energy Act 2004 was introduced in July 2004, also 
concerning the duty of Ofgem to have regard to the principle of efficient 
regulation and its best enforcement in order to carry out greater market 
function and sustained competition. The Act also provided the power to 
Ofgem to contribute to the solution regarding vulnerable consumers who were 
on prepayment meters, in order to help provide them with access to a cheaper 
deal (NAO 2004; Ofgem 2003, 2002, 2001, 1999). 
 
Changes in legislation and requirements continued to be the key measure 
included in reform policy implementation. Consumer protection was supported 
and became the main focus within the retail electricity market. The 
perspective of changes in response to the interests of consumers was on the 
use of better laws and regulations as a key way to promote a desirable 
outcome. EU Directive No. 54 of 2003 had an influence on improvements 
within the UK regulatory regime. Choices and better services with transparent 
information became the best regulatory measures of electricity service 
provisions, which were expected to assist people who live in fuel poverty. 
Accordingly, the Directive had a clear instruction for the regulatory bodies to 
focus on public benefits. Better regulation policy was addressed by the 
government departments and in the Energy Act 2004, with this being 
promoted to be included within an appropriate regulatory regime. 
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Since 2003, that there has been high use of regulation through the introduced 
form of licence condition making suppliers comply with the regulation and this 
has happened simultaneously with the attempt to improve the principle of 
regulation used. It can possibly take some time for the full effects of regulatory 
changes to occur because using high regulation is usually opposed by 
suppliers and may lead to an inflexible system as a consequence. These 
changes in the regulatory regime most likely have influenced the cost of the 
retail supply sectors as well as the cost of electricity service. This, again, 
reflects a weakness within the market system because of the conflict between 
the interests of consumers, the profits of suppliers and the role and duties of 
the regulator. 
 
4.2.6 White Paper 2007 and the Energy Act 2008 
The introduction of the White Paper 2007 took place in May 2007; its 
challenging focus was on how to ensure affordable energy and a warm home 
for everyone in our society through improved regulation, while providing 
energy security across the UK. The focus was partly related to the resurgence 
of poor relations between Russia and the West, which threatened the security 
of gas supply, being the main fuel for electricity generation in 2006, as well as 
final electricity prices for consumers (DECC 31.03.10; James 2009). 
 
The Energy Act 2008 was also announced; the related aspect regarding 
consumer protection was about the delivery of ‘smart meters’ as a key 
solution to protect consumers from facing the risk of becoming fuel poor 
because they would help consumers monitor and control their electricity 
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consumption as well as receive accurate bills, resulting in a reduction in their 
bills and, eventually, lower carbon emission taking place as a result of less 
energy consumption. Importantly, smart meters will be installed in every 
household by 2020 (OPSI 25.01.10; Gallacher Personal Interview 10 June 
2009). 
 
Additionally, the Act emphasised that Ofgem must protect the interests of 
existing consumers while ensuring their future interests and must pursue the 
sustainable development of the industry. This partly related to the volatility in 
the oil price crisis during 2008 which threatened energy security as well as 
final electricity prices for householders. Accordingly, Ofgem could work 
closely with others to ensure desirable outcomes, such as DECC and 
Consumer Focus. The EEC programme has since been replaced by the 
programme now known as the Carbon Emission Reduction Target (CERT), 
which focuses more on the target for improving home energy efficiency (OPSI 
25.01.10; James 2009; Ofgem 2009b). 
 
From the above details, a policy and a regulatory regime have been further 
developed, which focus on consumer benefits and address the need to make 
electricity affordable for all consumers, while the regulator has statutory duties 
to ensure energy security as well as sustainable development. The White 
Paper 2007 and the Energy Act 2008 provide powers for the government and 
Ofgem to commit to deliver these desirable outcomes to the public. However, 
these seem to create a significant contradiction within the industry. For 
example, CERT and affordable energy for all consumers/vulnerable groups 
142 
 
are considered to be non-market objectives and presumably require a 
changed regulatory regime as an incentive to regulate the industry and 
command suppliers. This means that some social concerns with appropriate 
regulations need to be investigated so as to protect non-vulnerable 
consumers from this social cost and high electricity prices. This detail 
highlights the potential for long-term disagreement and for a failure or an 
uncertainty in meeting lower electricity prices. Summarising, the effect of retail 
supply and market mechanism on service prices is limited as it is related to 
social concerns along with the use of regulation. 
 
4.2.7 The Electricity Directive 2009/72/EC 
The Directive currently being used for all internal electricity systems in the EU, 
including for the UK retails electricity market, is called ‘Directive 2009/72/EC’, 
an amendment to Directive 2003/54/EC (OJ L 211, 14.08.2009). The Directive 
continues to promote with regard to the common rules for the internal 
electricity market; it not only emphasises consumer protection and consumer 
rights through provision of appropriate information as part of universal service 
obligation, but also encourages Member States to indicate methods to be 
applied so as to ensure better consumer protection, particularly for those who 
are vulnerable. Electric metering is the main scheme relating to the long-term 
solution suggested in meeting sustainable benefits for consumers. The energy 
ombudsman and consumer bodies are also encouraged to act to help deliver 
benefits to consumers (ibid; Article 3). Energy efficiency (final consumers are 
directly related with an efficient use of energy) and an introduction of 
renewable energy generation and use of green electricity in response to a 
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sustainable climate change policy are also intensively highlighted. This is 
required to be implemented in Member States with the aim of a secure supply 
of electricity, as well as improved benefits for European society (ibid.) 
 
According to the Directive, full unbundling is highly expected to be in effect by 
March 2012 so as to ensure third party access and transparency, particularly 
in the transmission sector, these changes in regulatory policy most likely 
having an impact on retail supply and final prices for consumers, as noted in 
Article 9 of the Directive. 
 
Furthermore, again, the role of the energy regulatory body, by forming 
appropriate regulation in respect of various issues, is suggested, similar to the 
previous EU Directive. Organising the required information exchange for the 
consumer switching process is also included in their major tasks. Additionally, 
the regulator is obligated to pursue a high standard of universal service in 
electricity supply (OJ L 211, 14.08.2009, Article 35, 36). 
 
The above details indicate a redeveloped Directive, with more innovative 
focus in several areas, such as: better consumer safeguards; a competitive 
environment in the system (through full unbundling); the role of the regulator; 
essential data exchange for consumer switching; economic and social 
cohesion; and sustainable development in response to the issue of climate 
change. These changes in legislation and requirement are aimed at widening 
sustainable development of the EU reformed electricity systems toward the 
achievement of increased economic and social interests. Additionally, working 
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with consumer bodies and the energy ombudsman to increase benefits for 
consumers is suggested. In comparison to the previous Directive, vulnerable 
groups are more related to the necessity to ensure adequate consumer 
protection policy to help lift them out of fuel poor. It shows the focus on 
consumer power within the relationship between consumers, the regulator, 
and suppliers. and this is currently gaining importance and is having an 
impact on the UK electricity system. 
 
4.3 Evolution of the electricity price structure 
Electricity prices for consumers, in particular householders, have increased 
many times since privatisation was introduced in 1989. These unfavourable 
price movements have arisen from various reasons, resulting in high 
electricity bills for consumers. The effect of significantly increased prices for 
consumers, however, is extreme in the UK, which leads to them facing 
undesirable results, including a rapid increase in the number of them facing 
fuel poverty, having their electricity supply disconnected, and many elderly 
people dying during the winter months as a result of hypothermia (The Bow 
Group 2007; Judge Business School, University of Cambridge n.d.).  
 
Figure 4.3(a) below shows evidence that the UK domestic retail electricity 
price index has increased considerably since the privatisation policy was 
implemented; despite the fact that there was a decrease in electricity prices 
from 1993 until 2003, the overall historical trend shows an increase (DECC 
Energy Statistics 28.09.09). 
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Figure 4.3(a): The UK Retail Electricity Price Index between 1990 and 
2009 
 
Retail Prices Index = Y axis; Year= X axis;   
Source:  DECC Energy Statistics 
 
As a result of the above, it is important to now examine price structure in 
relation to related electricity costs. This should provide a better understanding 
with regard to electricity price rises. 
 
The impact of the costs of the generation, transmission, 
distribution and retail supply sectors on final electricity prices 
The total cost of electricity is made up from fixed and variable costs, such as 
the cost of the assets and the required co-ordinations, and the cost of the 
various fuels used for electrical generation, respectively. For the former, in 
particular, this includes the exclusively excessive capital costs for the 
electricity industry, which have an effect on electricity prices and are totally 
passed on to consumers (Kwoka and Madjarov 2007; Pollitt 1997).  
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Others have demonstrated a different breakdown of the structure of the UK 
retail electricity price, showing that this is attributable to a mix of factors. 
Likewise, it has been noted that approximately 50% of an electricity bill is 
made up from the generation sectors. This is mainly driven by fuel prices, 
which vary according to the use of different energy resources. Not more than 
approximately 30% of the bill is for the network charge, which is paid to the 
incumbents for the use of transmission and distribution services. The 
remaining 20% is from suppliers including a charge for the supply services 
such as energy purchasing process, meter reading, data processing, and 
other administration costs (Thomas 2002b; Domah and Pollitt 2000).  
 
Some scholars are concerned that other related elements within the 
generation sectors have a substantial effect on the final electricity price. An 
example is the reserved power in the generation sectors obligated to be 
available 24/7; this is due to the properties of electricity that make it 
impossible to store, and the fact that demand will usually fluctuate throughout 
the day, it is useful to have reserved power for security and stability reasons 
to protect against electricity disruption. The minimum reserved power varies 
between 10% to 15% of total power production and is needed for securing the 
exceed load at all times, resulting in high fixed costs of assets and operating 
staff wages, which are passed directly onto consumers (Dr. Atipoang 
Nuntaphan Telephone Interview 12 February 2009; Kwoka and Madjarov 
2007). Additionally, the impact of other facts such as the costs of: 1) the 
introduction of retail competition; 2) the process of energy procurement; 3) the 
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rate of return; and 4) taxation are significant and have an impact on retail 
electricity prices (Thomas 2006; Littlechild 2001; Roberts et al 1991).  
 
In relation to the above, there are two ways of energy purchasing 
procurement within the retail electricity market: retail suppliers can buy energy 
either in advance or on the spot. The former is called a ‘hedge contract’, 
which helps to defend against the volatility of wholesale and retail market 
prices; the latter is called ‘spot price’ which is sold to the wholesale market 
and is much more expensive than the former (Domestic Retail Market Report 
June 2007; Otero and Price 2001). In relation to this, according to the two 
modes of electricity generation, the base load and the peak load generations, 
purchasing energy in advance on a hedge contract with the use of base load 
generation is the cheapest deal for retail suppliers, allowing them to deliver 
electricity at a lower price to the consumers. Hence, managing this in order to 
purchase in advance is essential and affects the retail electricity price for the 
consumers (RWE 05.03.09). Additionally, it is worth noting here that final 
electricity bills for consumers do not represent real-time pricing; in fact, 
electricity prices fluctuate and are rated hour to hour, so that suppliers are the 
only ones who know the real cost and the true cost benefit of business; the 
regulator does not (Borenstein 07.02.09; Corry 2003; Pollitt 1997).  
 
From the above, there are three important aspects regarding the impact of 
costs from electricity sectors on service prices. First, despite the fact that 
prices can be affected by costs driven by all sectors, the costs of generation is 
relatively critical. This clearly affects final prices for householders as a 
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consequence of movements in fuel costs and the bidding system within the 
wholesale market. The regulatory use of non-fossil fuels or of green energy 
resources, for example, can increasingly drive up electricity prices. 
Purchasing power from the spot market can be very expensive, especially 
when there is a high fluctuation in demand, and this can become difficult to 
control and is dependent on the temperature of the weather. This reflects the 
potential for unpredictable future electricity prices because the above 
mentioned issues of changes in demand and altered fuel prices occur outside 
the system (external factors), meaning that these parts are barely controlled.  
 
Second, again, it is realised that prices generally have been driven from all 
electricity sectors, implying that the vertically integrated companies who own 
all generation, transmission and distribution sectors, as well as performing as 
retail suppliers, have excessive powers to manipulate prices. This indicates 
the disadvantage of the market power of the system and the threats of 
unfavourable externalities, showing a combination of critical situations 
affecting price movement which need to be avoided. Presumably, this may be 
the case why UK electricity prices for consumers have been rising since 
deregulation of the electricity industry began in 1989.    
 
Finally, there are some issues regarding administrative procedures, which 
relate to costs of energy but these seem to create less pressure on prices, 
compared with the consequences of integration and market power.  
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The effect of restructuring and changed policy and regulatory 
regime on electricity prices 
a) From 1990 to 1992 
As shown in the figure 4.3(a), prices started rising immediately in 1990 as a 
result of the introduction of the privatisation policy within the electricity sectors 
and, importantly, prices continued to increase until 1992 before dropping for 
the first time in 1993. Scholars have argued that prices increased between 
1990 and 1992 because of the wider share of ownership, resulting in prices 
increased up to the cost, whereby, previous service prices set under the state-
owned electricity industry were not related to marginal cost (it does not reflect 
the marginal cost). Additionally, the price structure during post-privatisation 
was left to the market mechanism, supply and demand and uncertainty fully 
affecting prices (Pollitt 2007, 1997; Dubash 2001; Defeuilley 1999). 
Furthermore, anticipated high profits for new entrants also led to higher prices 
for consumers straight after the industry reformation in 1989 (Peerbocus 
2007; Dubash 2001).  
 
These above incidents relate to the issues discussed previously in Section 4.1 
regarding the consequences of privatisation, including: 1) unbundling; 2) the 
increase in new generators; and 3) the emergence of the wholesale electricity 
market. These new competitive players determined wholesale prices through 
the bidding system as soon as privatisation began, resulting in a significant 
price movement from 1990. In other words, increased prices were driven by 
the market or a competitive environment relating to supply and demand. 
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Moreover, companies all aimed to make profits on their investments; 
therefore, there was no doubt that prices would increase. 
 
On the other hand, despite it seeming that privatisation brought 
disadvantages of high prices for consumers during this period, evidence on 
prices increasing to the marginal cost highlighted the fact that the market 
solution, at that time, was a sustained way to protect consumers. High debts 
as a result of the government owning the assets, coupled with poor 
productivity from the electricity supply industry, and consumers being charged 
lower than the marginal prices did not demonstrate the potential for the 
government to continue delivering electricity at low price for consumers. 
 
b) From 1993 to 1998 
From Figure 4.3(a) it can be seen that, between 1993 and 1998, post-
privatisation, retail electricity prices were decreasing, although prices 
increased slightly in 1994. The reduction in prices was substantial with the 
retail price index decreasing from approximately 120 in 1993 to approximately 
100 in 1998. Scholars have argued that price reduction as a consequence of 
privatisation during this period was due to several related facts relating to 
privatisation.  
 
There were two exceptional arguments justified for the emergence of lower 
electricity prices. First, the increase in efficiency that occurred within the UK 
generation sectors, studies showing that private investment was more likely to 
lead to more efficient and cheaper technologies to better produce energy, 
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which in turn led directly to lower production costs and electricity prices (Pollitt 
2007; Thomas 2006, 2002b; Domah and Pollitt 2001). Second, the decline in 
the use of coal-fired power plants and nuclear energy for electricity generation 
created an impact on lowering the cost of electricity bills. The introduction of 
gas-fired power plants such as the combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) within 
the generation sectors by private investors at that time could help reduce the 
significant capital and maintenance costs incurred by nuclear power plants, as 
well as lowering carbon emissions and environmental costs. In relation to this, 
natural gas prices, at that time, were much cheaper than coal and oil 
(Sharman and Constable 2008; Green 1998).  
 
On the other hand, however, others have argued that benefits that occurred in 
this period were, in fact, relatively due to global changes such as the 
reduction in fossil fuel prices, and were not only related to the privatisation 
policy (Thomas 2004; Price and Hancock 1998; Parker 1997). In other words, 
decreasing electricity prices emerging between 1993 and 1998 was not only 
determined by an efficiency gain and lower cost as a result of using gas as a 
main fuel for electricity generation, but also by other changes. 
 
Nonetheless, seemingly, imposing privatisation led to advantages in this 
period; although prices were high at the beginning, however, the benefits 
derived from technology investment, increased energy efficiency, and 
application of the principle of supply and demand within the market resulted in 
a steep price reduction, in particular between 1996 and 1998. These all reflect 
the changes of: 1) the industry structure discussed previously in Section 4.1; 
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2) removing excessive regulation and barriers for new entry, as mentioned in 
Section 4.2, subsequently creating a number of new competitive generators 
accessing demand and offering a cheaper deal for consumers. In conclusion, 
this indicates that the competition-related consumer safeguard through the 
market mechanism, at that time (between 1993 and 1998), created greater 
benefits for consumers, compared with the regulated system. It reflects that 
the system was strengthened by the restructured industry with the use of an 
innovative regulatory regime, resulting in benefits for consumers.  
 
Figure 4.3(b): Retail Fuel Prices Index: Electricity, Gas and Coal between 
1990 and 2009 
 
Electricity   Gas  Coal 
 
Retail Prices Index = Y axis; Year= X axis;  
Source:  DECC Energy Statistics 
 
Figure 4.3(b) above shows the unfavourable price movements in gas and coal 
prices, reflecting that these fuel prices substantially affected retail electricity 
price movements. However, coal prices shown were not higher than those for 
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natural gas as argued by other scholars. Gas prices may not only have been 
the reason for the high use of gas-fired power plants in the generation sectors 
post-privatisation. Most probably, the environmental issue became one of the 
main reasons.  
 
c) From 1998 to 2003 
The decrease in electricity service prices continued from 1998 until 2003, as 
can be seen from Figures 4.3(a) and 4.3(b). Retail electricity prices sharply 
decreased during this period. Scholars have looked closely at this change, 
and indicated that the interests of consumers were met during this period with 
the introduction of full competition within the electricity industry (Littlechild 
2009; Pollitt 2008; Green 1998), despite some scholars such as Levi-Faur 
having argued that this desirable outcome may end soon because of the 
increase in gas prices (Levi-Faur 2001 p.73).  
 
Nonetheless, from the above perspective, together with the evidence shown 
in the above figures, the existence of the retail electricity market, at that time, 
clearly led to greater benefits for consumers. As revealed previously in 
Sections 4.1 and 4.2, the introduction of full competition within the electricity 
sectors has brought changes since 1998; the restructured industry with fully 
separated electricity sectors as a result of the liberalisation policy allowing 
bilateral access between supply and demand, along with the use of new 
regulatory regime, in order to maximise competition. Clearly, these 
developments focused on the interests of consumers in accordance with new 
approach of the Labour government starting in 1997. The use of price cap 
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regulation soon after retail supply was introduced reflects the significant 
strategy towards consumer protection and the method of motivating suppliers 
so as to improve efficiency using investment in technology. Changes and 
improvements within the system created the internal strengths, which 
significantly affected prices and related to retail price reductions during post-
liberalisation until 2003, because consumers then had choices and could 
choose to pay less. In addition to this, the downward trend in prices could also 
be a result of the supply-demand principle with the existence of high 
competition, where the RECs became totally separated and subsequently 
more competitive low electricity prices were offered across different areas. 
 
d) Post-2003 critical period for energy consumers 
The critical period has been since 2003, with retail electricity prices increasing 
sharply. Scholars and related organisations have indicated the adverse 
consequences arising from this unprecedented price change, highlighting 
increased costs for electricity consumers and an increase in the number of 
people who live in fuel poverty, in particular the vulnerable and those on low 
income who struggle to pay their electric bills (DECC Fuel Poverty Statistics 
07.12.11; The Bow Group 2007). It can be seen from Figures 4.3(a) and 
4.3(b) that this disadvantageous situation initially started in 2003, when 
substantial changes occurred in the distribution and retail supply sectors, this 
continuing for approximately five years after full competition in the UK 
electricity system began in 1998, as previously noted in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. 
These took account of changes in the structure of the system and of 
developments in the application of accompanying regulatory policy and 
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regulations. The significant changes with an explanatory table and related 
discussions are detailed below. 
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Table 4.3(c): Developments and changes in regulatory policy and electricity price 
movement from 1989 to 2010 
 1989-1993 1993-1998 1998-2003 post-2003 period –now** 
Price trend Upward Downward Downward Upward (Sharply increased) 
Policy Privatisation in 
1989 
(Post-privatisation) Liberalisation in 
1998 (with full 
competition) 
Five years after adopting 
liberalisation – unbundling 
and separated systems are 
currently continuing to take 
place. 
Accompanying 
legislation and 
regulation 
-the Electricity Act 
1989 
 
-Directive 
1996/92/EC 
-the Competition Act 
1998 
-the Utilities Act 
2000 
-the Warm Homes 
and Energy 
Conservation Act 
2000 
-the Enterprise Act 
2002 
-Use of price cap 
regulation which was 
removed in 2002 
-an establishment of 
Ofgem 
-Directive 2003/54/EC  
-the Package of Better 
Regulation 
-the Energy Act 2004 
-the White Paper 2007 
regarding affordable energy 
and a warm home for 
everyone 
-the Energy Act 2008 
-Directive 2009/72/EC 
Evolving changes 
towards the goals 
of reformation 
1) Wider share of 
ownership 
2) Prices were 
determined by the 
market mechanism 
3) The application 
of rate of return 
1) Efficiency gain 
from generation 
sector 
2) The decline in 
the use of coal/oil-
fired power plants 
1) An emergence of 
bilateral access 
2) Growth in 
investment 
(investment in 
technology) and 
energy efficiency 
3) An introduction of 
consumer choice 
and consumer 
switching process 
4)Distribution line 
was fully separated 
and there was an 
emergence of 
licensed suppliers 
5) Ofgem promoted 
a scheme called “A 
Fair Deal for 
Consumers” 
6) Social scheme to 
help those 
vulnerable 
introduced in 2001 
1)Rapid and extensive 
merger between various 
companies 
2) Company set-up 
3) A number of companies 
taken over 
4) Establishment of the Big 6 
= six major energy 
companies that currently 
supply more than 98% of UK  
households, and influence 
energy security in the country 
5) The emergence of issues 
of information accessed and 
used by consumers for their 
market engagement 
6)Switching process difficult 
and complicated 
7) Energy companies have 
played a key role in social 
obligation through the 
provision of social tariff after 
removing price cap in 2002 
8) Ofgem has failed both to 
ensure effective information  
for consumers and to protect 
their interests 
External changes  1) EU requirements 
concerning 
environmentally 
friendly electricity in 
generation, 
transmission, and 
supply sectors 
2) Gas price 
declined slightly 
(see Figure 4.3 b) 
 1) EU requirements 
concerning 
environmentally 
friendly electricity in 
generation, 
transmission, and 
supply sectors 
2) Gas price 
remained stable 
(see Figure 4.3 b) 
1)EU requirements 
concerning environmentally 
friendly electricity in 
generation, transmission, and 
supply sectors 
2) Gas and coal prices have 
increased steeply since 2003 
(see figure 4.3 b) 
Fuel Poverty* 
(see, fuel poverty 
statistics, DECC 
2011) 
  Downward Upward (Sharply increased) 
* Fuel poverty ratio = required fuel costs (required usage x price)/ income 
** The research timeline is fixed which starts from 2003 to 2010. 
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The author compiled Table 4.3 (c) above using information gathered from: 1) 
the current situations taking place within the system; 2) the findings gathered 
from previous studies shown in Chapter 3; and 3) the evolution of the 
electricity sector highlighted in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, with the aim to 
demonstrate that developments within the system continued to take place, not 
only during the period when liberalisation was introduced in the UK electricity 
sector, but also during the post-1998 period. Growth continued to occur for 
years after the liberalised market began; however, the most significant 
scenario has taken place since 2003 or five years after 1998. The most 
important aspect to look at in the table is with regard to the service price trend 
increasing sharply from 2003 up until now (2012). This analysis is consistent 
with the research timeline, which is from 2003 to 2010; therefore, the factors 
relating to increasing prices occurring during this critical time are examined.  
 
Clearly, the table demonstrates that there were several changes and 
requirements taking place in line with the moving upward trend of electricity 
prices during this period. These, as the key factors, can be categorised into 
two groups, which are the internal factors and the external factors (the 
situations inside and outside the electricity system). It is important to now look 
at how these factors affected electricity price movement during that period. 
Interview findings are also used for examining the current stage of the 
problem within the UK retail electricity market. 
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(a) The internal factors 
According to the table, the first concern to be discussed is with regard to the 
internal factors within the system, these being a significant weakness of the 
system, finally creating a negative impact on electricity prices as well as on 
householders. This factor includes: 1) the emergence of a number of 
inappropriate mergers within the whole electricity sector, with, in 
consequence, only six major firms running electricity services in the country; 
2) the emergence of the issue of the information being provided and used by 
suppliers and householders, respectively; 3) the emergence of the issue of 
energy switching, which was found to be complex and unfavourable; 4) the 
social energy scheme/tariff solely offered by energy companies, this creating: 
1) poor information for vulnerable groups; and 2) high costs being passed 
onto non-vulnerable householders; and 5) Ofgem’s failure in protecting the 
interests of consumers. Details are as follows. 
 
First, extensive vertical integration/mergers took place and, in consequence, 
the establishment of the ‘Big Six’ companies within the entire electricity sector 
once privatisation and liberalisation were introduced (see also Chapter 3). 
This has since become critical since distribution lines were separated in 1998, 
allowing extensive vertical mergers to continue, particularly between 1998 and 
2003 (see also Sections 4.1and 4.2). This issue greatly influenced the UK 
electricity system and adversely affected the balance of the supply sector, as 
it led to a significant reduction in competition within the whole system, 
including the retail market. In addition, as a result, it affects price 
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setting/information; thus, consumers were expected to see retail electricity 
prices increasing during this critical period. 
 
Likewise, as stated in Chapter 2, with regard to the issue of inappropriate 
mergers relating to extensive vertical integration, theories suggest that it 
creates a monopoly status, leading to an uncompetitive environment within 
the system, allowing market power to take place whereby those who own 
most of the UK electricity sector being able to lift prices without losing market 
share, and collusion may also occur.  
 
In relation to the above, most interviewees also thought that the sharp 
increase in electricity prices during the post-2003, including from 2003 to 
2010, was related to market power and collusion arising as a result of 
inappropriate mergers. For example, one commented that the UK retail 
electricity market is not working well and the competitive environment 
promoted is limited. He criticised this issue that “the companies have just 
been increasing their profit margins” (S5), and pointed out that “it was some 
source of market power (arising from in appropriate mergers)”. However, he 
suggested that “it is very difficult to test that they make such an excessive 
profit because 4 out of 6 of the companies are part of a much larger 
international group”. Similarly, one, from CF, explained that there has been 
overcharging in retail electricity prices in comparison to the wholesale 
electricity price trend; however, he has accepted that it is hard to prove this 
issue as it is not transparent, and argued that “we have got six firms and they 
are virtually integrated and they are like 99% of the market now”; and added 
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that “there is no a cartel but I would describe it as being tacit collusion where 
they (Big Six companies) have had a price leader like British Gas (begin to 
increase price) and the other five follow them” (C1). Likewise, the Ofgem 
representative admitted that it was difficult to oversee their financial accounts 
relative to the cost benefits of suppliers, saying that “at the moment we do not 
know how much suppliers are paying for their gas and electricity because of 
the vertical integration aspect of things” (R2).  
 
In short, electricity price rises from the post-2003 period up until 2010 were 
related to a reduction in competition in the system, whereby fewer firms 
emerged as a consequence of inappropriate vertical mergers (changes in the 
structure), and these major firms were able to exercise their market power 
and created collusion so as to increase prices for final consumers. 
 
Second, there was the emergence of the issue of price/tariff information 
(asymmetric information), which was provided and used by suppliers and 
householders, respectively, in the critical post-2003 period, including between 
2003 and 2010. Information available within the UK retail electricity market 
system during this time was found to be inappropriate and appeared to be a 
key issue relating to a poorly functioning market. This included: inadequate 
quality information, misleading information; confusion relating to the amount of 
tariffs; information was too complex to understand; information on energy bills 
was not qualified and did not help either to promote competition or the 
effectiveness of the retail electricity market (Hansard HC 10 June 2009; 
Consumer Focus 2008).  
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In theory (see Chapter 2), asymmetric information relating to ‘adverse 
selection’ creates an incentive for sellers (suppliers) to make use of and to 
provide further unsatisfactory information to consumers for their own benefit. 
Sellers hold better information than consumers while participating with the 
market, allowing the former taking this opportunity to manipulate expensive 
final price for consumers. 
 
In relation to the above, most interviewees suggested that the substantial 
electricity price rises during the post-2003 period until 2010 were related to 
the issue of information. For example, one, from Which? told the author that 
“70% of consumers find tariffs confusing” (G1). One said that “there has been 
little information to householders to tell them that they can switch and switch 
easily” (J2), and adding that “it is partly due to the complexity of the tariff and 
the lack of easy information allowing people to switch between different 
companies”. He criticised the issue of how people found information 
confusing, not knowing what the cheapest tariff was, thereby ending up with a 
more expensive deal, stating that “it is probably a sign that there is some 
rogue marketing, particularly from door to door sales people, who are signing 
people up to new tariffs without them realising that those tariffs are more 
expensive, because I find it very hard to believe that anyone would switch to a 
worse deal”. This implies a situation where consumers did not have adequate 
quality information and, as a result, a bad product or expensive electricity tariff 
was more likely to be offered and selected. This clearly reflects a situation of 
‘adverse selection’ in the UK retail electricity market. 
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Furthermore, one, from SimplySwitch, mentioned that “there have been cases 
in the past where people have complained that they have been mis-sold to, 
for example, door knockers, they are not giving out accurate information” 
(CS1). One, from CF, gave an example of a deceptive guarantee, saying that 
“consumers are promised that if they switch to a certain supplier they will 
always have cheaper bills and then obviously that does not happen and that 
has been a big problem” (C4). One person, from the energy ombudsman 
team, used his experiences to confirm to the author that “we occasionally 
have reasonable evidence that the consumer has been told untruths” 
(G2).With regard to this matter, another, from UK Power Limited, revealed 
that “some companies claim to be the cheapest supplier; however, it depends 
what that means” (CS6), and explained that “they (suppliers) may claim to be 
the cheapest supplier based on regional standard tariff so in other words they 
do not necessary include all available tariffs”. This discussion shows that 
consumers were holding less information than sellers while making the 
purchase and always were mislead by them. The strategies of providing a 
guarantee to consumers, in order to support them make their informed 
choices while having inadequate quality information was used. It created mis-
selling and was not a sustained solution, rather sellers usually had an 
incentive to take advantage off these consumers.  
 
 In short, from the above, electricity price rises during the critical period were 
related to a reduction in competition in the system. Poor information relating to 
asymmetric information was used for consumer market participation, resulting 
in adverse results for them. This unfavourably affected both consumer 
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switching and consumer power, harming the competitive environment and 
resulting in ineffective price structuring and a long-term expensive deal for 
consumers. 
 
Third, switching energy provider has become an issue since the price cap was 
removed in 2002, including between 2003 and 2010. Unfortunately, the 
switching process in the UK energy market was frequently found to be 
complex and repeatedly delivered undesirable results to people who had 
switched, leading most switchers to end up with worse deals.  
 
In relation to the above, most interviewees highlighted that the unexpected 
consequences of switching energy supplier related to difficulty in comparing 
pricing information, this resulting in most people ending up with more 
expensive suppliers after switching. In addition, however, another issue was 
also obvious; many interviewees argued that the issue around switching 
supplier also related to only small savings offered in the market, so it was not 
worth switching. These all had an impact on suppliers’ incentive not to price 
compete but to continue to offer high prices as taken place between 2003 and 
2010. For example, one, from CF, told the author regarding switching supplier 
that “most (consumers) understand that there are potentially savings to be 
made but the savings are not great enough for them to switch” (C2). Similarly, 
one, from CAB, stated that “people are being a bit sceptical about some of the 
benefits” (G4) and added that they were not sure that they were moving to a 
better deal and that something could possibly go wrong when switching, this 
causing all sorts of problems. Accordingly, the Ofgem representative admitted 
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that “we did have concern when we looked into it as to whether all customers 
were switching to a better deal, and we found that not all of them were” (R2).  
 
On the other hand, other interviewees have related this issue to attitude, 
confidence and trust, whereby consumers did not see that it was worth 
switching. For example, another pointed out that “there is an issue around 
trust” (G1), and argued that “people do not understand their energy prices and 
feel there is no control and there is little they can do (in switching)”.  
 
Alternatively, the switching rate is also of concern. Several interviewees 
thought that the switching rate was not an appropriate indicator to reflect the 
intensity of competition within the market as a result of the above discussed 
issues. For example, one stated that “switching rate is not the best indicator of 
how competitive the market is” (S5). Additionally, he suggested that “if you are 
going to look at switching rates you should look at annual switching rates to 
see if people are switching more than once”, with this means Ofgem cannot 
rely on switching rate as a guide for application of regulation. 
 
In short, according to the above, electricity price rises during the post-2003 
period up until 2010 were related to a reduction in competition in the system, 
whereby the switching service provider process was neither functioning nor 
helping people to achieve expected benefits from the market; with this also 
relating to consumer confidence and trust, leading a number of them to 
question whether or not it was worth switching. When people do not regularly 
exercise their power by engaging with the market and do not switch suppliers, 
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in return the suppliers become more powerful, maintaining control in 
manipulating and increasing prices for their own benefits. For this reason, a 
liberalised market becomes less competitive and prices increase every year.  
 
Fourth, from 2003 to 2010, the social energy tariff appeared to be a key 
scheme for protecting vulnerable people after removal of the price cap, and 
was aimed at ensuring reductions in energy costs paid by those considered 
vulnerable. However, this scheme became a significant weakness within the 
UK retail electricity system affecting price movement when two issues were 
related.  
 
Firstly, service provision was based on a voluntary agreement provided by the 
companies; the companies chose to contribute to social energy tariffs in their 
own ways and this led to various social tariffs becoming available within the 
system. Unfortunately, the vulnerable found the scheme information 
confusing, not knowing how and where to access the cheapest social tariff 
and ultimately being unable to make the right informed choices. As a result, 
they ended up paying more for their energy consumption while the companies 
themselves continue manipulating price by providing them with expensive 
deals for their own benefits. 
 
Secondly, since the scheme was based only on a voluntary agreement and 
suppliers were the only providers; this enforcement on companies created 
regulatory pressure and led to a disadvantage in the system. Dramatically 
cheap electricity prices offered to the poor by the companies as part of the 
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social energy tariff can also cause an increase in electricity prices for others 
(non-vulnerable households). 
 
In theory (see Chapter 2), with regard to conflict occurring when non-market 
objectives are heavily (or inappropriately) imposed within the liberalised 
market; with service prices obligated to be lower than competitive prices so as 
to maintain consumer welfare leads to worsening circumstances whereby the 
system becomes inflexible. Companies finally will have to increase service 
prices for other households so as to cover the resources spent on social 
obligation. 
 
Most participants also highlighted that information regarding the social tariff 
was complicated, resulting in consumers having poor information for their 
market participation and finally ending up purchasing a bad product. In 
addition, several participants also argued about the cost of social tariff being 
passed on to other non-vulnerable consumers and, hence, electricity prices 
increased sharply during the critical period. For example, one, from CAB, 
mentioned that “the Big Six all have social tariffs but for our advisers it can be 
somewhat complex to find out because every supplier has their own social 
tariff; it offers different things to different people and there is no consistency” 
(G4), and commented that “it is quite difficult, sometimes, to understand who 
offers what, and to whom”. This clearly reflects a situation where vulnerable 
groups were not able to obtain appropriate or adequate quality information 
and either failed to make the right market-participation decision. 
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The same participant also raised another important issue in relation to the 
above discussion in that there were a number of people “who might not be 
eligible for the social tariffs but who might be really quite poor, struggling to 
pay for their electricity; in their bills they may be paying additional amount to 
allow the energy suppliers to offer reductions to someone else” (G4), with him 
further arguing that although social tariff is helping some people to move out 
of fuel poverty, in the same time, it might be pushing other people into fuel 
poverty. Similarly, one pointed out that “the more you put on bills, the more 
you make the poor pay per head” (C1). Likewise, one person, from EST, 
spoke to the author regarding the impact of social schemes on non-vulnerable 
consumer bills, such as CERT, stating that “although funding comes from 
energy suppliers but is paid for by consumers (non-vulnerable consumers)” 
(C3). Equally, one clarified that “the truth is that any subsidy to anybody for 
green tariffs or for poverty is paid for by the energy company and that goes 
into the people’s bill” (SS3). This clearly highlights it is difficult to require 
companies, who aim to gain profits from their investments, either to convey 
the social tariff to consumers or to ensure universal service across the 
country; rather, resulting in high energy prices for other consumers. 
 
By contrast, one person, who works in association with energy firms, did not 
agree to the above point of view, arguing that “other householders never pay 
more for electricity to support those who are vulnerable” (C6). Clearly, this 
argument rests on insufficient evidence; instead, a number of confirmations 
highlighted that social costs are being passed onto non-vulnerable 
consumers. 
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In short, according to the above, electricity price rises during the post-2003 
period up until 2010 related to a weakness of the social tariff scheme. A 
confusing information of social energy tariff and asymmetric information 
between those considered vulnerable and energy suppliers allowed these 
suppliers to keep the vulnerable in fuel poverty, as well as, take the 
opportunity to manipulate their prices and charge more for a service than the 
other standard tariffs available in the market. Additionally, once suppliers were 
required to take part in social obligation, there was a shift in social obligation 
cost from companies’ responsibilities to other consumers. 
 
Fifth, Ofgem were found to be unsuccessful in regulating the UK retail 
electricity market. There were various critical issues relating to Ofgem’s 
performance in the system during the critical post-2003 periods, including 
from 2003 to 2010. These issues included: 1) failure in ensuring a lower 
electricity price for final consumers, this leading to fuel poverty; 2) failure in 
administering a social scheme, whereby vulnerable groups were provided with 
complicated information, resulting in them either failing to participate with the 
market or purchasing an expensive tariff; 3) failure in directing appropriate 
vertical and horizontal integration in the UK electricity sector, including the 
retail system, resulting in market power and a reduction in competition; 4) 
failure in supporting a transparent flow of information in the relationship 
between the regulator, suppliers and consumers, leading to the emergence of 
information issues and other related concerns, such as detrimental switching 
supplier; and 5) failure in maximising the intensity of competition within the 
retail system. In addition, Ofgem was captured by the interests of suppliers, 
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by using a light touch on suppliers. This associated with the energy security 
issue relating to the fact that energy provided in the country is dependent on 
these companies; therefore, it can be a problem if Ofgem forced investors to 
stop making more profit.  
 
In theory and the EU requirement, within the relationship between the energy 
suppliers, consumers and the regulators, Ofgem, as the national energy 
regulator, has been a key player in ensuring the sustainable development of 
the electricity sector and in safe guarding consumer protection through 
competition and must not be directed by the interests of the industry (see 
Chapter 2 and Section 4.2).  
 
Several interviewees have also highlighted that Ofgem’s role and 
performance (between 2003 and 2010) in relation to steep electricity price 
increases and consumer safeguards were neither efficient nor effective, and 
there were insufficient strategies and control exercised by Ofgem; these 
interviewees arguing that there should have been more immediate action by 
Ofgem to tackle the problems. For example, one said that “the problem with 
Ofgem at the moment is that it sees itself as a go-between between industry 
and the public” (J2), with him suggesting that “Ofgem needs to focus much 
more attention on the public”. Similarly, one argued that “Ofgem has been too 
close to the industry (energy industry)” (J3). He highlighted that “the suppliers 
have all the power and Ofgem has no power at all”, and criticised that “Alistair 
Buchanan, the chief executive of Ofgem very much comes from an industry 
background, so he is part of the club”. Another commented that “Ofgem is the 
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overarching body, which is very much run by the suppliers and not by the 
consumers” (CS5), and argued that “they have a vested interest in not seeing 
the supplier weakened”. Furthermore, one said that “Ofgem never referred the 
market to the CC for investigating the market” (C1), and commented that, for 
this critical reason, their role was questioned. These all reflect a scenario 
where Ofgem was not a champion for consumers, but for the companies. 
Ofgem agreed with many inappropriate mergers, but was neither able to 
exercise its powers nor use regulation over the companies. As a result, 
electricity prices have been increasing since the post-2003 period, this clearly 
being associated with the unresolved issue of fuel poverty. 
 
In terms of the relationship between market function, competition and 
consumer benefits, many thought that Ofgem did not exercise their power 
sufficiently to maximise competition in the system. For example, one argued 
that Ofgem was not able to improve the competitive levels of the system, 
saying that “there has not been much shake-up and the market is very static” 
(CS3). Likewise, one confirmed that “the competitive environment promoted 
by Ofgem is limited” (S5). While one argued that Ofgem has been too 
optimistic about how effective competition is going to be; therefore, a lack of 
creative or necessary regulation has become an issue in the system 
(including the retail market) since liberalisation began in 1998. Moreover, he 
said that “Ofgem has never, until recently, has any history of finding problems 
with the companies so I am not surprised that they did not identify a problem 
and I do not think that they are monitoring the situation well enough” (S5). 
Additionally, several participants thought that it would be a truly competitive 
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market if there were different small firms and not just six big ones. This 
reflects the vertical and horizontal integration issues and the degree of 
competition, this not yet being addressed by Ofgem, clearly showing their 
failure.  
 
Most highlighted an issue relating to the social scheme administered by 
Ofgem. The issue was that Ofgem did not coordinate with suppliers and 
related organisations regarding information to ensure who were entitled to 
these social tariff benefits, as could be seen from the unclear description of 
the term ‘vulnerable consumers’. For example, one stated that “it is quite hard 
to identify who is entitled to receive the benefit, for example, it is quite hard to 
identify people on low income” (C4); and therefore “there is a big problem with 
vulnerable consumers not understanding the tariffs”.  
 
Alternatively, the group of scholars takes a different view relating to Ofgem’s 
responsibility and performance. For example, one provided a criticism of their 
performance, which was influenced by what he called ‘the culture’, and this 
culture was established when the organisation was set up. The same 
participant argued that the first regulator, Prof. Littlechild, has clearly 
influenced the system, saying that “Prof. Littlechild designed the system and 
his belief was that regulation of utilities should be a temporary thing until 
markets take over, he believe that regulators are always inefficient because 
there is always regulatory capture so he left the regulator with a philosophy, ‘a 
culture’ that they were doing a temporary job and they should be doing as little 
as possible, because everything they did was going to be bad” (S5). He 
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added that “these authorities usually have to keep out of the way of the 
market because they believe that if they intervene too much they will just 
make thing worse”.  
 
Finally, with regard to the retail electricity market system one gave a view on 
Ofgem’s performance that “I think they have got themselves in a bit of a 
mess” (S6), and commenting that “in retail markets it is a bit strange, Ofgem 
kept saying if competition is wonderful; everything is beautiful in the garden 
and there is nothing wrong and they will not accept any criticism”.  
 
By contrast to the above relating to Ofgem’s performance, some people give a 
significant amount of credit to Ofgem against the argument. For example, one 
noted that Ofgem has usually conducted research to examine the extent to 
which consumers have engaged with the retail market, and indicated that 
Ofgem has achieved in ensuring the high degree of retail competition. He said 
that “I am not aware that Ofgem is not exercising their power enough as there 
are quite a lot of obligations on energy companies” (CS4). One, from EDF 
Energy, argued with regard to the issue of Ofgem’s duty and performance 
being captured by the interests of the suppliers that “that (the allegation) is 
completely incorrect and both Ofgem and ourselves think quite the opposite” 
(SS4), with him adding that “we disagree with Ofgem quite a lot”. The Scottish 
Power representatives also confirmed to the author that the allegation was not 
true, by giving an example that “we had a difference of opinion with Ofgem 
about what they thought the market should be and what the prices in the 
market should be” (SS11). However, these seem to be in contrast with the 
173 
 
fact that Ofgem never referred the market to the CC, as interview findings 
have shown previously. 
 
In short, the above all reflects a scenario where Ofgem has not acted 
appropriately in response to the weaknesses and the threats of the system. 
For that reason, electricity price rises during the post-2003 period up until 
2010 related to a weakness in Ofgem’s performance. In consequence, surely 
the issues of price rise and fuel poverty have remained unresolved.   
 
(b) The external factors 
According to Table 4.3(c), the second concern to be discussed is with regard 
to the external factors, these being a significant threat to the system and, 
critically, creating a negative impact on final electricity prices for households 
during the critical period. This discussed factor includes: 1) EU requirements 
regarding environmentally friendly electricity in generation, transmission 
network and supply sectors; and 2) an increase in fuel prices since the post-
2003 period, such as natural gas, oil, and coal (see Figure 4.3(b)).  
 
First, since 2001, there has been significant EU requirement regarding an 
environmentally friendly energy, this clearly resulting in high costs for 
electricity providers and high prices for consumers. These are associated with 
resources used, energy product, supply and consumption. The EC has set a 
target to be achieved by 2020 of a 20% share of renewables in final energy 
consumption within the EU. An environmentally sustainable system is 
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expected to be interpreted on a national basis in order to determine better 
changes for the benefit of European society (see Chapters 2 and 3). 
 
In relation to electricity goods, this requirement forms a significant threat to 
the system, affecting electricity costs and having an impact on the whole 
sector, which includes generation, transmission, distribution and retail supply. 
For example, the use of renewable energy resources and tremendous 
investments in technologies and innovations aimed at building a renewable 
energy power station need to be established. Wind turbines, solar panels, 
hydropower, geothermal power and biomass generators are examples of 
ways of generating renewable electricity energy.  
 
The current obligation known as the ‘Renewables Obligation (RO)’ was also 
established in 2002. This is still in effect and will expire in 2018. This requires 
all domestic suppliers to provide electricity generated from renewable energy 
resources at the target set. The suppliers have to prove how they meet the 
requirement by presenting ‘Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs)’. In the 
case that suppliers fail to meet target, it will result in a significant payment 
(Ofgem Achieved Press Release 2002a; RO First Annual Report 2004; RO 
Second Annual Report 2005). 
 
Not only the above schemes for generating renewable electricity, but also 
other related schemes established to achieve a reduction in the carbon 
footprint through the concept of energy efficiency, have since become a 
serious concern affecting the whole system and final electricity prices, 
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including the critical period from 2003 to 2010. In fact, the energy policy has 
been designed to enable the UK to meet the target of a 20% overall cut in 
carbon emissions from domestic housing by 2020.  
 
The above shows that not only the goal of the establishment of green 
electricity power plants but also energy efficiency has been key objectives. 
These clearly have an impact on UK energy firms since they need to ensure 
renewable energy technologies and provide grants and offers to help 
consumers pay for energy efficiency measures and other related schemes. In 
consequence, these practices, in return, affect final electricity prices for 
consumers. Evidence supporting the above argument is below. 
 
Importantly, all stakeholders, including the ‘Big Six’, indicated that the above 
EU requirement would lead to high energy prices for householders. For 
example, one commented regarding the impact of renewables on electricity 
costs, saying that “costs have been increasing as a result of the green 
obligations and the social tariff and things like CERT” (SS3), and he provided 
an example that “electricity generation in offshore wind turbines is being 
talked about at the moment and is massive; and at the moment the only place 
that can be paid for is on your and my energy bill (consumer bill)”. He 
summarised that “the overall price trend (retail price) is upwards because of 
the investment that we need to decarbonise our economy and guarantee our 
supply”. Similarly, one argued that “the need to invest in renewable energy 
generation would certainly push electricity prices up” (S6).  
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By contrast, however, DECC noted that this issue may have an impact on 
energy prices, including electricity, but not on consumer bills because energy 
efficiency schemes have already been introduced (DECC 2010). It seems that 
DECC has been too optimistic about this issue and, in fact, the energy 
efficiency scheme has not yet been made available for every household in the 
UK but only a small number of people. 
 
In short, according to the above, electricity price rises during the post-2003 
period, including from 2003 to 2010, have related to the significant EU 
requirement, a rising regulatory burden at EU level. Clearly, this issue is found 
to be a threat to the system, resulting in high costs for electricity providers and 
higher retail prices for consumers. 
 
Second, a sharp increase in fuel prices has become a serious issue for the 
UK electricity system since 2003, including the period from 2003 to 2010 (see 
Figure 4.3 (b)). It has been argued that the limitation on energy source relative 
to demand and economic crisis is part of the reason why retail electricity price 
has been increasing sharply since 2003 (see also Chapter 3). This expensive 
fuel, a critical external factor, creates an inflexible scenario in which all sectors 
are affected by the high costs, and this results in expensive electricity.  
 
In theory, the reformed electricity sector is an open system relating to general 
environment and an increase in fuel prices is a huge threat to the system, 
creating problem outside the energy sector and, therefore, it is hardly possible 
to manage the effect.  
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Interviewees also believe that the impact of higher fuel costs for generation 
fuel mix on electricity prices is critical and, moreover, in consequence, 
significantly relates to the security of electricity supply in the country. For 
example, one highlighted that “the underlying electricity price is driven by 
really the price of fuel, such as oil, so the price of electricity has risen more or 
less in line with the price of fuel” (CS3). Similarly, the Ofgem representatives 
commented regarding the issue of rising fuel costs, saying that “it is inevitable 
that energy costs are going to rise partly because we are running out of 
natural resources of gas in the UK” (R1), with them highlighting that “if current 
arrangements are just left as they are then costs will escalate and the security 
of supply will be threatened”.  
 
In short, from the above, electricity price rises during the post-2003 period, 
including from 2003 to 2010, to some extent have related to ongoing fuel price 
rises, this being seen as a result of limited supply relative to increasing 
demand, and the effect could be on final electricity prices for consumers as 
well as on the security of electricity supply in the UK. 
 
Figure 4.3(d): The effect of a combination of various factors on 
electricity prices and consumer benefits during the post-2003 period, 
including from 2003 to 2010 
Changes in structure 
of the system + 
changes in policy and 
regulatory regime + 
externalities 
 Various issues were 
identified both inside 
and outside the 
system 
(as weaknesses and 
threats) 
1) Market function 
was poor; 2) Price 
was increasing;  3) 
Consumer benefits 
and protection were 
affected 
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According to Figure 4.3(d) and to the above factors revealed and analysed, it 
can be seen that electricity price rises in the UK from 2003 to 2010 took place 
as a result of a combination of both internal and external factors. These 
included various issues forming within and outside the electricity system, 
which occurred as a result of changes in structure, regulatory policy and 
regulations, and externalities. These factors significantly concreted the 
weaknesses and threats, resulting in the market not functioning and consumer 
interests not being met. In particular, the issue of the provision of information 
(relating to asymmetric information) has been a critical one since the price cap 
was removed in 2002. In fact, it has been the most critical weakness of the 
system, escalating other disadvantages and exacerbating other weaknesses, 
including the problems of switching supplier relative to the degree of 
competition, and of the provision of the social tariff scheme. Additionally, an 
important reflection is that Ofgem has failed to make use of the most 
important component of the internal market system, which is price/tariff 
information, in strengthening the market. 
 
Conclusions 
In summary, restructuring the electricity sectors with changes in the regulatory 
regime has already affected prices, while externalities, including fuel price 
rises and EU requirements, become significant threats that increase the 
degree of problems within the retail electricity market. These all account for a 
much higher proportion of electricity price rises and for disadvantages for 
consumers, particularly the issue of information. Therefore, use of regulation 
for a sustainable solution is required. 
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Chapter 5: An Analysis of the Improvement 
of the Regulatory Regime Relative to 
Information 
 
After the introduction of full competition in 1998, a competitive energy market 
and market participation by consumers have become a constructive solution 
for creating consumer benefits and protection. However, until recently, 
important factors within the energy system and other externalities have 
significantly changed, in particular, provision of pricing information, leading to 
a reduction in competition within the system and affecting the interests of 
consumers. This shifting is critical and the market alone in this regard can 
neither drive a desirable outcome nor ensure a social goal. It needs an 
appropriate response from the regulator to pursue a practice of creating 
sustainability, security and affordability, otherwise leading to UK 
householders’ vulnerability along with energy poverty.  
 
Previous chapter shows that price/tariff information, as an internal factor, has 
gained in importance and has been the most critical factor adversely affecting 
the degree of competition as well as consumer benefits since liberalisation 
began. In relation to the previous findings, this chapter presents: 1) sources of 
the information issue; and 2) an empirical analysis of improvement in the 
regulatory regime of the UK retail electricity market, this focusing on a 
possible improvement in the regulatory information used in the relationship 
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between electricity suppliers, consumers, and the regulator. The goal is to 
generate a possibly sustainable solution in response to recent problems 
taking place in the electricity market.  
 
All interview findings presented in this chapter represent the whole analysis of 
improvement in the regulatory regime. This analysis will contribute to a new 
practice for improvement in the regulation and its enforcement in the light of 
consumer interests. This includes an increase in consumer benefits and 
protection, particularly for vulnerable groups. The analytical framework 
discussed in Chapter 2 is used for this analysis.  
 
This chapter is outlined as follows. According to the issue of information 
revealed earlier, the chapter begins with a review of empirical evidence 
collected from electricity suppliers and stakeholders with regard to provision of 
electricity price/tariff information for consumers from 2003 to 2010: Section 
5.1. This examines and explores a scenario whereby suppliers and others, 
such as energy comparison sites, CF, and Ofgem, managed to use price/tariff 
information for interacting with consumers and for stimulating them to engage 
with the retail market during the critical period. Section 5.2 investigates and 
analyses the empirical data collected through the fieldwork for answering the 
research question relating to how an improvement in the regulatory regime 
could be established in response to the issue, in order to ensure better 
consumer benefits. Discussion and conclusion are also included to 
summarise the research in the final part.  
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5.1 An investigation into the provision of information in the 
retail electricity market 
The following demonstrates an investigation into the provision of price/tariff 
information to consumers (sources of information issue), this being a requisite 
for market participation. It is important to now look at how this information was 
provided in the relationship between suppliers as sellers, consumers as 
purchasers, and the current regulatory body in the system. The investigation 
focused on the post-2003 period, including between 2003 and 2010. The 
details presented below attempts to address the sources of information issue. 
 
5.1.1 Provision of information by energy suppliers  
Suppliers as sellers in the retail electricity market have been playing a key 
role in providing price/tariff information for consumers since liberalisation 
began. Various suppliers have taken part in the fieldwork of the study, 
including some of the Big Six energy companies and other small energy 
suppliers. 
 
5.1.1.1 Strategies in providing information 
The study attempts to: identify what strategies electricity suppliers used for 
delivering information to UK consumers; and uncover how the information 
issue originally started within the relationship, with the result minimising the 
degree of competition and putting consumers at risk, particularly the 
vulnerable groups.  
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All participants highlighted one important aspect with regard to the provision 
of information, this always being processed and developed in connection with 
a licence condition: a set of regulations granted and used by Ofgem to control 
companies’ behaviour, at all times, and they cannot refuse to comply with 
these regulations (see also Chapter 2). For example, according to Ofgem’s 
requirement, the companies have to provide a statement about their 
customers’ tariffs. This reflects that there are certain rules on regulatory 
information that the companies have to act upon.  
 
• Big Six Companies 
Participants from the Big Six suppliers were questioned about the strategies 
they used in the provision of electricity price/tariff information for consumers. 
These companies independently linked provision information strategy to 
various factors in order to interact with energy users. Nonetheless, all defined 
their major means of providing price/tariff information to consumers relatively 
similarly, which included companies’ websites, Internet comparison sites, 
telephone service, doorstep selling, and information packs. 
 
The Npower representative explained to the author with respect to the 
company’s strategies that “we give all of our customers all of the information 
that they need even if we did not want to do it, we would have to do it” (SS2). 
He, however, stressed that there was a real challenge in providing information 
to consumers. This was because the company wanted to give consumers the 
widest possible choices but, because every single consumer is different and 
the company needed to ensure that they did not confuse them, either they did 
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not need or it was hard to understand, particularly vulnerable groups. In 
relation to this, he added that “our strategy is called ‘a crystal clear mark’ 
which is a balance between choice and not too much choice”.  
 
In terms of electricity tariffs the company made available, the same participant 
went on to say that “the number of tariff changes all the time and the key 
payment types all have slightly different tariffs and they have different 
combination” (SS2). He also indicated that the company always believes that 
there is no one best way for best interacting with all consumers through 
pricing information, pointing out that “different consumers want different things 
like some customers want to have the absolute cheapest price and some 
customers are more interested in different aspects of what the company 
provides to them”. The reflection here is that the company was aware of 
consumers’ difficulties regarding use of information and market participation, 
despite the fact that the company tried to make information valuable with 
more choice and simplification. A solution providing a balance between choice 
with the best possible information and simplicity, to date, has not yet been 
addressed. This is important as it can be seen from their practice that tariffs 
can be varied at all times depending on changing circumstances, this 
continuingly creating confusion for consumers. 
 
While the Scottish Power representatives shared their experiences regarding 
the information provision strategy, stating that “what we try to do is to keep 
our tariff structure relatively simple” (SS11), and arguing that they had very 
comprehensive information on their website, and defining the factor that the 
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company focused on in drawing the attention of consumers, which, both 
agreed, was related to pricing and timing. They explained that consumers’ 
own personal situations, their personal motivation, and market circumstance 
all affected the company’s plan on price, arguing that “these affect how the 
company comes out with lots of products”, and adding that “what varies a lot 
more would be the special offers that we could put as many as half a dozen to 
a dozen special offers up maybe on a monthly basis”.  
 
Clearly, information provision to consumers is similar for both Npower and 
Scottish Power. These two companies focused on providing a balance 
between choices and simple information and were concerned about what 
consumers really needed. Their strategies are always ready to be changed in 
line with changing circumstances. In fact, their strategies refer to a scenario 
where a range of tariffs can be generated and changed constantly. Perhaps 
this is not surprising due to the fact that consumers were faced with more than 
5,000 thousand tariffs from 2003 to 2010. 
 
Other members of the Big Six were more focused on dissimilar strategy. The 
EDF Energy representative revealed that the company used Internet links as 
a main strategy for provision of electricity price/tariff information so that 
consumers could make regular comparison and assessment. Additionally, he 
highlighted that the company always believes in brand and strong offers 
known as ‘non-price offering’, this being a major factor used to inspire 
consumers, stating that “if you have your supply of EDF energy you earn 
Nectar points” (SS4). The quote reflects what we understand about electricity 
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goods, a product that consumers do not see differences between several 
suppliers in the marketplace. EDF, therefore, created a premium product or a 
free gift to inspire consumers to use the product provided by them. This 
practice also generated brand loyalty, but this does not always result in good 
outcomes for either the market or consumers. In fact, such consumers did not 
use price information for their market participation, but were more concerned 
about the ‘prize’ on offer. The significance was that suppliers provided a 
number of tariffs with a range of options, resulting in confusion for consumers.  
 
Another company who focused on a significant non-price service, Scottish 
and Southern Energy (SSE), was also invited as a participant energy 
company. The SSE representative highlighted that, in their information policy, 
it was important providing consumers with details about extra benefits so that 
they could gain from being their customers, stating that “we have got affinity 
deals with Argos and My Savers and we also have a relationship with Mark & 
Spencer” (SS7). In other words, consumers received a range of free optional 
add-ons, earning points or having the option to select premium and other 
services. Nonetheless, in terms of the factor which the company referred as 
important in interacting with consumers was the transparent benefit, which 
she stated that “it is all about ensuring that information is clear and easy for 
the customer to understand”. 
 
The notion of information provision strategy relating to a non-price competition 
was a very important theme throughout the interviews with the participants 
from EDF Energy and SSE. The strategies applied by them define how 
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several companies made price/tariff information available in the UK from 2003 
to 2010, consumers being offered electricity with various choices of prizes. 
The companies continued to generate a number of different tariffs to inspire 
consumers, because they believed that their strategy was about developing a 
product with various choices in response to a competitive market, but this, in 
fact, could also give consumers a confusing message, and could increase 
information asymmetry between suppliers and householders, possibly leading 
to disadvantageous results. 
 
Figure 5.1(a): Information provision strategy by the Big Six energy companies 
 
Figure 5.1(a) demonstrates a critical scenario in the UK retail electricity 
market whereby information strategies used by big companies in the 
relationship were neither constructive for consumers nor for the market. A 
great number of price/tariff structures, along with a range of non-price offers 
continued to be generated, while the suppliers themselves could not arrive at 
a balance between choice and simplicity.  
 
Struggle finding a 
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Other small suppliers 
On the other hand, other small suppliers had different strategies in providing 
information to consumers. Interviewees from these companies were asked the 
same question regarding their information provision strategy. The strategies 
used by this group were relatively similar by focusing on making all 
information uncomplicated for consumers to understand. 
 
The following seven representative companies, which include: 1) LoCo2 
Energy Ltd; 2) Green Energy (UK) plc; 3) Ovo Energy; 4) Ecotricity; 5) Good 
Energy; 6) Utilita Energy Limited; and 7) EBICo Ltd, did offer tariffs with 
options for consumers to choose either between 100% renewable energy and 
low-carbon energy, or between standard tariff and Economy 7. Most thought it 
was important to ensure price/tariff information with transparency and 
simplicity. Also, payment techniques used did not differentiate between 
electricity tariffs. 
 
The LoCO2 Energy Ltd representative explained the strategy used by the 
company in delivering information to consumers, stating that “the website, the 
magazines and the different price comparison sites are the main way that we 
provide the information” (SS8), and highlighting that the most important factor 
in their approach was “making it accessible and transparent so that the 
consumers can compare (compare the saving)”. She also provided an 
example by saying that “we only have three main tariffs: 1) the top price for 
100% renewable energy; 2) the middle price for 100% of renewable energy 
but it is sourced from a wider range of technology; and 3) the economic price 
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for 20% renewable energy combined with 80% low carbon energy”. This 
shows how the company applies their strategy to interact with people. 
 
Other small suppliers participating in this research had the same strategy for 
information provision: Green Energy (UK) plc, Ovo Energy and Ecotricity, 
however, delivered only two uncomplicated electricity tariffs to consumers, 
including 100% renewable and low-carbon energy tariffs. 
 
The Green Energy (UK) plc representative mentioned that “we publish the 
domestic tariff (for households) on our website and we are included on most 
comparison websites” (SS5), adding that “we are very open about our pricing 
policy and we communicate with our consumers regularly by email, and in the 
form of our bi-annual newsletter”. The Ovo Energy representative clarified in 
short that “the strategy to promote our energy is through traditional marketing 
channel” (SS6), by which she meant the media and public relations. Also, the 
Ecotricity representative explained that the company provided price/tariff 
information through their website, stating that “our website contains 
information about us as a company, our tariffs and our ethical approach” 
(SS9), as well as having a price match to other standard tariffs (brown energy) 
offered by different suppliers, such as the Big Six. All these companies 
highlighted providing information on their websites as a major strategy. Their 
prices were also clear and easy to understand and it was not an issue for their 
customers. 
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In terms of the factor which the companies regarded as very important for 
consumer inspiration; Green Energy (UK) plc and Ecotricity confirmed that the 
significant factor was their clean energy. This was unlike Ovo Energy, which 
regarded the most important factor in information provision as “price 
competitive” (SS6), and stressed that “consumer comprehension of 
competitive price/tariff information is a key priority for the company”. With 
these small companies already creating simple and transparent information, 
consumers could see a comprehensive tariff with an option being offered and 
could easily make decisions in their own interests. 
 
Another group, consisting of three small comparable companies, including: 
Good Energy, EBICo Ltd and Utilita Energy Limited, was also invited to take 
part in the interview. They also used a strategy of simple and clear information 
and offered just two simple tariffs: standard and Economy 7. However, only 
Good Energy provided 100% renewable energy, while EBICo Ltd provided 
brown energy with neither a renewable nor a social tariff. Utilita Energy 
Limited merely offered energy for prepayment consumers.  
 
The Good Energy representative explained to the author regarding the 
strategy that “the company has only two tariffs and both are available in an 
information pack sent to all enquiries and on the website” (SS12), and 
highlighted that “evidence of 100% renewable energy via supplier fuel mix 
information is the key information” used by the company to inspire consumers. 
EBICo Ltd also used a similar strategy to promote information through website 
and an information pack; however, unlike Utilita Energy Limited. The EBICo 
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Ltd representative told the author that the company also had a number of 
partners, mostly social landlords or providers of social housing, with the 
company marketing directly to their tenants. Therefore, some people and 
vulnerable groups were made aware of their electricity service, whereby these 
understood that their landlords, whether it was a Council or the Housing 
Association, recommended buying electricity from the company. Moreover, he 
suggested that a telephone service to these people was also available. 
 
The latter generally used face-to-face sales activity and recommendation as 
major methods of gaining new customers. The Utilita Energy Limited 
representative regarded their customers as “people who can generally be 
categorised by being hard to reach with most marketing techniques 
(vulnerable groups)” (SS1), and added that “they do not engage so much with 
the internet and they do not use landlines and they are difficult to mail shot”. 
However, he stressed that “as part of the sales process the customer is given 
a quote and some price comparison carried out”. These showed the method 
the companies used in dealing with vulnerable people who were not able to 
access information through the Internet. It reflects the importance of face-to-
face communication strategy used by the companies in delivering information 
to these people.  
 
With regard to the factor they used for inspiring consumers, EBICo Ltd and 
Utilita Energy Limited focused on competitive pricing. However, not 
surprisingly, Good Energy valued their green resources and energy as a ‘real 
deal’ by stating that “we are not competing on price” (SS12).   
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Table 5.1(b): Electricity tariffs provided by small energy companies 
Small energy companies 
 
Tariffs offered 
LoCo2 Green 
Energy 
(UK) plc 
Ovo 
Energy 
Ecotricity Good 
Energy 
Utilita 
Energy 
Limited 
EBICo 
Ltd 
A: 100% renewable energy or low 
carbon energy 
 
A 
 
A 
 
A 
 
A 
   
B: Standard/domestic tariff or 
Economy 7(day/night) 
     
B 
 
B 
 
B 
 
Table 5.1(b) lists the tariffs that were identified and provided by the small 
energy companies, in that they either offered two tariffs of 100% renewable 
and low-carbon energy (A), or they offered two tariffs of standard/domestic 
tariff and Economy 7 (B).  
 
 
Figure 5.1(c): Information provision strategy by small energy companies 
  
Figure 5.1(c) above shows a key theme applied in their strategy of information 
provision by small energy companies. 
Choice and 
simplicity were 
included in 
information 
Focusing on lowest 
price and clean 
electricity sourced 
from green resource 
Create a small 
number of tariffs that 
are simple and 
transparent 
Information 
strategies by small 
energy companies 
 192
All the above discussions reflect that, for small companies that were not 
delivering 100% renewable electricity maintained competitive price 
information (the lowest price) as their best factors for gaining new customers. 
In relation to this, just two tariffs were offered (see Table 5.1 (b)); in 
consequence, price/tariff confusion was not reported, whereas the Big Six had 
significant issues with providing a great number of tariffs that confused 
consumers. Despite the fact this was part of companies’ product development 
strategy, the overwhelming choice provided no real choice; rather, it adversely 
increased asymmetric information between sellers and buyers and affected 
competition unit. 
 
Additionally, as a result of the provision of various non-price offers, aimed at 
increasing consumer satisfaction, a competitively low price (a real value of 
electricity goods) was not sufficiently focused on. In theory, interaction 
between buyers and sellers is driven by price and satisfaction relative to self-
interest (see Chapter 2). However, in the real world of the retail electricity 
market, suppliers regularly used the strategy of non-price competition to 
overlay and distort the value of competitive price information and, as a result, 
consumers do not have adequate quality information about the electricity 
product, which is all about price. Clearly, it reflects weaknesses in the 
relationship between consumers and suppliers as well as in the interaction 
between consumers and the market. Additionally, the greater the information 
inefficiency between suppliers and householders the greater scope for 
misleading information and scams across the system. 
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5.1.1.2 The cheapest tariff and the social tariff 
Suppliers were asked how they normally promoted their cheapest tariffs to 
consumers and how frequently this information was updated. They were also 
asked whether or not their social tariff was the cheapest tariff and what the 
criteria for qualifying for the benefits were. With regard to promoting the 
available cheapest tariff, most companies normally promoted the cheapest 
tariff through the Internet both via their own websites and on comparison 
sites. However, each company had more than one cheapest tariff available 
because a cheapest tariff with certain combinations was not necessarily 
cheaper than others that were combined with different options and prizes. All 
revised their available tariffs annually.  
 
Opinions expressed regarding the social tariff varied. The similarity in social 
tariff provision among suppliers was that the social tariff was the cheapest 
tariff or was equal to the cheapest deal offered in certain areas, as well as 
being the same tariff available across all payment methods. With regard to the 
criteria relating to who would be eligible to obtain benefits, all believed that it 
needed to be created by the companies. For these reasons, the criteria are 
relatively different among suppliers. For example, Scottish Power offered their 
social tariff as the cheapest tariff emphasising that “we guarantee the 
customer the cheapest price in that region regardless of payment method” 
(SS11). They meant, in other words, that it was not only the cheapest tariff the 
company had but it was the cheapest tariff the company provided in that area. 
However, they argued that there were a great number of the cheapest tariffs 
because of “the nature of the charging structure of the distribution charge in 
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different regions”, this argument being similar to other companies’ such as 
SSE’s. However, this quote reflects a critical information management 
towards cheapest tariff provision, showing that there were various cheapest 
tariffs available within one energy company. This implies how the Big Six 
possibly hide and manipulate the cost of the transmission network charge, 
because, in fact, these companies mostly own both transmission and 
distribution lines as a result of vertical and horizontal integration (see also 
Chapter 4). In relation to this, the participants, from Scottish Power, explained 
about the criteria for qualifying for the social tariff, stating that “we are working 
with the Department of Work and Pension”, this Department helping the 
company to identify who was eligible for benefits. However, the participants 
also clarified that “our view is that the money needs to be well targeted and go 
to people who need it the most and that is a big feature of how we seek to 
work through our social tariff; it is not just about being as simple as trying to 
meet a government obligation and give the money away in the easiest 
possible manner”. This implies that budget on social tariff was their significant 
issue and this could possibly have an impact on non-vulnerable consumers.  
 
Similarly, the EDF Energy representative explained that their cheapest deal 
was promoted online. He confirmed that people who were on the social tariff 
provided by EDF Energy would be no worse off. However, he highlighted the 
issues of social tariff provision and of its criteria, saying that “it is about 
whether or not we can identify the fuel poor; the definition of real poverty is 
when people spend more than 10% of their income on fuel; on the biggest 
problem we have now is that we do not know what people’s incomes are” 
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(SS4). Nonetheless, he said that “if you (consumers) say you are on benefits; 
it is possible for someone to prove they are on benefits; they will have a 
benefit book and we would be able to find out that way”. With regard to the 
target set for those considered vulnerable, he confirmed that there was no 
target since this related to a requirement from the government. Data gathered 
from EDF Energy implies a scenario where information regarding the benefits 
for vulnerable groups was unclear. Not only did these people not know what 
benefits they were entitled to and where to ask for, but the companies 
themselves were confused and could not identify what benefits each particular 
consumer might receive.  
 
From the above, it can be seen that there were two main types of cheapest 
tariff being provided by energy suppliers across the UK: 1) the cheapest tariff 
for non-vulnerable consumers; and 2) the cheapest tariff for vulnerable groups 
known as ‘the social tariff’. Each was different in different areas and, 
particularly, the former also varied depending on different combinations. This 
clearly shows the real world of the UK retail electricity market, where 
significant confusion faced by consumers had arisen from the way in which 
energy companies promote the cheapest tariffs in the market. Additionally, the 
differing ways in which the companies have interpreted social tariff has also 
exacerbated the information issue among vulnerable people. Clearly, this 
affects the intensity of competition and consumer confidence and trust. 
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5.1.1.3 Information on electricity bills 
Energy suppliers were asked to describe how information was provided on 
consumer bills. Most tended to provide householders with all of the necessary 
information as possible in order to meet licence conditions. However, they 
believed that this could be too much for consumers. The following discussion 
provides an example of how energy suppliers communicate with consumers 
through billing information. 
 
Participants from the Big Six all viewed information on bills relatively similarly, 
and they provided as much necessary information as possible. For, example, 
the Npower representative stated that “what we try to do is put as much 
simple information on the front page of the bills as we can, and have as little 
small print as well can, and as much ability for the consumer to calculate their 
bill from the information that we have given them” (SS2). Similarly, the SSE 
representative stated that “we provide a whole load of information on every bill 
or statement that the customer gets, not just once a year, such as the 
customer’s tariff, product information, the pence per kWh” (SS7), adding that 
“the bill is very clearly explained and we have designed our bill to make sure 
that is clear for customers to understand in response to customer feedback”.  
 
The above all imply that consumers tended to receive a lot of information on 
their bills. Electricity goods/service is an exceptional product in that it differs 
from others, whereby consumers need to know and understand various 
details for their market participation, such as the tariff’s name, a statement of 
consumption, and fuel mix information relative to environment protection. 
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These are to help consumers to be able to decide whether they should 
continue with their current supplier or to switch to another offering them a 
better deal. Nonetheless, it implies that, in the same time, it is difficult to 
address and identify the right information at the right level for consumers. 
 
5.1.1.4 Information assessment and complaints 
All suppliers usually assessed price/tariff information provided to consumers 
to ensure that it was comprehensive and supported them in making informed 
choices. Participants were therefore asked to give their perspectives on the 
information assessment process, the relation to consumers’ complaints, and 
to the relationship between suppliers and consumers. Most admitted that they 
received some complaints regarding the issue of information whereby 
consumers found it complicated. However, some of them argued that their 
information was not difficult to understand, and suggested educating 
consumers to help understand pricing information. 
 
For example, the Scottish Power representatives approached information 
assessment by conducting ‘voice of customer research’ every quarter, in 
order to try to understand and evaluate what consumers were thinking and 
saying about them, including the provision of information, such as billing. The 
participants also admitted that the company received complaints but these 
were not related to unclear information and the company also did not find their 
information too complicated to understand. Both shared experiences 
regarding the background of the complaints, stating that “in general, the 
perception is that the media and consumer groups present that the pricing 
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and tariff information is not easy to understand, which this is a general belief” 
(SS11), and further explaining that “there has also been a lot of volatility in the 
prices when people would expect that their energy bills was to be fixed and 
not changed much and people do not understand that well why an energy bill 
moves and why it is so volatile; for example, the cost of energy efficiency and 
government obligation all of which make up a big part of people’s bills”. This 
statement, however, implies that consumers did not trust the company and 
thought that price increases were introduced just to increase the company’s 
profits. It is clear that the confidence and trust issue is critically affecting the 
relationship between suppliers and consumers. 
 
Equally, the EDF Energy representative told the author that the company took 
other related factors into account when assessing information, saying that “if 
you value Nectar points then you will see the tariff and assess the tariff in a 
different way because you (consumers) are not just buying energy; you 
(consumers) are getting Nectar points at the same time” (SS4). With regard to 
complaints relating to complicated information, he also argued that 
information was not too complicated to understand and stated that “I think it 
(energy price/tariff information) is no more different than car insurance or 
banking and I do not think energy is more or less complicated than retail 
banking”, with him further arguing by questioning that “is that a failure of 
consumer policy or is that because they (energy) are just complicated things 
and people should be more educated and able to understand things?”. In 
addition, he believed that consumers might switch to cheaper deals or more 
expensive deals because there was a high degree of switching and the 
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market had to be working in some way or other. Again, the above review by 
EDF Energy reflects the issue of pricing inefficiency commonly related to an 
introduction of a high range of tariffs with non-price offers. As a result, it is 
possible that the company set all high prices for consumers.  
 
Nonetheless, the above details all highlight that big energy companies mostly 
received complaints regarding information confusion. This shows that their 
various energy tariffs have become a critical issue for consumers and the 
system. 
 
Small energy companies also regularly performed information assessment to 
ensure that their information is clear and transparent. It is not surprising that 
most small companies did not have complaints relative to unclear information 
as they kept the number of tariffs low. Instead, the companies were confident 
that customers were able to understand their tariffs and how their energy was 
priced. Likewise, one participant from these companies declared that “keep 
thing simple helps to limit confusion” (SS5). Accordingly, these small 
companies all had good communication with customers through clear 
information provision, which has helped to strengthen the relationship 
between suppliers and consumers and the competition unit. This clearly 
reflects a key principle required in a well-functioning market system, which, in 
theory, is a beneficial interaction between sellers and buyers (see Chapter 2). 
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5.1.1.5 Licence conditions on regulatory information 
According to the licence conditions suppliers are required to provide 
information to consumers and Ofgem. Therefore, suppliers were asked to 
express if they found working under these conditions difficult.  
 
Most of the Big Six suppliers thought that working under this condition, to 
some extent, was not easy. For example, the Scottish Power representatives 
explained that, since liberalisation began, there has been a code of practice 
document that various regulators made the energy companies comply with, in 
that “it was probably about 20 pages” (SS11). As a result, the participants 
commented that “the most difficult thing for us is taking all those obligations 
but making sure that we present it back to customers in a communication 
style that is straightforward and concise, and people understand”. Additionally, 
information cost was also an issue for them. 
  
Similarly, the SSE representative highlighted two issues occurring as a result 
of working under the licence conditions: 1) providing some information to 
Ofgem on a regular basis was not always easy, with her stating that “as  the 
system (the energy market) is a live/open system, the data is constantly 
changing, this information may be accurate on the day but not necessarily 
what might be the same tomorrow or another day” (SS7); 2) providing a 
financial statement every year, with the representative arguing that “some 
information that we have been asked for, it might be that we have to run a 
special report to get”.  
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On the other hand, small suppliers did not find this licence condition an issue, 
although only a few of them referred working under these licences to the cost 
issue. Instead, they felt that the obligation provided them with a structure to 
what they were trying to achieve. For example, one stated that “we have not 
found any difficulties (from working under the licence condition)” (SS8), and 
added that “I think the guidelines are there to protect us from any difficulties”, 
while another commented that “the information requirements we have to give 
at the moment are relatively simple to provide” (SS10). These comments 
reflect that information provided by these small companies was already 
transparent and simple, which was consistent with the licence condition.  
 
Discussion 
The above discussions all suggest that the issue of information mostly came 
from suppliers’ sites. This is not to say that they did not try to make 
information clear or transparent. In fact, most of them tried to do this very 
thoroughly. However, ‘a process of product development and refinement’, 
established by suppliers, with the aim to differentiate products from 
competitors, was a major source relating to the information issue in the retail 
electricity market. These have resulted in a large number of tariffs existing in 
the marketplace (approximately 5,000 tariffs with different non-price offers). 
Moreover, this issue is also combined with other factors, including: 1) different 
transmission network charges in different regions and; 2) different payment 
methods, clearly kept a number of tariffs extremely high and exacerbated the 
issue of consumer confusion and trust. This was also an issue for a provision 
of cheapest tariff.  
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According to the above discussion regarding the amount of tariffs, the 
resulting consequences can be listed as follows.  
 
First, consumers did not use the lowest price in their market participation but 
the ‘prize’. As mentioned, for electricity goods, the product is not different 
between suppliers but the price. Thus, in the competition unit, the cheapest 
price should be primarily promoted by the company and should be used by 
consumers. Second, some consumers, who preferred to use price for their 
informed choices, found information too confusing as a result of the high 
number of cheapest tariffs in the system. Ultimately they did not have 
adequate quality information; therefore, possibly avoided participating with the 
market. Third, the amount of cheapest tariffs available in the market 
negatively affected consumer confidence and trust. Consumers who have not 
yet switched will not do so, and those who have already switched will not 
switch again as a result of them having ended up with worse deal. This relates 
to the complex issue in that the cheapest tariff with a certain combination 
available in the market was not necessarily the cheapest deal either offered 
by the company or available in the country.  
 
Fourth, sellers will not focus on price as their major strategy in the market. 
The energy company will not focus on using the lowest price to inspire 
customers, but on maintaining promoting special deals that combine 
expensive prices with non-price offers, such as a tariff with Nectar points. This 
reflects the argument, by Stiglitz, with regard to the fact that when the market 
is plagued by information issues, there are motivations for sellers to make use 
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of and to increase imperfect information for their profits (see Chapter 2). Also, 
buyers will engage with the market less because there is no cheaper service 
to buy, resulting in a reduction in competition. Finally, some interest groups 
will take this opportunity, where information is complex, to maintain 
manipulating prices and misleading them through a promotion of non-price 
offer and a deceptive guarantee regarding the prize. 
 
The above was never an issue for the small energy suppliers because, by 
keeping their number of tariffs low, it prevented confusion. Accordingly, 
asymmetric information between suppliers and householders was less 
significant. This implies that appropriate licence conditions determining the 
appropriate range of tariffs in the market and reducing the degree of 
asymmetric information and its adverse consequences is required for a 
competition unit. Additionally, information regarding the social tariff was seen 
as an issue for both suppliers and consumers. The reason behind this was not 
related to suppliers’ administrations but to social policy and Ofgem’s 
administration, leading to fuel poverty remaining unresolved. 
 
5.1.2 Provision of information by Ofgem, consumer bodies 
and other related organisations 
For the retail energy market system, Ofgem has worked with a range of 
organisations in order to support consumers by providing the necessary 
information for their market participation. Representatives from Ofgem, 
Consumer Focus (CF), Consumer Direct (CD), the Citizens Advice Bureau 
(CAB), and the Energy Saving Trust (EST) were invited to share their working 
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experiences for the investigation of this study. It is important to now examine 
how this information all has benefited and supported consumers in their 
engagement with the energy market.  
 
The Ofgem representative was asked to explain Ofgem’s view regarding 
information provided by suppliers for consumers, relative to the aspects of 
appropriateness, adequacy, and accuracy. In relation to this, the participant 
was also asked to comment on how this information had an impact on 
consumer confidence and trust issue. Additionally, the difficulties faced by 
suppliers arising from working under some licence conditions with regard to 
provision of information were discussed. The Ofgem representative 
highlighted that, after conducting an ‘energy probe’ in 2008, with regard to the 
retail electricity market, they did have significant concerns about these issues, 
stating that “we found that there is a scope to improve information; and we are 
making a requirement that on the customer bills, it has to have more 
transparent information around what the benefits of switching are, in particular 
what the cheapest tariff is, and how much consumers can save by going on 
that tariff” (R2). This shows that Ofgem has considered billing information as 
the major remedy for all information issues. However, it seems that the 
solution has not been addressed. 
 
The same participant said that Ofgem was aware of suppliers’ difficulties, 
stating that “there are some costs to them (suppliers) from that, but it is one of 
the things we have sort of done (ask them to provide clear information to 
consumers) and we feel it is the right thing to do” (R2). In addition, he told the 
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author with regard to information requirement on suppliers’ financial accounts 
that “it involves getting data around how much the companies actually pay for 
gas and electricity (wholesale cost)”, which he argued would help to open up 
transparency and fairness that could have an impact on price/tariff information 
for final consumers. This implies that Ofgem was active when dealing with 
regulatory information against poor and unfair price/tariff information used in 
the system. However, again, it seems that issue of transparent information 
regarding the link between wholesale and retail prices has not yet been 
addressed. 
 
Other participants, from CF, CD, CAB and EST, were also asked about the 
role of the organisation in supporting consumers to engage with the market 
through information and how this is being evaluated and is influencing the 
interaction between consumers and the market. Additionally, complaints and 
difficulties relative to misleading and poor information were asked to be 
identified.   
 
One, from CF, highlighted the role of the organisation in supporting interaction 
between consumers and the market, stating that “we provide price 
comparison fact sheets and performance information for customer service 
company performance; we also run an accreditation scheme, it is a code of 
practice for online price comparisons, it is called the ‘Confidence Code’ (to 
govern the behaviour of the price comparison website and how they display 
their tariffs); that is to encourage consumers to do price comparisons, safe in 
the knowledge that the information is accurate, comprehensive and unbiased” 
 206
(C2). Another, from CF, further clarified that “we provide information leaflets 
on how to switch supplier; we have a lot of independent pricing information for 
consumers, which consumers can sign up to receive it by email, and people 
can ask us to send them if they do not have access to the internet; and 
information was edited every year” (C4). She also stated that “we do a lot of 
lobbying of things go wrong and we work a lot with bodies like Ofgem to 
ensure that consumers get the best independent information”. Additionally, 
with regard to billing information, she stated that “is something Consumer 
Focus has been very supportive of”. In terms of complaints, the former said 
that “they mostly related to billing” (C2); other issues such as switching and 
mis-selling had been found to be a critical issue for vulnerable groups.  
 
The above clearly highlights the important role of CF in supporting better 
interaction between buyers and the market. Billing information was a major 
focus and was promoted by the regulator and consumer bodies to support 
consumers so that they received the right information. 
 
One, from CD, revealed that “the role of CD is to provide clear and practical 
advice (information) for consumers”, with her explaining that “CD provides 
pre-shopping advice to consumers upon request” (C5), which includes 
directing consumers to the CF website and making consumers aware of the 
things they should consider before choosing an energy company: 1)whether 
or not there is a standing charge; 2) does the tariff suit their needs; 3) do they 
understand the terms and conditions of the tariff; 4) any minimum term for a 
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particular tariff; 5) the payment method required; and 6) and the unit price of 
the tariff.  
 
In addition, another CD representative highlighted another work CD was 
responsible for, which was “offering advice (information) to consumers who 
have got issues (complaints) with their energy suppliers” (C7), with him 
clarifying that “we give them advice around their consumer rights, their rights 
that arise from industry standards, and we give information about how to 
resolve the problem themselves and the next step available to them; if their 
first attempt at resolving is not successful, we have referral routes open to the 
energy companies for escalating complaints and also signposting information 
to the Energy Ombudsman”. In terms of information evaluation, one said that 
“it was made through a satisfaction survey” (C5). With regard to the sources 
of complaints, both detailed that most related to: 1) pricing information; 2) 
clarity of bill; 3) problems arising from contract; 4) connection and alternation 
of supply; and 5) meter provision or exchange. 
 
In terms of information provision of social tariff relating to energy efficiency, 
the participant clarified that “we would tell them that there are social tariffs 
relative to energy efficiency available from your energy suppliers; consumers 
have to speak to them about whether they qualify for them or not” (C7), and 
added that “we may also suggest people contact Energy Saving Trust, which 
may be able to give them additional information”. 
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The above suggests that CD supported consumers with information, by 
making them aware that there might be choices for them and then by pointing 
them in the right direction about the best people to approach in order to 
support them in making an informed choice. This also helps to strengthen the 
interaction between consumers and the marketplace.  
 
Similarly, the CAB representative identified their work, whereby most 
customers were from the vulnerable groups, by stating that “when someone 
comes to the Bureau that there is a problem, for example with affording to pay 
for essential items like electricity, what the advisor do is look at their income 
and expenditure and see how much they are spending on each, the advisor 
would see if they are getting all the benefits that they might be entitled to; also 
advisor might look at the amount the person is spending on electricity and 
suggest that they might want to think about switching” (G4), and this was to 
help them reduce energy bills. However, he highlighted that most consumers 
did not know either their tariffs or their consumption, this leading to a difficulty 
in CAB’s routine work.  
 
Another effort made by the CAB in supporting consumers was with regard to 
arranging a special programme (a campaign) named ‘Energy Best Deal’, this 
aiming at delivering information and signposting people to obtain a better 
energy deal through switching supplier, with the same participant stated that 
“it is just trying to get people to understand how they can save money by 
switching, by looking at how they pay, checking they are on the best tariff, and 
thinking about energy efficiency” (G4). Another participant working for this 
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programme told the author that “the programme provides advantage for 
householders because it is providing (face-to-face) information” (G3), with her 
arguing that “there is a lot of ignorance out there, people do not know that 
they can switch their provider, they do not know if they are allowed to, how it 
happen, if it will be expensive, if they need to change their electricity meter”, 
and she noted that, by conducting the programme (in sessions), “I found them 
very useful, because people do say they are going to make a change”. 
Additionally, both agreed that billing information containing a summary of 
energy usage and its cost was important and key information for all 
consumers for their market participation.  
 
The above reflection relates to the important role of CAB in delivering 
essential face-to-face information to consumers, particularly for vulnerable 
groups. This organisation clearly helps to create better communication and 
better interaction between consumers and the market. 
 
Another organisation taking part in the study was the Energy Saving Trust 
(EST), which is responsible for providing energy efficiency information to 
consumers. Most services were available for those considered vulnerable, 
and this reflects how consumer bills and fuel poverty can be reduced in this 
era of liberalisation. The EST representative highlighted that all necessary 
information for consumers was available in the website, highlighting: 1) 
energy efficiency; and 2) renewable energy, as well as providing information 
via an advice line, allowing people to discuss all options available. The main 
information they provide is maintained on their ‘Grant Information Database’, 
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which was developed and updated by energy suppliers. With regard to 
provision of information, he explained that “we would ask a series of question 
to find out what type of property the person lived in, what type of energy 
efficiency they already have and try to identify what it is most useful for that 
person; then we use our database to find out whether there are any offers 
which matches that need and then we will provide them with information or 
put them in touch directly (with the suppliers)”. He explained that, according to 
CERT, suppliers have to make savings in the amount of CO2 emitted by 
householders, with energy suppliers meeting the target by promoting energy 
efficiency to householders. It can be seen, for example, with a certain energy 
tariff offered by SSE, cash credit will be given to customers who manage to 
achieve a 10% reduction in energy usage plus another cash credit will bill 
given for arranging loft insulation or cavity wall insulation.  
 
Discussion 
From the above discussions, it can be seen that Ofgem and CF played a 
significant part in supporting consumers with information in order for them to 
benefit from the market system. This information was developed in two ways: 
1) providing guidance information directly for consumers regarding how to 
participate with the market through websites and other channels, such as 
factsheets and leaflets; and 2) generating regulation and related codes of 
practice to enforce suppliers to produce adequate, fair and good information 
for consumers. Other related organisations such as CD, CAB and EST also 
played a significant role in giving impartial advice directly to consumers, 
making them aware of the choices available, in order for them to take 
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advantage of the energy system. This, mostly, was made available through 
advice lines and face-to-face advice.  
 
Figure 5.1(d) below shows the scenario of information provision in the retail 
energy market, where several organisations were related and were acting to 
support consumers with the necessary information. It also reflects that Ofgem 
has the direct authority to take action to tackle the problem. 
 
Figure 5.1(d): Information provision by Ofgem, Consumer body, and others 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dotted line = use the authority to ensure that suppliers disseminate sufficient necessary information to consumers 
Solid line = provide guidance information directly to consumers with regard to market participation and benefits 
Thick black line = information provided by suppliers to consumers 
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Energy comparison sites connect to consumers through the Internet, offering 
them price/tariff comparison information. The companies’ roles are to: 1) help 
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through them. However, they are required to comply with the Confidence 
Code generated by CF.  
 
Seven energy comparison companies took part in this study, sharing their 
experiences in delivering information to consumers. They include: Which?, 
uSwitch.com, energyhelpline.com (firsthelpline.com), UK Power Limited, 
iammoving.com, SimplySwitch, and The Energy Shop. All were asked to 
identify the extent to which information was used by consumers in the retail 
electricity system, and how the companies provide information to consumers 
in order for them to be able to participate with the market and to switch to a 
better deal. In addition, they were asked to provide details of the information 
consumers want to know and how it should be supplied to them.  
 
Most participants highlighted that most UK householders already used 
information to participate with the market, except vulnerable groups, and half 
of this active population used price comparison sites for energy. In addition, 
all indicated that consumers who used their websites looked for the cheapest 
deal to switch to because energy was all about price. 
 
With regard to the key information which consumers want to know, 
participants commented that it was the amount of money they will have to 
spend on their energy. For example, one stated that “what customers care 
about is how much their energy is going to cost them” (CS3). Similarly, 
another highlighted that “the main thing consumers want to know is the total 
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cost that each supplier will charge for the same amount of gas or electricity” 
(CS6).  
 
Nonetheless, most participants argued that, in the retail energy market, 
information confusion arose from the fact that there are many cheapest tariffs 
available across the country depending on a variety of issues, including: cost; 
region; payment type; regular amount of energy usage; meter with daily 
standing charge; meter with a higher and a lower tariff; and other special 
premiums. Many participants also expressed that this confusion significantly 
related to rates and calculation, and arguing that this reflected the roles of 
energy comparison sites in that they are in the retail market to help 
consumers easily engage with the market by aggregating all the energy deals 
and displaying them in one comparison table for consumers to be able to 
make the decision to switch.  
 
Participants highlighted details consumers need to provide when entering 
energy comparison sites, including: 1) details of the supplier that the customer 
was with; 2) the name of the customer’s tariff; 3) energy usage; 4) how much 
the customer spends; and 5) postcode, these details requiring just a few 
minutes to search through the system and customers then receiving a result 
table comparing the deal they currently have with all other suppliers’ deals. 
This is critical as millions of consumers do not know their energy usage and 
that limits the role of energy comparison sites in supporting their market 
participation.  
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Throughout the interviews, most participants agreed that price/tariff 
information was too complex and ultimately put consumers off the market. 
However, one disagreed and raised an important issue by stating that 
“complexity is not deterrent, what determines whether people are willing to 
switch or not after entering the comparison service is the available amount of 
savings” (CS3). Similarly, another gave an example of a situation, where 
consumers entered their website and left without switching because of saving 
amount, stating that “a lot of people visit our site and then the vast majority go 
away” (CS6). These findings are coherent with the argument discussed in 
Chapter 4 with regard to the internal issue of switching energy suppliers 
where consumers did not see enough benefits from doing so. This reflects 
their critical attitudes relating to trust and confidence. 
 
Discussion 
From the above, it is evident that energy comparison sites play an important 
role in delivering impartial and useful information to consumers. The lowest 
energy price with the highest saving was the key product highlighted in the 
comparison table and used by these companies to inspire switching. This 
helps people to better interact with the market for their self-interest.  
 
Previously, it was understood that the issue of information during the post-
2003 period, including between 2003 and 2010, was significantly related to 
the complexity and a large number of energy tariffs. However, throughout the 
interviews with these companies, it seems that energy comparison sites work 
effectively, by helping consumers to save a lot of time in participating with the 
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market if consumers know their exact energy consumption. In other words, 
these energy comparison websites help to mitigate the degree of complexity 
relative to asymmetric information in the retail energy market. However, in 
order to access these energy comparison sites, consumers needed access to 
the Internet; in fact, millions of consumers cannot access the Internet, 
particularly vulnerable groups, and millions of non-vulnerable consumers 
usually switch suppliers via sales agents; for these reasons, confusion clearly 
remains. It is worth noting here that a lot of benefits are being offered online 
and are being missed by these people. 
 
Another major concern highlighted above is that many people using 
comparison websites decided not to participate with the market, because the 
prices being offered were no better between suppliers and the savings on 
offered made switching not worthwhile. Again, this reflects the relation 
between the fact that savings have not been great enough for buyers to 
switch and the fact that electricity prices have increased sharply since 2003 
(see Chapter 4). A sharp electricity price rise has an impact on market 
participation decisions by consumers, and vice versa. This reflects that Ofgem 
not only needs to ensure simplicity and transparency of price information but 
also a free price manipulation and a fair deal. 
 
5.2 Improvement in regulatory regime relating to information 
The stakeholder interviews in Section 5.1 highlighted that the issue of 
information mainly related to: 1) a wide range of energy products resulting in 
confusion with more than 5,000 tariffs being available in the UK retail market; 
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and 2) a high- energy price setting (price manipulation), causing high-
electricity price information, whereby price conveys information, consumers 
using this information to decide whether they want to participate with the 
market or leave. What became the case was that consumers did not see a 
significant amount of savings in their market participation. These two 
concerns negatively affected consumer decision making, their confidence and 
trust, leading them not to make informed choices and not to benefit from the 
liberalised market. Regulation was suggested to be a sustainable solution in 
order to protect electricity consumers. 
 
Many participants argued that it was important to use regulation to answer the 
electric energy issue; one clarifying that “the supply of energy is not like any 
other product, it is an essential product and there is constant demand” (J2). 
Similarly, one highlighted that “with other commodities consumers can tolerate 
market failure; if electricity market fails then the system collapses instantly” 
(S5). In relation to this, another emphasised the need to have the right use of 
regulation to answer the energy issue, and explaining that “the issue of 
whether we need regulation is related to how competitive the market is right 
now”. These statements clearly support the need to have improved regulation 
and its enforcement in the current energy market where a significant reduction 
in competition has emerged and critically affecting the interests of consumers 
(see Chapter 4).  
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It is important to now examine the interview findings and to analyse how 
regulation (licence conditions) can be improved, in order to answer the issue 
of price/tariff information.  
 
5.2.1 Regulation in response to a wide range of energy tariffs 
The wide range of energy tariffs has clearly created substantial confusion and 
disadvantaged the interaction between households and the market. As 
mentioned earlier, consumers were not confident in taking advantage of the 
market: some avoided taking the risk by not participating with the market, and 
some unfortunately purchased a bad product or an expensive electricity deal. 
In consequence, not only the market became less competitive and inefficient, 
but also exacerbating other issues, such as fuel poverty. Clearly, the analysis 
framework highlights the value of government intervention through an 
introduction of regulation in response to this issue.  
 
Participants were asked to identify what method should be used by Ofgem in 
response to the issue, in order to improve the market and to increase the 
benefits received by consumers. More than half of the participants suggested 
improving the interaction between consumers and the market (the competition 
unit) as well as suppliers through regulatory information, such as billing 
information. Other suggestions were varied. 
 
For example, one suggested to “work on increasing their interaction with the 
market, helping people to understand how pricing works and how to get a 
better deal; looking at barriers to switching and encouraging more people to 
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switch” (S3), with him concluding that it was important to have an appropriate 
method in making better use of the existing market element and an 
arrangement relative to information for better interaction. This reflects that 
regulatory information is a key element to help create the desired interaction 
between householders and the market.  
 
Similarly, one stated that “Ofgem needs to give consumers much better billing 
information about their energy and how much they spend”(CS4), and adding 
that “bills are very complicated and it is very difficult to work out what tariff you 
(consumers) are on and what price you are paying”. Equally, another stated 
that “better information is part of the solution so I think things like annual 
energy statements will help” (G4). 
 
In relation to the above, several participants suggested improving the billing 
format. For example, one suggested that Ofgem should improve by “more 
standardised language on bills so it is easy to educate and inform consumers; 
they are going to look the same or have the same type of information (basic 
standard)” (C2). Additionally, another argued about investigating billing 
details, asking Ofgem to examine how electricity is priced, stating that “what 
the authorities need to do is to change the way that electricity prices are 
displayed (on bill)” (J3), and added that “Ofgem needs to change the way 
people are charged to be by unit rather than kilowatt-hours because it is 
difficult for people to work out”. These all highlighted how regulatory 
information on energy bills may be improved in order to promote transparent 
information and maximise healthy interaction between consumers and the 
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market, in response to the issue where the availability of a large number of 
tariffs already destroyed competition.  
 
Alternatively, one indicated what Ofgem needed to work on regarding 
information on bill, stating that “consumers should be informed very clear how 
competitive that (current) tariff is compared to other tariffs offered by the 
company and also to the rest of the market” (J2). One suggested that 
“consumers should be able to tell from billing information more easily where 
their electricity is generated from, so they can make a properly informed 
choice about the tariffs on offer” (SS5). 
 
From the above, the notion of linking desired method to an improved energy 
bill was a common theme from many participants. Details relating to energy 
bills were discussed because confusion regarding bills still remains. According 
to the findings, regulatory information on bills should be developed to provide: 
1) name of the tariff; 2) energy consumption relative to the money consumers 
have spent; 3) other related information used for encouraging them to 
calculate and compare energy usage. Nonetheless, it is worth noting here 
that, actually, in theory (see Chapter 2), these practices are commonly 
highlighted, discussed, and imposed. The problem here is that the issue of 
information in the UK retail electricity market still remains these days.  
 
The above method regarding billing improvement might not be the only way to 
cope with all confusion; in other words, there might not be the need for Ofgem 
to create new licence condition for additional information on bills. Having said 
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that, billing information is necessary, helping people to understand what tariff 
they are on, as well as their energy usage and spending, but only improving 
this information may not help to resolve the confusion and trust issues. Any 
means to promote further transparency to support consumer confidence, 
allowing them to be less confused, would be advantageous. Regulatory 
information regarding billing, at present, should be developed towards the 
establishment of a basic standard/format. Information used within this 
standard should be for creating simplicity and transparency.  
 
In relation to the above discussion, many participants recommended that 
energy price comparison websites could effectively help to mitigate the 
confusion issue. However, several participants raised an issue with regard to 
the website and confidence and trust. For example, one said that “people do 
not always have the trust in them (energy comparison sites); they would 
rather do their homework or just stay where they think it is too much hassle (to 
deal with these websites)” (CS1). Thus, the same participant promoted the 
need to have more requirements in response to this issue, stating that “it is 
more a case of getting the Confidence Code out there that more people feel 
trust the comparison sites who are regulated to give the correct information”. 
Others agreed with this argument and also urged Ofgem to take more action 
on the Code of Confidence that protects consumers when comparing energy 
tariffs on websites. Therefore, improved regulation on this tool is important. 
 
According to the interview findings, use of price comparison websites is a 
practical way to cope with confusion arising from the diverse range of energy 
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tariffs and other related issues. It helps consumers face the least confusion 
because the system calculates every detail for them and shows them a 
comparison table. However, according to the interviews, the issue of trust was 
identified as a major difficulty with this method. Thus, it needs Ofgem and 
other related organisations to use their authority to clarify and campaign 
regarding the benefits and ease of use of these sites. For this reason, 
regulatory information should also be developed in association with provision 
of the Code of Confidence towards increased use of energy comparison sites 
for better interaction between consumers and the market. 
 
In terms of information for vulnerable groups, who usually do not have a bank 
account or access to the Internet but who switched when representatives from 
energy suppliers approached them directly or through the use of door to door 
salesman, all agreed that developed regulation was important for these 
people in order to eliminate confusion and misleading information. For 
example, one noted that this kind of code of practice is called ‘Energy Sure 
Code’ and is run by the Energy Retail Association to govern the behaviour of 
energy sales agents, for which the participant stated that “there does need to 
be some better regulation on that” (C4), and further arguing that “there is 
hardly any regulation on telephone sales too”, which also required Ofgem to 
take action. 
 
Alternative methods to increase interaction between those considered 
vulnerable and the market were also suggested. The participants, from the 
CAB, urged Ofgem to always support the energy programme, known as the 
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Energy Best Deal, in order to directly provide vulnerable groups with adequate 
necessary information for their market participation. For elderly people, one 
regarded the method Ofgem needed to focus on as “supporting 
communication process” (C6), in that could be made through communities, 
friends and families, to provide them with “up- to- date information” through a 
billing statement.  
 
From the above discussion relating to vulnerable groups, the interview 
findings show that there should be more licence conditions regarding better 
information for those considered vulnerable. First, Ofgem and other related 
organisations need to generate regulations to ensure that these people are 
protected from mis-selling, deception, scam, disguise and other 
misrepresenting information by sales agents. Second, regulatory information 
should be developed and used in order to deliver more energy information 
sessions to communities, whereby the authorities could connect to consumers 
directly by offering them face-to-face information. Third, up-to date billing 
information is also necessary for vulnerable groups.  
 
On the other hand, participants from the energy suppliers agreed that it 
important to support the interaction between consumers and the market. 
However, most argued that existing obligation regarding providing the 
necessary information for consumers was intense enough in the market 
system; therefore, opposing the high use of regulatory information and urging 
Ofgem to ensure that licence conditions would effectively deliver what 
consumers really want to see and what consumers want suppliers to provide. 
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Moreover, most considered current billing information was too confusing with 
too much information for consumers. For example, the Scottish Power 
representatives highlighted that all existing regulatory information was 
relatively intense for suppliers and consumers, and commented that “people 
are wanting bills that are relatively straightforward and simple; they do not 
want lots of paper” (SS11), with them suggesting to Ofgem that “it is always 
about simplicity and effectiveness that we really like to see in licence 
conditions”.  
 
Similarly, the SSE representative highlighted that there was a conflict in that 
the company had to provide the information on the bills but consumers 
thought that there was too much information and they did not understand, with 
her stating that “there is an awful lot of information on the bill that we are 
required to provide” (SS7) , and added that “our concern was that in providing 
all of information, which Ofgem asked us to do, consumers might not read all 
of the information; what consumers want to know is how much they owe the 
company’”. 
 
From suppliers’ perspectives, information on bills is now too much for 
consumers, and they will never read nor use all of the information. There is no 
basic standard/format for suppliers when providing billing information. It 
seems that all suppliers attempted to provide consumers with too much 
information without a practical format, which confused consumers. 
Accordingly, simplicity and transparency, towards the goal of effectiveness, 
where consumers could potentially use that information for better deals were 
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actually the notion needing to be focused on by Ofgem. For these reasons, 
regulatory information should be developed and used to ensure that billing 
standards are structured. 
 
Discussion 
An improvement in regulatory information and its enforcement is key, being 
the main response to the issue of information in the retail electricity market. A 
licence condition on improvement in billing information is required for 
structuring a billing standard/format to be used for providing simple and clear 
information to all UK householders. This is considered to be a constructive 
method in delivering fundamental details to consumers regarding their energy. 
In terms of the ways to be used for avoiding any confusion, arising from the 
amount of tariffs in the retail system; the two types of consumers need to be 
considered. For non-vulnerable people who can access the Internet and who 
are perhaps more able to benefit from the market regardless of payment 
method, using energy comparison sites could provide a solution for delivering 
the quality information. For this reason, a licence condition on improvement in 
practice and code is required, in order to increase consumer confidence and 
trust and to provide reassurance for consumers that all information on these 
sites is independent, impartial and comprehensive. Thus, as a result of 
empowering consumers to use information and to make informed choices, 
internal strength of the system, can be secured. 
 
For vulnerable groups, a licence condition is also needed to avoid confusion; 
at the same time, ensuring confidence and trust. First, regulation is required to 
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control sales agents’ behaviour; a heavy financial penalty for companies who 
breach the licence conditions regarding misleading information and deceptive 
guarantee should be introduced and imposed. Financial penalties could be 
much higher in order to demonstrate the importance of the offences. This 
would prevent detrimental outcomes as well as protect those who might 
otherwise be suffering from fuel poverty in the retail electricity market as a 
result of being plagued by problems of information (asymmetric information). 
Second, face-to-face energy sessions are meaningful and can be carried out 
in all communities, in order to inform consumers about how the market works 
and how to interact with the market. Figure 5.2 (a) lists the methods that were 
identified by participants for Ofgem to focus on and regulate. 
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Figure 5.2 (a): Methods suggested be used and regulated by the regulator in 
order to answer information confusion through increasing their interaction with 
the market 
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On the other hand, according to previous discussion in Section 5.1.1, it can be 
seen that small energy companies have used an impressive strategy for 
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As a result, these companies received no complaints with regard to 
information confusion. Therefore, it is important that Ofgem considers 
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consumers and have a detrimental effect on information as well as the degree 
of competition.  
 
5.2.2 Regulation in response to a high- energy price setting 
The issue of high-energy price setting/information is associated with the fact 
that electricity prices have been increasing sharply since 2003, including the 
period under discussion between 2003 and 2010 (see Chapter 4). As 
consumers were informed by price and tariff information, therefore, this high 
price issue directly affected competition unit and market participation by 
consumers. People could not perceive enough saving or positive gain from 
interacting with the market and switching suppliers (see Section 5.1.3). One 
highlighted that “the gains from the market are going to get smaller and 
smaller” (C1), and arguing that “this is not real competition because we do not 
know what is going on with prices”, while another stating that consumers 
understood that “prices are very similar” (J2). This disadvantage arises from a 
market being plagued by the issue of price information relating to high-price 
setting, unfairness, market power, collusion and pricing inefficiency (internal 
factors). Clearly, the analysis framework highlights theories and related laws 
and legislations validating the value of government intervention through an 
introduction of regulation in tackling this issue. The goal is to ensure adequate 
consumer protection and to enhance equal opportunities for affordability for 
everyone in society. 
 
The issue of the provision of information relating to confusion over switching 
suppliers and its solution have been discussed above. However, it is now 
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important to investigate what should be done to resolve other unfavourable 
internal issues since these lead to high-energy price setting/information and, 
in consequence, diminish the interact between consumers and the market. 
 
Previously in Chapter 4, other unfavourable internal factors/issues relating to 
high-energy price setting were discussed, including: 1) a number of 
inappropriate mergers relating to market power, price lifting and tacit 
collusion; 2) the social energy tariff scheme relating to social cost being 
passed on to consumers; and 3) Ofgem’s failure, these factors all being 
considered important and requiring regulatory solution to be implemented that 
helps to sustain a fair price information for householders.  
 
Participants were asked to identify what method should be used by Ofgem 
and the government in order to address the problems as well as to improve 
the market and increase benefits for consumers. Many of them stressed that 
sensible use of regulation and enforcing Ofgem’s authorities were necessary, 
in order to resolve these issues. The notion of linking solution to use of 
regulation was identified in various ways below. 
 
1) Inappropriate mergers, market power, and collusion  
With regard to the issue of there being a high-energy price setting as a result 
of inappropriate mergers, market power and other related issues, this relating 
to only a small number of firms existing in the marketplace, several 
participants underlined the need to have more companies entering the 
market, and urged Ofgem to use their power through regulation to advocate 
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this. For example, one expressed that “it is very difficult for new companies to 
enter this retail market. Over the last four years there probably were three or 
four companies that tried and failed” (CS3). One asked Ofgem and the 
government to encourage “investment” (SS3), and one recommended that 
Ofgem look at “barriers to entry” (S3) so as to ensure better competition and 
flexible market. Another commented that “if we had companies able to come 
in to this market easily, even if they did not come in but they were able to 
come in, then the Big Six companies would be less comfortable because they 
would feel they were threatened by entrants” (S6). This reflects a scenario, 
where the existence of a small number of energy companies in the market 
was unlikely to be temporary; at the same time, entry and exit was neither 
effortless nor costless. What the contestable theory suggests, therefore, 
cannot be applied to judge market performance in this regard (see Chapter 2).  
The participants clearly raised such issue of critically long-term market power, 
and a market not being able to best perform under this all-encompassing 
power, this leading to excessive price manipulation. This again justifies the 
need to use regulation to support and secure internal strength, such as the 
effective power of consumers, as well as to decrease weaknesses, such as 
unfair price/tariff information (see Stiglitz’s argument). 
 
In relation to the above situation, one recommended Ofgem to “refer it 
(inflexible market relative to competition problem) to the CC (called 
Competition Commission referral)” (C1), with him clarifying that this should 
help to investigate whether there was anti- competitive practice in relation to 
market power and price manipulation in the retail market, and to accurately 
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identify the issue. In consequence, this approach allows the system to be 
examined, as well as provide a solution with regard to high-energy price 
setting relative to inappropriate mergers. At the same time, the degree of 
competition and the power of consumers can be maximised  
 
2) Social tariff scheme 
Previously, in Chapter 4, the issue of the provision of a social tariff for 
vulnerable people led to a critical situation, whereby suppliers passed on huge 
costs from non-market objectives to consumers. Several participants argued 
in favour of direct subsidies or a benefit system relating to social obligation. 
For example, one stated that he was not convinced that implementing a non-
market objective such as a social tariff scheme on a mandatory basis for all 
suppliers, as well as making them pay for this, was the best way to tackle the 
social issue. He went on to say that “what you have with social tariffs is one 
set of customers paying for a benefits to be given to a different set of 
customers” (G4), and urged Ofgem and the government to “tax this through 
the tax and benefit system” as a means to sustainably answer the problem of 
fuel poverty. The notion of linking a sustainable way to address social 
obligation to direct subsidies was a common theme for these participants. 
This approach helps to avoid high energy bills for non-vulnerable consumers 
who, as well being affected by the global financial crisis, are at risk of falling 
into fuel poverty. 
 
Many participants felt that supporting people with money (higher income) 
could help to tackle the symptom of fuel poverty, while the social tariff was 
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recently found relatively ineffective in tackling fuel poverty and provided little 
value to those considered vulnerable. For example, one suggested that “if you 
(the government) want to help poor people you (the government) should give 
poor people more money by giving them more income” (S6). Another argued 
that that “if consumers have a higher minimum wage, that means that people 
can afford to buy their energy” (SS4). Clearly, these participants focused on 
using a method to help vulnerable groups have sufficient money to pay 
expensive electricity bills. This approach is important; not only because it is a 
solution for the poor, but because it also ensures fair energy prices for other 
households.  
 
There was also a notable exception among participant, with regard to 
methods to resolve the effect of high-energy price setting. One recommended 
that “ there should  be an extent where price can be set so we have a limit of 
what they are actually earning; so if companies are earning over a certain 
amount then they should give some of it back to their customers” (CS1). 
Similarly, one also suggested that “there should be proper returns; people are 
already paying for it and they need to have returns on that” (C1). 
 
The above interview findings all reflect similar discussions relating to 
advocating the government to be responsible for social obligation and energy 
poverty. This approach helps to provide sustainable protection for vulnerable 
groups, at the same time helping to ensure fair energy price information for 
other households. 
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3) Ofgem’s failure 
Previously in Chapter 4, Ofgem’s failure (poor performance) was examined, 
using empirical evidence to identify their performance relative to the issues. 
This related to energy prices during the critical post-2003 period, including 
between 2003 and 2010. It can be seen that their failure related to poor 
internal strength and increased weakness. The Ofgem Probe into electricity 
supply market was launched in 2008, this also implying that Ofgem had 
admitted that they had failed to regulate the retail market. Additionally, the 
issue of Ofgem’s failure partly relates to the argument on regulatory capture. 
For these reasons, it is now important to examine how regulation can be 
changed and what the regulator can do to ensure economic and consumer 
interests. 
 
One of most significant issues highlighted by most interviewees was with 
regard to the link between retail prices for consumers and wholesale prices. 
This relationship has recently been debated, in particular with regard to 
electric energy. A hedge contract was in place, whereby energy was bought in 
advance at least six to twenty-four months beforehand. Unfortunately, final 
prices for consumers were not linked with prices in the market when the 
contract was being arranged. As a result, electricity prices have been 
increasing and, therefore, the role of Ofgem was questioned. In relation to 
this, one suggested that “Ofgem should have greater power to act against 
companies which fail to lower their prices in line with falls in wholesale prices” 
(J2). Another commented that “Ofgem needs to have teeth and needs to be 
strong enough to be able to impose penalties to force suppliers to do things” 
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(CS5), with him giving an example that “in 2008 when prices went up by 50%, 
this is the underlying process, the consumer prices went up by 55%, so the 
price rise of the raw material was matched by the price rise to the customer 
on the way up, but on the way down it has not”. Similarly, one mentioned that 
“it is quite easy for the companies to make sure that it does not appear that 
they are making very large profits from their retail electricity business” (S5), 
adding that “if Ofgem was being as tough as they should be then they would 
have tried harder to make sure that they had enough information to check 
whether the companies were making excessive profits”. One argued for 
Ofgem to act on “transparency” (G1), in order to resolve the issue.  
 
The notion of a good regulator using their authority in response to the 
problems, where necessary, was also an important theme throughout the 
interviews. According to Stiglitz, inadequate regulation would affect economic 
and consumer interests; thus, Ofgem’s power, in addition to the use of 
adequate regulation, would allow the market to perform successfully.  
 
In addition, alternatively, the participant felt that the fine (financial penalty) that 
suppliers have faced “is very weak” (CS5); for this reason, he thought that 
Ofgem should exercise their power by increasing penalties worth “X million 
pounds”, while one urged that “Ofgem needs to stop assuming consumers 
can switch to get better deal with a big saving amount and get themselves out 
of it and they need to make the market as a whole work” (C1). Furthermore, 
participants advocated sufficient and effective market system monitoring in 
order to ensure a better performance from Ofgem. For example, one said that 
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“there needs to be a lot of monitoring going on to see actually how consumers 
are engaging in this market and what suppliers are doing, and to ensure that 
any consumer detriment is dealt with” (C4). Clearly, these participants were 
concerned about effective penalties, the value of switching supplier, and 
sufficient investigation and evaluation of the market by Ofgem. This can help 
to guide the regulator in what to regulate.  
 
Discussion 
As discussed, despite people receiving comprehensive information and 
understanding how the market works, they may leave the market without 
making an informed choice due to prices being high and savings being low. 
Therefore, regulation is required in order to resolve the source of high price 
information relating to high-electricity price setting in the UK  
 
In terms of market power occurring as a result of inappropriate mergers, one 
source of high-price setting, regulation is needed to advocate sufficient market 
entry, since the interview findings implies long-term market power from just a 
few energy companies: the ‘Big Six’. Clearly, the market is not self-correcting 
in this regard. According to Stiglitz and the theoretical framework, intervention 
needs to take place in order to maximise competition against this long-term 
market power. In addition, Competition Commission referral is required for 
market investigation in order to address the issue relating to inappropriate 
mergers. Failing to refer market investigation to the CC resulted in Ofgem 
being strongly criticised as being captured by the interest of energy 
companies.  
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In terms of social cost being passed on to consumers, this being a significant 
issue relating to high-electricity price setting, all companies have to survive by 
the use of cross subsidies, although this is prohibited, but there is no way to 
investigate their financial accounts. However, regulation may not be the best 
solution. Having said that, because of the social tariff scheme provided by 
suppliers it is inevitable that non-vulnerable consumers would pay more to 
support the poor; otherwise energy companies to soon leave the market. This 
means competition is ended; in other words, there is no room for energy 
companies to remain because they cannot stay profitably. Some suggested 
supporting social obligation through the taxation system or ensuring their 
higher incomes (the government needs to give people money). It is worth 
highlighting here that this would lead to the same result, by taxing people to 
give them more incomes or allowing taxpayers to pay for this social cost. That 
is to say that it would be difficult for non-vulnerable people, particularly in the 
current economic climate.  
 
Additionally, some suggested considering mandating the energy companies 
returning profits to support social obligation and vulnerable groups. This is 
also seen as giving the same result as providing the social tariff, meaning that 
the problem will remain. In addition to this, according to the theory (see 
Chapter 2: Roberts et al.), there are three methods that can be used to 
resolve this issue, including: 1) government intervention through social policy, 
not energy policy; 2) taxation; and 3) a cross subsidy. Having said that, it is 
important that government intervention takes place so as to deal with the 
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issue; this can be determined through social benefit system and is therefore 
beyond the scope of this research. Future study may be meaningful.  
 
In terms of Ofgem’s failure giving an impact on pricing, this is a critical 
weakness of the system that needs to be immediately resolved. Strengthening 
Ofgem’s role can help to increase strength, and at the same time reduce the 
weakness. Ofgem needs to improve regulation in order to support further 
market entry and addressing market power arising as a result of inappropriate 
mergers. In the case that there needs to be extensive investigation, Ofgem 
needs to refer market investigation to the CC. Ofgem themselves should 
focus on better monitoring of the market and implementing remedies in order 
to ensure better market function as well as price efficiency. With regard to 
social obligation, the government should carry out all the process to meet the 
social goals; not Ofgem. 
 
5.2.3 Improvement in the regulatory regime in the light of 
consumer interest 
The study sought to analyse an improvement in the regulatory regime in the 
UK retail electricity market needed to be applied within the system so as to 
ensure an increased level of consumer benefits. The interview findings below 
show what stakeholders thought could be a potential way to improve 
regulatory regime. However, the results did vary. 
 
Participants were asked to identify to what extent they think the regulatory 
regime in the UK retail electricity market needs to be reformed and to suggest 
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possible alternative approaches. Half of the participants offer various 
approaches. Some thought that it was not necessary for it to be reformed, 
while some felt uncomfortable to suggest it and refused to do so. Many were 
opposed to more regulation (intervention), while others were firmly in favour. 
 
Many thought that regulation in a poorly functioning market, such as the 
electricity market, is acceptable towards achieving the social goal. For 
example, one thought that the regulatory regime of the electricity market 
needed to be improved for “the poor” (CS6). Similarly, one emphasised the 
relationship between an improved regulatory regime and the importance of 
ensuring adequate protection for vulnerable people, stating that “the regulator 
can help by looking into the fuel poverty people because the poor have 
difficulty in paying their bills” (CS6). Another thought that the market system 
was not actually delivering for consumers, particularly for those considered 
vulnerable. For that reason, he suggested that “we would like to see 
regulatory regime changed so that they primary focus is actually on marking 
sure the vulnerable groups do get a good deal and they are not taken 
advantage” (G4). Equally, one suggested the need to bring in “a consumer 
champion (to be the regulator), somebody who looks at the whole market from 
a consumer’s perspective rather than from the industry’s perspective or to 
take a more consumer focused role” (J3), with him further stating that “the 
government also need to give Ofgem some serious powers to make sure that 
the suppliers are playing fair with the consumers”. In addition to this, one 
valued “greater transparency in the energy market” as a key theme to help 
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delivering benefits to consumers (G1), and highlighting that “this could be 
achieved through an improved regulation”. 
 
In relation to the above, one recommended the regime having sufficient power 
to effect and influence in reality, stating that “what needs to happen is that the 
regulatory regime has to actually have physical power” (CS5). Another 
referred to the need to improve the regulatory regime as “it needs to think 
afresh about its priorities as well as keeping energy generation going; so it 
needs to impose much tougher oversight, control on the industry to ensure 
that it delivers a good deal because at the moment energy prices are too high 
because there is insufficient control exercised by Ofgem” (J2).  
 
On the other hand, one response of an improved regulatory regime suggested 
that what we need “is not a change in regulation but concentrate on good 
regulation” (C1), with him arguing that good regulation for the supply sector 
was about “protecting the consumers who cannot interrupt the market”. 
Additionally, he stressed about “getting Ofgem to use the power” to protect 
the poor. Similarly, one expressed that “I do not think adding more regulations 
would be the process; it would just be more a case of looking at what we have 
got (regulation)” (CS1), with him suggesting to make what we have more 
effective. 
 
A further response in favour of an improved regulatory regime argued that the 
system would inevitably soon face the period of moving back to applying price 
regulation, stating that “may be that we have to move back to regulation of 
 239
final price and not expect competition to deliver good benefits in the retail 
energy market” (S6). The same participant clarified that the government and 
Ofgem can “regulate it without it being nationalised”, with her stating this on 
the grounds that “the retail competition is too difficult in electricity market for 
householders, not for companies”. According to hers, there are many 
elements for competitive market that has been missing  
 
Another highly recommended withdrawing retail competition, explaining that 
“as it does not work, and the regulatory regime needs to be completely 
reformed (S5)”. He pointed out that Ofgem needs to “change the management 
and bring in people that are prepared to be much more interventionist and 
much tougher”, and arguing that Ofgem were too optimistic about how 
effective competition was going to be in the energy market. In addition, he 
stated that “now is the time to apply (appropriate) regulation because the 
belief in market in the public is not as strong as it has been as a result of 
financial crisis; people are now realising that regulation is there for a good 
reason and it needs to be serious and tough”, with him further highlighting that 
there was a lack of necessary regulation in the system. He suggested this for 
several reasons, his two major concerns being: 1) the issue of the 
unconstructive relationship between wholesale and retail markets, resulting in 
inefficient retail prices for households (high-energy price setting); and 2) the 
method of tackling fuel poverty through the liberalised market, to date, has not 
been successful and society is facing fuel poverty with death rate increasing 
three-fold since the law (regarding social tariff) was passed in 2002. In relation 
to the above suggestion, he additionally suggested that Ofgem and the 
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government should apply a new system with a single buyer, whereby there is 
one separate organisation/authority, whose responsibility is to purchase 
electricity from companies and later to sell this energy to all retail suppliers on 
the same terms, with this helping to maintain energy price in the retail system. 
 
One interesting view was that it is worth returning to nationalisation. A few 
participants thought that it was important to either return to regulated system 
or impose specific regulations, whereby the government can ensure how 
consumers are treated. For example, one stated that “to renationalise the 
industry with no more competition would help consumers” (C2), and clarifying 
that “there are lots and lots of problems ( in the energy market); Ofgem have 
gone some way in the probe to address some of remedies, but maybe more is 
required, which I think there is certainly more required for low income, 
vulnerable, disadvantaged people and people who have not engaged in the 
competitive market”.  
 
An alternative view suggested to particularly improve the regulatory regime for 
“encouraging more investment” (SS3). Additionally, one noticeably urged that 
the regulatory regime should be improved to support consumers to use less 
energy in order to obtain benefits for themselves ( to have cheaper bill) and 
also for environmental benefits, arguing that “this has not really been looked 
at by Ofgem” (CS3). 
 
The responses of opponents to an improvement in the regulatory regime were 
also varied. For example, one commented that “there is quite a bit of 
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regulatory pressure at the moment” (S4), further arguing that “if we move 
away from that (the current regime) to a regime where the government 
decides all the prices and maybe keeps the price low for social reasons, that 
is going to lead to more trouble”. Another highlighted that “I do not think that 
the regime should be reformed in any significant way” (S3); with him further 
arguing that, rather, the government needs to only focus on sustainable 
methods of energy generation as a primary concern. In addition to these 
arguments, all of the large suppliers were opposed to relating the solution to 
use of regulation. 
 
Nonetheless, one of regulatory bodies’ representatives considered three 
factors relating improved regulation. He explained that “it needs to be 
improved around the sort of protecting vulnerable consumers”, and went on to 
say that the others associating with “encouraging new entry as well as 
increasing liquidity in electricity market” (R2). In relation to this, the 
representatives from Project Discovery (run by Ofgem) valued the use of 
regulation relating to government intervention, as government impact and 
guidance influences the direction in which the energy system would have to 
develop in order to best deliver its objectives. However, the participant 
commented that in terms of consumer interests in this era “it has a number of 
aspects to them so obviously there is the costs that the consumers face but 
consumers also want to have a secure supply”, and indicated that “we 
(Ofgem) have to balance these things all of which are in the consumer 
interests to try and come up with the best mix” (R1). This implies that an 
improvement in the regulatory regime to benefit consumers was in their 
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policies. However, it has not yet been addressed since there are many 
important factors needing to be taken into account such as the issue of 
energy security. 
 
With regard to the need to improve the regulatory regime, participants’ 
responses fell into five categories: 1) required nationalisation; 2) agreed with 
strongly/supported; 3) advocacy for alternative approaches; 4) disagree; and 
5) no comment (and not sure), as shown in Figure 5.2 (b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*One interview recording was partly damaged. 
 
Discussion 
Interestingly, half of the participants supported using regulation as a way to 
respond to the recent problems (see Figure 5.2 (b)), although, suggestions 
were varied. This implies the significant value of an improvement in the 
regulatory regime in the UK retail electricity market. Obviously, the aspect of 
consumer interest was the major focus throughout the interview findings. The 
Figure 5.2 (b): Perspectives on the extent to which the regulatory regime needs to be 
improved 
 
 
                                                                                              
1 Consumer bodies          2 Scholars                       3 Consumer bodies      2 Scholars                1 Scholar 
 1 Journalist                     2 Journalists                     3 Suppliers                   4 Suppliers              3 Consumer bodies     
                                2 Government                  2 Comparison site                                          2 Government                      
                                        2 Comparison site           1 Regulatory body                                           2 Comparison sites                
                                                                                                                                                       5 Suppliers               
                                                                                                                                                        1 Regulatory body                     
                                                                                                                                                      
Required 
nationalisation 
Agreed with 
strongly/ 
supported 
Advocacy for 
alternative 
approaches 
Disagreed No comment 
(and not sure) 
 243
participants connected an improved regulatory regime (with a productive 
authority exercised by Ofgem) to the goal of ‘adequate consumer protection’, 
particularly for vulnerable groups, whereby this goal was identified in line with 
Stiglitz’s argument and national and international legislation. 
 
Clearly, transparency and the provision of sufficient necessary information 
were highlighted, these being suggested to be processed through an 
improved regulatory regime in the interests of consumers. Others supporting 
findings relating to bringing in a consumer champion and compelling Ofgem to 
use their authority and become more strict with suppliers reflect a lack of 
regulation enforcement and accommodating managements. According to the 
findings, Ofgem appears to have significant shortcomings in ensuring 
consumer interest. Therefore, specific regulation to enhance internal strength, 
especially with regard to the required information towards transparency and 
the effective means to enforce it by the regulator, as examined in Sections 
5.2.1 and 5.2.2, are required. Again, this also highlights that an effective and 
efficient regulator is the core part of a developed regulatory regime. 
 
In terms of the notion of bringing in a consumer champion to the system as a 
method to ensure the light of consumer interests and to resolve the fuel 
poverty issue, this was stressed in the interviews and it could be of use. 
However, it is worth noting here that the regulator’s job is to maintain 
competition in the marketplace and to ensure that consumer interests are 
protected by efficient operation of the market. Ofgem deserves to be criticised 
if the intensity of competition is low and affects pricing. Equally, if the interest 
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of consumers was distorted by, for example, poor internal strength and 
weakness, such as poor information, occurring as a result of inappropriate 
practice by suppliers and of the failure to interact with the market by 
consumers, then, Ofgem needs to be investigated and deserves to be 
blamed. Unfortunately, the requirement with regard to the social issue is not 
their responsibility. Ofgem’s authorities would neither relate to providing them 
with financial support nor mandating suppliers to provide free services, but 
helping to mitigate the effects of: 1) a large number of tariffs, which resulted in 
asymmetric information and adverse selection; and 2) high energy costs, as 
well as supporting better decision making in market participation. Other than 
these, Ofgem could also support administering all social schemes. 
 
Alternatively, some participants thought that it was important to return to 
nationalisation for better benefits for consumers. In fact, it is difficult to return 
to a regulated system at a time when the global financial crisis is such a 
threat. Some urged Ofgem to apply and impose the existing good regulations 
by implementing a practical means of enforcement relative to Ofgem’s duty 
and authority.  
 
In summary, in this era when there are many varying challenges occurring 
inside and outside the system, some issues have become more complex, and 
the market is not self correcting; for this reason, an improvement in the 
regulatory regime in relation to better and sufficient information clearly 
becomes meaningful for the interests of consumers. 
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5.2.4 Research findings: discussion and conclusions 
The stakeholder interviews explore the sources of the issue of information in 
the UK retail electricity market in Section 5.1, which relating to: 1) confusion 
and asymmetric information arising as a result of the existence of a large 
number of energy tariffs in the market; and 2) high-energy price setting 
occurring as a result of the influence of several factors. In relation to this, the 
interview findings identify methods to be used by Ofgem and related 
organisations in order to increase the degree of consumer benefits while 
securing the economic growth (see Section 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 5.2.3).  
 
With regard to the former issue, in Section 5.2.1, most participants referred to 
better billing information, which can be made through clearer presentation in 
the billing format, as a practical way to help mitigate information confusion for 
all consumers. Supporting consumers to use energy comparison websites 
was considered important throughout the interviews. The participants viewed 
this approach as a productive way of helping to facilitate householders to 
easily participate with the market without confusion. However, the participants 
also highlighted that the issues of confidence and trust still needed to be 
resolved. According to the interview findings, regulations and its enforcement 
relating to an improved standard billing format and the assurance of 
information provided by energy comparison websites are required; Ofgem 
needing to sufficiently exercise their authority towards these objectives, in 
order for consumers to be able to benefit from the retail market system.  
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In terms of vulnerable groups, the participants favoured three desirable 
methods to be implemented, with the aim of helping them take advantage of 
the market as well as ensuring their interests were protected. Better billing 
information with a clear format was again highlighted as a way to end their 
confusion, at the same time supporting them more in their interaction with the 
market. The participants also acknowledged the need to protect vulnerable 
groups from any anti-competitive behaviour from sales agents who deliver 
misleading and deceptive information. Finally, the participants identified face-
to-face information as a productive way to inform vulnerable groups about 
how the market works and how they can effectively participate with the 
market. In addition, regulation on an appropriate range of energy tariff in order 
to help mitigate confusion arising from the current large number of energy 
tariffs in the market would be very useful. However, this needs future study. 
 
With regard to the latter issue, in Section 5.2.2, participants’ perspectives on 
the method to be used, in order to address the issue of high prices as a result 
of high-energy price setting by suppliers, were varied. Interestingly, the 
participants related the methods suggested to different issues regarding high 
price information. The participants highlighted the need to create regulation in 
order to address the issue of market power arising from inappropriate 
mergers. In addition, Competitive Commission Referral was suggested. This 
means that Ofgem needs to improve the regulatory regime in relation to 
supporting more investment against market power and to support more 
market investigation under the CC’s power. The social obligation was also 
discussed, but most suggestions were outside Ofgem’s remit. Additionally, 
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according to the interview findings, the perceived weaknesses of Ofgem 
included failure: 1) to investigate market power relating to the unclear link 
between wholesale and retail prices that affect high- energy price setting; 2) to 
ensure competition relating to market entry; and 3) to implement sufficient 
monitoring on market performance and competitiveness relative to consumer 
benefits. Ofgem’s role was questioned throughout the interviews (see also 
Chapter 4). The interview discussion clearly shows that Ofgem did not 
exercise their authority adequately in order to ensure advantages for 
consumers; thus, Ofgem’s role needs to be improved as part of an improved 
regulatory regime. Moreover, if they had, they would have referred the market 
investigation to the CC and the long-term market power issue (with collusion) 
would not have existed. Having said that, clearly, Ofgem was captured by the 
interest of the industry; however, it is important to also carry out future study 
with regard to the responses by suppliers to Ofgem’s requirement in order to 
verify this argument.  
 
Finally, the participants’ perspective on the extent to which the regulatory 
regime in the UK retail electricity market needs to be improved/ reformed was 
identified in Section 5.2.3. Contrasting opinions over the issue were significant 
and they suggested a wide range of solutions for an improved regulatory 
regime, but half of the respondents decided to support improvements in light 
of consumer interest and adequate consumer protection in association with 
appropriate information and better interaction between consumers and the 
market. Clearly, suppliers were opposed to an improvement in regulation and 
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its enforcement, arguing there were too many regulations in the market, in 
particular relating to better information provision.  
 
Nonetheless, clearly, the above discussions all reflect the argument that it is 
now important to address a developed regulatory regime in the retail 
electricity market; this being completed the interests of consumers will be met. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, the results are discussed and compared for consistency with 
earlier research findings in Section 6.1. Section 6.2 provides the summary of 
conclusions, including the clear picture of how the research question can be 
answered. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 discuss future research and 
recommendations, respectively. 
 
6.1 Overall discussion 
The study clearly addressed the problem within the retail electricity market 
during the post-2003 period, including the studied period between 2003 and 
2010. This is similar to other earlier research conducted during the era of 
market orientation with regard to the source of pricing information. For 
example, many researchers have found market power to be the major source 
of the problem affecting service prices in the retail system (see Chapter 3, for 
example, Woo et al. 2003). Importantly, most researchers have shown that 
the interests of consumers in the UK retail energy market have not yet been 
met, and information regarding knowledge was found to relate strongly to 
disadvantages (Ipsos MORI 2008; Sioshansi 2006; Rowlands et al. 2004). 
This research findings, however, has added some details to earlier findings. 
First, price/tariff information is confusing because of the existence of a 
significant number of tariffs in the retail market arising as a result of product 
development by the energy companies. Second, confusion associated with 
the degree of asymmetric information between energy suppliers and
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householders has become the greatest weakness and exacerbating other 
related factors. Third, the findings of the research also show high price/tariff 
information relating to high price setting (market power) and minimal savings, 
resulting in people avoiding the retail market and benefits not being delivered 
to them.  
 
In terms of the original research question relating to knowledge gap, the 
question was formulated as ‘how the regulatory regime in the retail electricity 
market can be improved’. The findings were used to analyse this possible 
improvement, including an examination of Ofgem’s performance. In fact, the 
need to improve regulation and its enforcement in response to the interests of 
consumers was also highlighted in several earlier researches: for example, 
one found market power resulted in consumers receiving the least benefit 
from energy efficiency and the liberalised market system, causing pricing 
inefficiency; for this reason, support using regulation was strongly emphasised 
(see Chapter 3, for example, Brown 2001). On the other hand, many found 
Ofgem to be captured by the interests of the industries, arguing the need for 
further reform (see Chapter 3, for example, Newberry 2002; Tenenbaum 
1996; Anderson 1981).This research, however, can be compared to the 
above studies. The research has added many important details to earlier 
findings. First, the research chose to focus on an improvement in the 
regulatory regime of the UK retail electricity market, which differs from the 
earlier works. Second, the study originally looked at the link between the 
method to be used and the provision of poor pricing information. Third, a 
guarantee strategy used in response to asymmetric information and adverse 
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selection was evidenced in this study. However, this was found to be opposite 
to the theory (See Chapter 2).  
 
Fourth, the study focused on the link between the solution to be applied and 
the influence of both internal and external factors on the market, particularly 
the latter recently becoming a serious threat to the system with the market 
was not being self-correcting (see details in Chapter 4). The research also 
related these challenges to consumer interest and consumer safeguarding, 
including those considered vulnerable. Fifth, the research only focused on 
examining the current stage of the problem, indicating the most critical factor, 
price/tariff information relating to the perspective of asymmetric information, 
needing to be resolved, this calling for regulatory information and the 
appropriate means to enforce it. Finally, the research examined Ofgem’s 
performance, showing that Ofgem did not exercise their power adequately, 
partly because of their ‘culture’, keeping away from exercising too much 
power and making regulation temporary. In relation to this, the research also 
looked into Ofgem with regard to the argument relating to regulatory capture, 
providing empirical evidence that Ofgem failed to refer market investigation to 
the CC. Clearly, there have not been any previous studies relating to all these 
challenges taking place between 2003 and 2010 in the context of an 
improvement in the regulatory regime. 
 
In short, the above reflects the contribution to knowledge, where a knowledge 
gap in Chapters 2 and 3 or the original question formulated in Chapter 1 can 
now be addressed.  
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6.2 Summary of conclusions 
This section details summary of conclusions and some recommendations, 
aiming at providing a wider picture of how the research findings presented in 
Chapter 4 and 5 relate to the theoretical framework, the knowledge gap being 
examined in Chapter 2 and 3, and to the original research question in Chapter 
1.  
 
Chapter 1, Introduction, introduced the study with discussions around aspects 
of the current problem within the UK retail electricity market. This includes: 1) 
high electricity price; 2) a number of people falling in to fuel poverty; 3) more 
people dying as a result of cold-related illness; 4) market failure as a result of 
changes within and outside the market system; and 5) the impact of the issue 
of information on the degree of competition and on the interests of 
consumers. An application of regulation was highlighted as a way to resolve 
the problem. The research question was formulated as how the regulatory 
regime in the retail market system can be improved in order to answer the 
problem.  
 
In Chapter 2, Theoretical Framework, the analysis on the theoretical 
framework, the study shows that the emergence of internal and external 
factors has pressured the competition unit, affecting the interests of 
consumers; especially, the issue of market failure relating to pricing 
information. This included complicated, misleading, deceptive and unfair 
pricing information, with all being weaknesses and creating a significant 
reduction in competition. The need to apply appropriate regulation and best 
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enforcement in the market system, in order to address the problem, was 
strongly emphasised in many laws, concepts and theories, particularly in 
theory of Stiglitz. His looked at what needs to be done in the real world market 
where market power is not temporary and also information is far from perfect 
but severely complex. The goals are to maximise competition (facilitating the 
market to be more competitive) and to ensure that benefits can be sustainably 
delivered to consumers. His therefore is used to lead the theoretical 
framework of analysis in the study.  
 
In Chapter 3, Literature Review, related literature was examined to clarify the 
current stage of knowledge and identify the knowledge gaps associating with 
the research question. Previous studies showed that benefits of lower 
electricity prices have not yet been delivered to people but householders, 
including the poor, have been left with worse deals. Studies also showed that 
further investigation into the issue of pricing information is important as it has 
recently affected the degree of competition in the market system and the 
interests of consumers. Many studies found that regulation was necessary for 
protecting energy consumers but not yet has been addressed in response to 
the problem, particularly the issue of the provision of retail price/tariff 
information. It was therefore worth investigating how regulation can be 
improved in order to answer this issue. 
 
Chapter 4, A Historical Overview of the UK Electricity Sector, the chapter has 
shown that the UK retail electricity market has already had various changes in 
structure and regulatory policy and regulation but still has not been working 
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well. The problem took place as a result of the reduction in competition due to 
both internal and external factors. In consequence, electricity price rise have 
become a critical issue since 2003, including between 2003 and 2010. In the 
chapter, market power was found to be a long-term issue, interrupting market 
function, and seriously undermining energy price setting relating to pricing 
inefficiency (poor information). In addition, the issue of information confusion 
associated with: 1) asymmetric information between suppliers and consumers 
and 2) adverse selection in the retail market has been extreme and has 
affected retail electricity prices the most. It showed that consumer power has 
been affected; their interaction with the market and competition was poor and 
ineffective. Consumers’ confidence and trust issue was also found to relate to 
unproductive pricing information. In addition to this, confusion associated with 
‘asymmetric information’ and high price information allowed suppliers to keep 
vulnerable groups in fuel poverty. These all call for the regulator to take action 
to ensure that the interests of consumers are protected.  
 
Also, the chapter showed that EU Directives, national Acts, and competition 
policy provide the regulator with the authorities to create regulatory practices 
and to impose them in order to protect energy consumers, in particular the 
vulnerable, where necessary. Unfortunately, it revealed that Ofgem failure in 
using their authority has been part of the sources of electricity price rises. The 
regulator failed to create the necessary regulatory practices and to exercise 
its power adequately, this to some extent relating to their ‘culture’. A lack of 
tough regulation and its appropriate enforcement on suppliers, including a 
failure in referring market investigation to the CC, implies a closer relationship 
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between Ofgem and suppliers. It was a concern that Ofgem tended to be 
captured by the interests of energy companies.  
 
In Chapter 5, An Analysis of the Improvement of the Regulatory Regime 
Relative to Information, in order to resolve the issue of information confusion, 
Ofgem clearly needs to improve the regulatory regime in relation to the 
following : 1) to support transparent information through a better billing format; 
2) to ensure independently information on websites in order to help mitigate 
confidence and trust issues for those who can access the Internet; 3) to 
create tougher financial penalties for those who provide consumers with 
misleading information and deceptive guarantee; and 4) to advocate sufficient 
energy information sessions in order to deliver face-to-face information, with 
this again expected to mitigate their confidence and trust issues. In addition, 
there is the need to emphasis the effective means and tough action exercised 
by Ofgem. These all are aimed at ensuring an increased level of consumer 
benefits, especially the vulnerable groups. 
 
6.3 Future research 
Importantly, the methodology used in this research relating to referring 
information being the greatest weakness of the UK retail electricity market 
needs other related and stronger evidence to confirm this, and different 
approaches may be needed to better address this issue. Also, other 
approaches may be needed to gain greater insight with regard to how the 
regulatory regime relative to information can be improved. 
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In addition, this research has raised some important questions and has 
described limitations that still need further study before being answered. 
Some interview findings present a different view than that available from 
earlier research and it is worth developing further study. First, many 
participants thought that it was important that the relationship between 
wholesale and retail electricity prices was investigated. This is to identify how 
electrical energy can be priced fairly. Future research could help to develop a 
better understanding and to clarify this relationship. Second, many participant 
highlighted the need to apply government intervention in order to help protect 
vulnerable groups, because social tariffs were limited to funding. According to 
the findings, direct subsidies and direct financial support were argued to be 
helpful. Future research to clarify the opportunity for government intervention 
and its impact on the interests of non-vulnerable consumers will be 
meaningful. Third, many participants argued that Ofgem was too ‘closed’ to 
the energy companies. Further study to address this issue with more evidence 
should again be significant. Finally, future research to further relate the UK 
retail electricity market to the theory and concept of Stiglitz would create a 
wider picture of how consumer interest is linked to regulation. 
 
6.4 Recommendations 
The findings of this research highlight the issue of information confusion 
relating to ‘asymmetric information’ arising as a result of the existence of a 
large number of energy tariffs in the retail market. The author would like to 
make the following recommendations: 
257257 
• The regulator (Ofgem) should seek a better solution in order to 
minimise the number of tariffs in the market. 
• The regulatory should further investigate the energy tariffs provided by 
the small energy companies, which are simple and more transparent, 
and should create a tariff model for suppliers. 
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LIST OF APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Interviewees 
Telephone and personal interviews provided by  
1. Alex Brundrett 
SimplySwitch 
Energy Comparison Sites 
London 3 March 2010 2:00pm 
2. Andrew Hallet 
Senior Policy Advocate 
Consumer Focus 
London 16 March 2010 11:00am (Interview has been scheduled.) 
3. Ann Robinson 
Director of Consumer Policy  
uSwitch.com 
Comparison Sites 
London 8 June 2009 5:00pm 
4. Audrey Gallacher 
Head of Company Performance & Consumer Experience 
Consumer Focus 
London 10 June 2009 9:30am 
5. Ben Castle 
Strategy Manager 
Energy Saving Trust 
London 11 June 2010 3:00pm 
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6. Ben Woodside and Jamie Black 
Economists 
Ofgem 
London 7 May 2010 
7. Bill Bullen 
Director 
Utilita  
Supplier Sites 
London 22 February 2010 4.28pm 
8. Chris Harris 
Head of Retail Regulation 
RWE Npower 
Supplier Sites 
London 4 March 2010 2:00pm 
9. Dr Atipong Nuntaphun 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 
Public Utility Sites 
London 12 February 2009 10:00am 
10. Dr Fiona Cochrane 
Senior Policy Researcher/Policy Advisor 
Which? 
The UK’s Consumer Association 
London 13 November 2009 2:00pm 
11. Dr Garry Felgate 
Chief Executive 
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The Energy Retail Association 
London 3 March 2010 4:00pm 
12. Dr Richard Sills 
Ombudsman team 
Energy Ombudsman 
London 24 February 2010 2:00pm 
13. Dr. Sebastian Eyre 
Head of Energy Regulation  
EDF 
Supplier Sites 
London 17 May 2010 11:00am 
14. Edward Harris 
Economist 
Ofgem 
London 21 April 2010 2:45pm 
15. Florian Ritzmann 
Senior Business Development Director 
Iammoving.com 
Energy Comparison Sites 
London 26 February 2010 3:00pm 
16.  Hannah Mummery 
Senior Policy Advocate – Company Performance and Consumer Experience 
Consumer Focus 
London 24 February 2010 11:00am 
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17.  Ian Walls 
Green Energy (UK) Plc 
Supplier Sites 
London 16 February 2010 12:48pm 
18. Jessica Cracker 
Marketing Manager 
OVO Energy 
Supplier Sites 
London 8 March 2010 12:45pm 
19. Jo Thornhill 
Money Sector/Consumer Affair Correspondent 
Mail on Sunday/ Daily Mail 
London 24 February 2010 9.30am 
20.  Joe Malinowski 
TheEnergyShop.com 
Energy Comparison Sites 
London 5 March 2010 3:30pm 
21. Kate Hobson 
Quality Monitoring Officer 
Consumer Direct 
London 30 April 2010 8:46am 
22.  Katherine Marshall 
Regulation Manager 
Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE) 
Supplier Sites 
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London 6 May 2010 2:30pm 
23.  Maria Chappell 
LoCO2 Energy Ltd 
Supplier Sites 
London 29 March 2010 3:30pm 
24.  Mark Vickery 
Senior Marketing Manager 
Fundraising Innovation Ltd. 
Incorporating firsthelpline.com, energyhelpline.com and switchandgive.com 
Energy Comparison Sites 
London 20 November 2009 2:00pm 
25.  Martin Hickman 
Consumer Affair Correspondent 
The Independent 
London 19 February 2010 10:30am 
26. Michael Abrey-Bugg 
Energy Manager 
Age UK 
London 15 June 2010 10:00am 
27. Mike Cheshire 
PR Manager 
Ecotricity 
Supplier Sites 
London 2 March 2010 
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28.  Miles Brignall 
Money Sector/Consumer Affair Correspondent 
The Guardian Newspaper 
London 16 June 2009 11.00am 
29.  Phil Levermore 
Managing Director 
EBICo Ltd 
Supplier Sites 
London 9 March 2010 3:45pm  
30.  Professor Jon Stern 
Research Director 
The Centre for Competition and Regulation Policy 
City University 
London 9 March 2010 2:30pm 
31.  Professor Michael Pollitt 
Assistant Director of the ESRC Electricity Policy Research Group  
Executive Director of the Electricity Policy Research Group,  
University Senior Lecturer in Business Economics,  
Cambridge University 
Cambridge Judge Business School 
London 11 March 2010 2:00pm  
32.  Professor Stephen Littlechild 
Honorary Professor 
University of Birmingham  
Business School 
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London 15 March 2010 11:00am 
33.  Professor Steve Thomas 
Professor of Energy Studies 
University of Greenwich  
Business School 
London 12 March 2010  
34.  Professor Catherine Waddams Price 
Director of the ESRC Centre for Competition Policy 
London 17 March 2010 3:30pm 
35. Raymond Jack and Pamela Kelly 
Raymond Jack: Director, Energy Retail 
Pamela Kelly: Regulation and Compliance Manager 
Scottish Power 
Supplier Sites 
London 31 May 2010 3:30pm 
36.  Richard Eden 
Managing Director 
UK Power Limited 
Energy Comparison Sites 
London 25 February 2010 3:00pm 
37. Sophy Fearnley-Whittingstall 
Head of PR and Communication 
Good Energy 
London 2 March 2010 
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38. Susan Carr 
Financial Capability Trainer 
Hillingdon Citizens Advice 
London 26 May 2010 1:00pm 
39.  Tony Herbert 
Social Policy Officer 
Citizens Advice 
London 22 March 2010 
40.  Tom Ballard 
Consumer Voice Project Officer 
Consumer Direct 
London 4 May 2010 10:00am 
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Appendix 2 to Chapter 3 
Summary of other related studies relating to regulation of electricity sectors 
The author and years of 
publication 
Research topic Examined variables Method The findings 
Moore (1975) (before an era of 
liberalisation) 
The impact of the use of regulation 
on energy price reduction in the 
USA. 
The relationship between 
quantitative independent variables 
such as the percentage of investor-
owned electric utilities within the 
electricity sectors, and a dependent 
variable of average market electricity 
price. 
Statistical regression was used for 
verifying the research hypothesis. 
Regulation did not contribute to 
electricity price reduction. Instead, it 
shows that price will positively 
increase when applying regulation 
within the system. 
Woo et al. (2003) Why electricity market reform can 
simply fail to deliver better electricity 
service, including analysing the 
issues that may contribute to the 
adverse outcome.  
The way the wholesale market 
connected to various participants, 
using three criterions to give an 
evaluation: 1) the competitiveness of 
the market, looking at market entry 
barriers; 2) market function, looking 
at how the market enables market 
participants to make informed 
choices; and 3) the cost of electricity 
Case studies: UK, Norway, Alberta, 
and California. 
Market power has caused market 
failure and has been a main barrier 
against public benefits. The number 
of consumers engaged with market 
was inadequate. Also, market failed 
to low the prices close to the cost of 
production. 
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production, looking at electricity 
prices and marginal cost 
Sioshansi (2006) The experiences of electricity 
markets in the US and the UK. 
The overall view of electricity 
sectors, including the retail system, 
and analysing: 1) the cause of the 
shortcomings of the regulated 
system leading to the introduction of 
electricity sector reform; and 2) the 
remaining unresolved issues, as a 
result of these changes. 
Case studies: the US and the UK, 
using national statistics issued by 
various organisations such as 
Ofgem and NAO. 
The expectation with regard to 
private companies would do better to 
deliver energy services through a 
well competitive market to 
consumers has not yet been fulfilled. 
Only large consumers have 
benefited from the reformed energy 
system. Additionally, consumers are 
having difficulty comparing offered 
tariffs; market power was found to 
relate to this undesirable result. 
Anderson (2009) Electricity restructuring and the 
perspective of market failure. 
Each country’s history of reformation 
policy implementation, experiences, 
and results, focusing on: electricity 
prices relating to fuel poverty, a 
balance between market force and 
regulation, regulatory framework, the 
performance of the regulator. 
Case studies: reformed electricity 
sectors in the UK, Spain, Portugal, 
Germany, France, Australia, and the 
USA 
Large and small consumers were 
not satisfied with the new system in 
which governmental agencies failed 
and regulatory authorities failed to 
benefit and protect them. 
Householders had difficulty using 
information to switch suppliers, 
thereby lessening competition and 
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creating inefficient market. The 
regulatory regime was seen as 
disadvantage to the reformed energy 
sector because it could not prevent 
an uncompetitive situation from 
arising. Additionally, the regulator 
often focused on the interests of the 
industry and on economic issues. 
Moreover, market power became a 
critical issue arising from the 
collusive horizontal and vertical 
integration of larger firms, thereby 
accelerating price increases. The 
study proposed ending the energy 
sector reform. 
Rangel (2008) A creative intervention through 
competition policy by authorities and 
the regulator to prevent market 
power. 
Market power within the reformed 
electricity system where hydro 
power became dominant and was 
presented as the most reliable 
energy produced in the whole 
generation sector. The study looked 
at four main criteria: 1) very low 
Case studies: the UK, New Zealand, 
Canada, and Norway.  
Firms employed strategic allocations 
of energy output over time. This was 
because hydro generation was more 
flexible than thermal-based power 
generation. In addition, mergers 
created market power and limited 
competition. The study argued for 
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response to price changes by 
consumers; 2) generation capacity 
and transmission constraints; 3) 
limited scope of market entry; and 4) 
significant differences in energy 
production technology which limits 
generation substitution.   
more intervention by competition 
authorities and better strategies to 
increase competition. 
Littlechild (2009) Use of price regulation and its 
negative impact on the energy 
market system. 
Regulation and the way the regulator 
managed to deal with restructuring 
(replacing public ownership with 
private ownership) 
Case studies: reformed energy 
systems in Argentina, the UK, the 
USA, and Canada. 
There were alternative ways to deal 
with regulatory regime without using 
price regulation because it would 
impede development within the 
reformed energy market. The study 
proposed using many ways such as 
public hearings as a key way to deal 
with energy prices. 
Stern (2001) A comparative study with regard to 
the regulatory regimes and retail 
systems of electricity sectors. 
Pros and cons of each regime with 
regard to public interests. 
Case studies: the UK, the USA, and 
the EU member states. 
The role of the energy regulator is 
explicit and vital within reformed 
electricity sectors in European 
countries, not in the USA where the 
courts play a major role. 
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Newberry (2002) A comparative study of problems of 
liberalisations in reformed electricity 
sectors. 
The growing evidence of problems 
that affect allocation and distribution 
of resources. The study looked at 
three main areas: 1) competition in 
wholesale market; 2) adequacy and 
security of supply; and 3) the 
introduction of appropriate regulation 
by the regulator. 
Case studies of the USA and 
European countries. 
The regulation for generation and 
transmission networks required for 
mitigating market power and for 
supporting electricity liberalisation 
was less focused on in EU practice, 
in comparison with the US’s, 
reflecting the poor performances of 
the energy regulators. 
Coen and Thatcher (2001) Various aspects of utilities reform in 
Europe, including the UK. 
The study looked at the degree of 
change, such as the conflict in 
reform, and the development of the 
regulatory regime. 
Case studies of electricity and of 
telecommunications. 
EU level regulation has influenced 
national-level regulation and 
required national regulatory 
authorities to comply with toward the 
goal of an EU single market. 
However, this has courted significant 
controversy. 
Eberlein (2001) How economic regulation has been 
introduced and driven at EU level. 
The study looked at how European 
countries adjusted (convergence) 
regulatory policy and related process 
towards economic regulation at EU 
level 
Case studies of reformed electricity 
sectors in European countries, 
including the UK. 
The economic theory of regulation 
has failed due to the complexity of 
and differences in regulatory 
processes within the reformed power 
sectors of the EU Member States. 
Some countries in Europe are 
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struggling in modifying and applying 
this new economic regulation 
towards EU requirement. 
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